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Technical Specification

**Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI);
PAdES Baseline Profile**

Reference

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Foreword

This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI).

Introduction

TS 102 778-3 [1] (PAdES-3 henceforth) and TS 102 778-4 [9] (PAdES-4 henceforth) specify formats for Advanced Electronic Signatures built on PDF ISO-32000 [2]. That document defines a number of signed and unsigned optional signature properties, resulting in support for a number of variations in the signature contents and powerful processing requirements.

In order to maximise interoperability in communities applying PAdES to particular environments it is necessary to identify a common set of options that are appropriate to that environment. Such a selection is commonly called a profile.

The present document profiles TS 101 903 [11] signatures contexts where AdES signatures are used and in particular its use in the context of the "Directive 2006/123/EC [i.2] of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market" (EU Services Directive henceforth).

1 Scope

The present document defines a baseline profile for PAdES that provides the basic features necessary for a wide range of business and governmental use cases for electronic procedures and communications to be applicable to a wide range of communities when there is a clear need for interoperability of AdES signatures used in electronic documents to be interchanged across borders. In particular it takes into account eSignature needs in the context of the EU Services Directive [i.1].

The profile defines four different conformance levels addressing incremental requirements to maintain the validity of the signatures over the long term, in a way that all the requirements addressed at a certain level are always addressed also by the levels above. Each level requires the presence of certain PAdES attributes, suitably profiled for reducing the optionality as much as possible and referring to the forms that are specified in PAdES [1] and [9].

Clause 4 identifies the four conformance levels and shows how these levels might encompass the life cycle of the electronic signatures.

Clause 5 provides details on the way that the requirements will be presented throughout the present document.

Clause 6 profiles short-term related PAdES attributes.

Clause 7 profiles a PAdES signature for which a Trust Service Provider has generated a trusted token (time-mark or time-stamp token) proving that the signature itself actually existed at a certain date and time.

Clause 8 profiles long-term related PAdES attributes tackling the long term availability of the signature validation material.

Clause 9 profiles long-term related PAdES attributes tackling the long term availability and integrity of the signature validation material.

NOTE: The present document makes use of certain verbal forms (e.g. **may**, **shall**, **shall not** and **should**) as key words to signify requirements, conforming to ETSI Drafting Rules, clause 14a [i.7].

2 References

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at <http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference>.

NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

2.1 Normative references

The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.

- [1] ETSI TS 102 778-3: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PDF Advanced Electronic Signature Profiles; Part 3: PAdES Enhanced - PAdES-BES and PAdES-EPES Profiles".

NOTE: Available as ISO Standard or directly from Adobe's PDF Reference http://www.adobe.com/devnet/pdf/pdf_reference.html in especially part 1 clause 12.8 can be retrieved from http://www.adobe.com/content/dam/Adobe/en/devnet/acrobat/pdfs/PDF32000_2008.pdf.

- [2] ISO 32000:2008 (all parts): "Document management - Portable document format".

NOTE: Available at http://www.adobe.com/content/dam/Adobe/en/devnet/acrobat/pdfs/PDF32000_2008.pdf.

- [3] ETSI TS 101 733: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAAdES)".

NOTE: Available at http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/101700_101799/101733/.

- [4] IETF RFC 3852 (2004): "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)".

NOTE: Available at <http://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup/3852>.

- [5] IETF RFC 2634 (1999): "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME".

NOTE: Available at <http://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup/2634>.

- [6] IETF RFC 5035 (2007): "Enhanced Security Services (ESS) Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility".

NOTE: Available at <http://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup/5035>.

- [7] ETSI TS 102 176-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures; Part 1: Hash functions and asymmetric algorithms".

NOTE: Available at http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/102100_102199/10217601/.

- [8] ECRYPT II (European Network of Excellence in Cryptology II): "ECRYPT II Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes".

- [9] ETSI TS 102 778-4: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PDF Advanced Electronic Signature Profiles; Part 4: PAdES Long Term - PAdES LTV Profile".

NOTE: Available at http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/102700_102799/10277804/.

- [10] ETSI TS 103 173: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); CAAdES Baseline Profile".

NOTE: Available at http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103100_103199/103173/.

- [11] ETSI TS 101 903: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); XML Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAdES)".

2.2 Informative references

The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

- [i.1] Commission Decision 2011/130/EU of 25 February 2011; establishing minimum requirements for the cross-border processing of documents signed electronically by competent authorities under Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market (notified under document C(2011) 1081).
- [i.2] Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market.
- [i.3] Commission Decision 2009/767/EC of 16 October 2009 amended by CD 2010/425/EU of 28 July 2010 setting out measures facilitating the use of procedures by electronic means through the 'points of single contact' under Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market.
- [i.4] ETSI TS 102 231: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Provision of harmonized Trust-service status information".
- [i.5] ETSI TS 101 533-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Data Preservation Systems Security; Part 1: Requirements for Implementation and Management".
- [i.6] ETSI TS 102 640-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Registered Electronic Mail (REM); Part 1: Architecture".

[i.7] ETSI Drafting Rules (EDRs).

NOTE: Contained in the ETSI Directives: <http://portal.etsi.org/Directives/home.asp>.

3 Definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply:

generator: any party which creates, or adds attributes to, a signature

NOTE: This may be the signatory or any party that initially verifies or further maintains the signature.

protocol element: element of the protocol which may be including data elements and / or elements of procedure

service element: element of service that may be provided using one or more protocol elements

NOTE: All alternative protocol elements provide an equivalent service to the users of the protocol.

trust service provider: body operating one or more (electronic) Trust Services

NOTE: See [i.4].

verifier: entity that validates or verifies an electronic signature

3.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in PAdES-3 [1] and the following apply:

TSL Trust Status List

NOTE: See [i.4].

4 Conformance Levels

The present specification defines four conformance levels as indicated below.

Applications managing signatures conformant to requirements specified in clause 6 may claim **B-Level** (basic level) conformance.

Applications managing signatures conformant to **B-Level** and also conformant to requirements specified in clause 7 may claim **T-Level** (Trusted time for signature existence) conformance.

Applications managing signatures conformant to **T-Level** and also conformant to requirements specified in clause 8 of the present document may claim **LT-Level** (Long Term level) conformance.

Applications managing signatures conformant to **LT-Level** and also conformant to requirements specified in clause 9 of the present document may claim **LTA-Level** (Long Term with Archive time-stamps) conformance.

These conformance levels are defined for encompassing the life cycle of electronic signature, namely:

- a) B-Level profiles incorporation of signed and some unsigned properties when the signature is actually generated.

NOTE 1: It is considered that this level is sufficient to conform to the Commission Decision 2011/130/EU of 25 February 2011 [i.1].

- b) T-Level profiles the generation, for an existing signature, of a trusted token proving that the signature itself actually existed at a certain date and time.

- c) LT-Level profiles the incorporation of all the material required for validating the signature in the signature. This level is understood to tackle the long term availability of the validation material.
- d) LTA-Level profiles the incorporation of time-stamp tokens that allow validation of the signature long time after its generation. This level is understood to tackle the long term availability and integrity of the validation material.

NOTE 2: The levels b) to d) are appropriate where the technical validity of signature needs to be preserved for a period of time after signature creation where certificate expiration, revocation and/or algorithm obsolescence is of concern. The specific level applicable depends on the context and use case.

All conformance levels up to LTA use attributes defined in PAdES [1] and [9] and underlying specifications.

When signed data is exchanged between parties the sender **should** use at least signatures conforming to a level that allows the relying parties to trust the signature at the time the exchange takes place.

NOTE 3: Archiving or preservation of electronic signatures over long term requires in general conformance to LTA level. The use of LTA-level is considered an appropriate preservation and transmission technique for signed data. Conformance to lower level is sufficient when combined with appropriate additional protection techniques such as use of systems compliant to TS 101 533-1 [i.5].

NOTE 4: The assessment of the effectiveness of other preservation and transmission techniques for signed data are out of the scope of the present document. The reader is advised to consider legal instruments in force and related standards such as TS 101 533-1 [i.5] or TS 102 640-1 [i.6] to evaluate their appropriateness.

5 General requirements

5.1 Algorithm requirements

Generators are referred to applicable national laws regarding algorithms and key lengths.

Generators are also recommended to take into account the latest version of TS 102 176-1 [7] for guidelines purposes and the latest ECRYPT2 D.SPA.x [8] yearly report for further recommendations, when selecting algorithms and key lengths.

MD5 algorithm **shall not** be used as digest algorithm.

5.2 Compliance requirements

Profiles in the present document define requirements for generators of PAdES signatures [1] and [9].

A verifier **shall** be able to accept a signature containing any elements/properties conformant to PAdES [1] and [9], but this profile does not specify any processing requirement on such elements/properties present in the signature as it is meant to be used together with a specification describing processing during signature validation.

Requirements are grouped in four different categories, each one having its corresponding identifier. Table 1 defines these categories and their identifiers.

Table 1: Requirement categories

Identifier	Requirement on generator
M	Generator shall include the element in the signature.
O	Generator may include the element in the signature.

Optional elements defined in PAdES-3 [1] but not specified in the present document are treated as "O" as above.

Certain service elements **may** be provided by different protocol elements at user's choice. In these cases the semantics of M and O defined in the table above depend on the requirement for the service element itself. Tables 2 and 3 (each one applies to a different requirement on the service element) define these semantics.

Table 2: Requirements for mandatory service with choices

Requirement Identifier for the Service / Protocol element	Requirement on generator
Service = M	Generator shall provide the service by including one protocol element chosen from the list of choices.
Protocol Choice = O	Generator may use this protocol element for providing the mandatory service elements.

Table 3: Requirements for optional service with choices

Requirement Identifier for the Service / Protocol element	Requirement on generator
Service = O	Generator may provide the service by including one protocol element chosen from the list of choices.
Protocol Choice = O	If the generator decides to provide the service, then she may use this protocol element.

The present document shows new requirements for each service and protocol element in tabular form. Below follows the structure of the table.

Table 4: Requirements for optional service with choices

Service / Protocol element	Reference	Requirement on generator	Additional requirements / notes
Service:			
Choice 1			
Choice 2			

Column **Service / Protocol element** will identify the service element or protocol element the requirement applies to. Service elements that **may** be implemented by different protocol elements (i.e. users **may** make a choice on several protocol elements) build tables with more than one row.

Column **Reference** will reference the relevant clause of the standard where the element is first defined. The reference is to PAdES-3 [1], except where explicitly indicated otherwise.

Column **Requirement on generator** will contain an identifier of the requirement, as defined in table 1, bound to the corresponding protocol element for the generator.

Column **Notes / Additional requirements** will contain numbers referencing notes and/or letters referencing additional requirements. Both notes and additional requirements are listed below the table.

Profiles **may** be affected by applicable regulations; hence implementers **should** check any national regulation that **may** affect these profiles.

6 Requirements for B-Level Conformance

This clause defines requirements that PAdES signatures claiming conformance to the B-Level have to fulfil.

The current clause specifies compliance requirements for short-term electronic signatures. This clause actually profiles PAdES-BES (signatures that do not incorporate *signature-policy-identifier*) and PAdES-EPES (signatures that do incorporate *signature-policy-identifier*) signatures.

All attributes profiled by PAdES Part 3 [1] and specified in ISO 32000-1 [2] apply as stated in those specifications unless mentioned here otherwise. Also PAdES Part 3 states that "Requirements for handling PDF Signatures specified in ISO 32000-1, clause 12.8 apply except where overridden [...]". The following clauses will apply the same strategy.

NOTE 1: Given that PAdES signatures are enveloped inside a PDF document and are detached in the sense of a CMS signature, the signature placement is implied by PAdES-3 [1] and ISO 32000 [2]. In ISO 32000 [2], section 12.8.3.3.1 reads "No data shall be encapsulated in the PKCS#7 SignedData field.", no re-statement will be given here, however readers should be aware of the fact that subtle dependencies exist.

In consequence, the following PAdES properties are addressed directly in this clause:

`SignedData.certificates`, the `M` entry in the signature dictionary (provides a claimed signing time like CAdES [3], clauses 5.1 and 5.9.1), `signing-certificate`. Further `content-type`, `message-digest`, `signature-policy-identifier`, `signer-attributes`, `content-type`, `content-time-stamp` and the `Location` and `Reason` entries in the signature dictionary are inherently addressed.

NOTE 2: PAdES Part 3 [1] prohibits the use of the attributes `signing-time`, `counter-signature`, `content-reference`, `content-identifier`, `content-hints`, and `signer-location`. PAdES Part 3 [1] prohibits the use of the attribute `commitment-type-indication` for PAdES-BES and allows its use for PAdES-EPES.

6.1 Attributes defined in CMS Signature

6.1.1 Placements of the signing certificate

Table 5

Service / Protocol element	Reference	Generator requirement	Additional requirements / notes
<code>SignedData.certificates</code>	CMS [4], clause 5.1	M	a, b

Additional requirements:

- a) The generator **shall** include the signing certificate in the `SignedData.certificates` field.
- b) In order to facilitate path building, generators **should** include in the `SignedData.certificates` field all certificates not available to verifiers that can be used during path building. In the case of signature based on qualified certificates and whose verification is expected to be based on TSLs (in particular on Trusted Lists as defined in CD 2009/767/EC amended by CD 2010/425/EU [i.3]), the generator **should** include all intermediary certificates forming a chain between the signer certificate and a CA present in the TSL which are not available to verifiers.

NOTE 1: A certificate is considered available to the verifier if reliable information about its location is known and allows automated retrieval of the certificate (for instance through an Authority Info Access Extension or equivalent information present in a TSL).

NOTE 2: In the general case, different verifiers can have different trust parameters and can validate the signer certificate through different chains. Therefore, generators may not know which certificates will be relevant for path building. However, in practice, such certificates can often clearly be identified. In this case, it is advised that generators include them unless they can be automatically retrieved by verifiers. In the specific case of a signature meant to be validated through TSL, it is advised to include at least the unavailable intermediary certificates up to but not including the CAs present in the TSLs, since the TSL is information that is shared globally by all verifiers.

6.2 Attributes overridden in PAdES-3

6.2.1 Signing time

Table 6

Service / Protocol element	Reference	Generator requirement	Additional requirements / notes
Service: provide a claimed time of signing	[1], clause 4.5.3	M	a
M entry in the signature dictionary	ISO 32000-1 [2], clause 12.8.1	M	

Additional requirement:

- a) The generator **shall** include the claimed UTC time of the signature as expressed in [2], clause 7.9.4 as content of this element.

6.3 Attributes defined in ESS

6.3.1 Signing certificate

Table 7

Service / Protocol element	Reference	Generator Requirement	Additional requirements / notes
Service: protection of signing certificate		M	
ESS signing-certificate	ESS [5], clause 5.4	O	a, b
ESS signing-certificate v2	ESS [6], clause 4	O	a, b

Additional requirements:

- a) Generators **shall** use either the signing certificate or the signing-certificate v2 attribute, depending on the hash function using, in accordance with ESS [6], clause 2.
- b) Generators **should** migrate to the use of ESS signing-certificate v2 in preference to ESS signing-certificate in line with the guidance regarding limited lifetime for the use of SHA-1 given in clause 9.2 of TS 102 176-1 [7].

7 Requirements for T-Level Conformance

This clause defines those requirements that PAdES signatures conformant to B-Level, have to fulfil to also be conformant to T-Level. In consequence, PAdES signatures claiming conformance to the T-Level of the present profile **shall** be built on signatures conformant to the B-Level.

A PAdES signature conformant to T-Level **shall** be a signature conformant to B-Level for which a Trust Service Provider [i.4] has generated a trusted token (time-mark or time-stamp token) proving that the signature itself actually existed at a certain date and time.

- NOTE: PAdES signatures conformant to T-Level of the present specification are, in consequence PAdES-BES or EPES signatures suitably profiled as per the requirements defined in this clause.

7.1 Service as defined in CAdES

7.1.1 Trusted time for existence of the signature

Table 8 further profiles the provision of the trusted token that proves existence of the signature at a certain date and time. The provision of the `Service: trusted signing time` is profiled as in CAdES Baseline Profile [10] clause 7 extended by the option to provide a document-time-stamp in lieu of a `signature-time-stamp` attribute PAdES Part 3 [1], clause 4.5.2 or `time-mark`.

Table 8

Service / Protocol element	Reference	Generator Requirement	Additional requirements / notes
Service: trusted time for existence of the signature	[1], clause 4.5.2 [3], clause 4.4.1	M	
<code>signature-time-stamp</code> attribute	[1], clause 4.5.2 [3], clause 6.1 [3], clause 4.4.1	O	a, b, c, d
<code>time-mark</code>	[3], clause 4.4.1	O	e
<code>document-time-stamp</code>	[9], clause A.2	O	d

Additional requirements:

- a) The present profile recommends usage of time-stamps as attestation of the time for existence of the signature instead of time-marks.
- b) A PAdES signature claiming conformance to the T-Level **may** contain several `signature-time-stamp` attributes.
- c) The generator **shall** use DER encoding for any `signature-time-stamp`.
- d) The B-Level signatures as profiled in clause 6 shall reserve space for the `signature-time-stamp` attribute [1], clause 4.5.2, if it is anticipated to propagate them to a higher conformance level. Alternatively a `document-time-stamp` can serve this purpose, which covers the whole document including the signature value and **may** be applied before the DSS and DSS/VRI.
- e) If a time-mark is used, then no additional attribute is incorporated in the signature. It is the responsibility of the TSP generating the time-mark to provide the needed trust on the signature time.

8 Requirements for LT-Level Conformance

This clause defines those requirements that PAdES signatures conformant to T-Level, have to fulfil to also be conformant to LT-Level. In consequence, PAdES signatures claiming conformance to the LT- Level of the present profile **shall** be built on signatures conformant to the T- Level.

Hence implementations claiming conformance to the LT-Conformance Level build the PAdES-LTV form (PAdES Part 4 [9], clause 4) on signatures that **shall** be conformant to the T-Level requirements and to the present clause.

8.1 Profile of ISO 32000-1 LTV Extensions

8.1.1 Document Security Store

Table 9

Service / Protocol element	Reference	Generator requirement	Additional requirements / notes
Service: certificate and revocation values		M	
DSS	[9], clause A.1	M	a, b, c, d, e
DSS/VRI	[9], clause A.1	O	f

Additional requirements:

- a) The generator **shall** include the full set of certificates, including the trust anchor when it is available in the form of a certificate, that have been used to validate the signature and which are not already present. This set includes certificates required for validating the signing certificate, for validating any attribute certificate present in the signature, and for validating any time-stamp token's signing certificate (i.e. a TSA certificate) already incorporated to the signature.
- b) In situations different than those ones identified in clause 6.1.1 of the present document requirements a) and b): applications **should** include certificate values within the DSS.
- c) The present document recommends to avoid duplication of certificate values within the signature.
- d) The generator shall include the full set of revocation data (CRL or OCSP responses) that have been used in the validation of the signer, and CA certificates used in signature. This set includes all certificate status information required for validating the signing certificate, for validating any attribute certificate present in the signature, and for validating any time-stamp token's signing certificate (i.e. a TSA certificate) already incorporated to the signature.
- e) The generator **shall** use DER encoding for the certificate-values and the revocation-values.
- f) Although VRI is acceptable under this LT-Level, its use should be avoided to maximise interoperability.

9 Requirements for LTA-Level Conformance

This clause defines those requirements that PAdES signatures conformant to LT-Level, have to fulfil to also be conformant to LTA-Level. In consequence, PAdES signatures claiming conformance to the LTA-Level of the present profile **shall** be built on signatures conformant to the LT-Level.

A PAdES signature conformant to LTA-Level **shall** be a signature conformant to LT-Level to which one or more `document-time-stamp` has been incorporated.

NOTE: As stated in PAdES Part 4 [9], a LTA form may help to validate the signature beyond any event that may limit its validity.

Table 10

Service / Protocol element	Reference	Generator requirement	Additional requirements / notes
Service: trusted time for existence of the validation data	[10], clause 9 [3], clause 6.5	M	
<code>document-time-stamp</code>	[9], clause 4 [9], clause A.2	M	a, b, c, 1, 2

Additional requirements:

- a) Signatures conformant to LTA-level **may** have more than one `document-time-stamp` applied after the `DSS` and `DSS/VRT`.
- b) Before generating and incorporating a `document-time-stamp` attribute, applications claiming conformance to this profile, **shall** include all the validation material, which are not already in the signature, required for verifying the signature. This validation material includes all the certificates and all certificate status information (like CRLs or OCSP responses) required for:
 - validating the signing certificate;
 - validating any attribute certificate present in the signature; and
 - validating any time-stamp token's signing certificate (i.e. a TSA certificate) already incorporated to the signature (including, of course, any previous `document-time-stamp`).

This validation material **should** be incorporated within `DSS`.

History

Document history		
V1.1.1	September 2011	Publication
V2.1.1	March 2012	Publication
V2.2.1	October 2012	Publication
V2.2.2	April 2013	Publication