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Foreword

This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

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In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings:

shall indicates a mandatory requirement to do somethingshall not indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something

The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports.

The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document.

should indicates a recommendation to do something

should not indicates a recommendation not to do something

may indicates permission to do something

need not indicates permission not to do something

The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended.

can indicates that something is possiblecannot indicates that something is impossible

The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not".

will indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency

the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

will not indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an

agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

might indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the

behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

might not indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency

the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

In addition:

is (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

is not (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements.

1 Scope

The present document specifies the stage 3 protocol and data model for the PLMN and/or SNPN interconnection Interface. It provides stage 3 protocol definitions and message flows, and specifies the APIs for the procedures on the PLMN interconnection interface (i.e N32).

The 5G System stage 2 architecture and procedures are specified in 3GPP TS 23.501 [2] and 3GPP TS 23.502 [3].

The Technical Realization of the Service Based Architecture and the Principles and Guidelines for Services Definition are specified in 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] and 3GPP TS 29.501 [5].

The stage 2 level N32 procedures are specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6].

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

[1]	3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2]	3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage 2".
[3]	3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System; Stage 2".
[4]	3GPP TS 29.500: "5G System; Technical Realization of Service Based Architecture; Stage 3".
[5]	3GPP TS 29.501: "5G System; Principles and Guidelines for Services Definition; Stage 3".
[6]	3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
[7]	IETF RFC 9113: "HTTP/2".
[8]	IETF RFC 8259: "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format".
[9]	IETF RFC 9110: "HTTP Semantics".
[10]	Void.
[11]	IETF RFC 793: "Transmission Control Protocol".
[12]	3GPP TS 29.571: "5G System; Common Data Types for Service Based Interfaces Stage 3".
[13]	IETF RFC 7518: "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)".
[14]	IETF RFC 7516: "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)".
[15]	IETF RFC 4648: "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings".
[16]	IETF RFC 7515: "JSON Web Signature (JWS)".
[17]	IETF RFC 6901: "JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Pointer".
[18]	3GPP TS 29.510: "Network Function Repository Services; Stage 3".
[19]	3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification".

[20]	3GPP TR 21.900: "Technical Specification Group working methods".
[21]	IETF RFC 7468: "Textual Encodings of PKIX, PKCS, and CMS Structures".
[22]	IETF RFC 9457: "Problem Details for HTTP APIs".
[23]	IETF RFC 1952: "GZIP file format specification version 4.3".
[24]	Void
[25]	3GPP TS 29.518: "5G System; Access and Mobility Management Service; Stage 3".
[26]	3GPP TS 29.503: "5G System; Unified Data Management Services; Stage 3".
[27]	OpenAPI: "OpenAPI Specification Version 3.0.0", https://spec.openapis.org/oas/v3.0.0 .
[28]	3GPP TS 22.261: "Service requirements for the 5G system; Stage 1".
[29]	3GPP TS 23.288: "Architecture enhancements for 5G System (5GS) to support network data analytics services; Stage 2".
[30]	GSMA PRD IR.67: "DNS Guidelines for Service Providers and GRX and IPX Providers version 23.0".

3 Definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

c-SEPP: The SEPP that is present on the NF service consumer side is called the c-SEPP.

p-SEPP: The SEPP that is present on the NF service producer side is called the p-SEPP.

NOTE: For the purpose of N32-c procedures, the two interacting SEPPs are called "initiating" SEPP and "responding" SEPP. The c-SEPP and p-SEPP terminology is not used in this specification though it is used in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6].

c-IPX: The IPX on the NF service consumer side.

p-IPX: The IPX of the NF service producer side.

N32-c context: This context is set up at the SEPP after the Security Capability Exchange procedure is finalized. It defines the security capability that is mutually agreed and effective for both the cSEPP and the pSEPP.

Roaming Hub: A type of Roaming Intermediary that provides a set of services to client PLMNs to facilitate the deployment and the operation of roaming and interworking services; as defined by GSMA (see clause 3.1 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]).

Roaming Intermediary: an entity that provides roaming related services (see clause 3.1 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]).

Leaf IE: it is a JSON attribute defined as a simple data type, an enumeration or an array of simple data type.

Non-Leaf IE: it is a JSON attribute defined as an object (i.e. structured data type) or an array of structured data type.

Recursive non-leaf IE: it is a non-leaf attribute defined with the same data type as one of its ancestor attributes (see examples in Annex F.3).

3.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

GZIP GNU ZIP

IPX IP Exchange Service

JOSE Javascript Object Signing and Encryption

JWE JSON Web Encryption JWS JSON Web Signature

PRINS PRotocol for N32 INterconnect Security

RI Roaming Intermediary

SEPP Security and Edge Protection Proxy

TLS Transport Layer Security UPU UE Parameters Update

4 General Description

4.1 Introduction

This clause provides a general description of the interconnect interfaces used between the PLMNs and/or SNPNs for transporting the service based interface message exchanges.

4.2 N32 Interface

4.2.1 General

The N32 interface is used between SEPPs of different PLMNs for both roaming and PLMN interconnect scenarios.

The N32 interface may also be used between SEPPs from an SNPN and another SNPN or PLMN, for SNPN interconnect scenarios (e.g. for SNPN connectivity with a Credentials Holder network, see clause 5.30.2.9.3 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [2]). Unless specified otherwise, references to "PLMN" throughout this specification shall be substituted by "SNPN" for a SEPP that is deployed in an SNPN.

The SEPP that is on the NF service consumer side is called the c-SEPP and the SEPP that is on the NF service producer is called the p-SEPP. The NF service consumer or SCP may be configured with the c-SEPP or discover the c-SEPP by querying the NRF. The NF service producer or SCP may be configured with the p-SEPP or discover the p-SEPP by querying the NRF.

The N32 interface can be logically considered as 2 separate interfaces as given below.

- N32-c, a control plane interface between the SEPPs for performing initial handshake and negotiating the parameters to be applied for the actual N32 message forwarding.
- N32-f, a forwarding interface between the SEPPs which is used for forwarding the communication between the NF service consumer and the NF service producer after applying application level security protection or TLS security protection.

4.2.2 N32-c Interface

The following figure shows the scope of the N32-c interface.




Figure 4.2.2-1: N32-c Interface

The N32-c interface provides the following functionalities:

- Initial handshake procedure between the SEPP in PLMN A (called the initiating SEPP) and the SEPP in PLMN B (called the responding SEPP), that involves capability negotiation and parameter exchange as specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6].

4.2.3 N32-f Interface

The following figures shows the scope of the N32-f interface.




Figure 4.2.3-1a: N32-f Interface with TLS security




Figure 4.2.3-1b: N32-f Interface with PRINS

The N32-f interface shall be used to forward the HTTP/2 messages of the NF service producers and the NF service consumers in different PLMN, through the SEPPs of the respective PLMN.

If TLS is the negotiated security policy between the SEPP, then the N32-f shall involve only the forwarding of the HTTP/2 messages of the NF service producers and the NF service consumers without any reformatting at the SEPPs and/or the IPXs (see figure 4.2.3-1a).

The application layer security protection functionality of the N32-f is used only if the PRotocol for N32 INterconnect Security (PRINS) is negotiated between the SEPPs using N32-c (see figure 4.2.3-1b).

The N32-f interface provides the following application layer security protection functionalities:

- Message protection of the information exchanged between the NF service consumer and the NF service producer across PLMNs by applying application layer security mechanisms as specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6].
- Forwarding of the application layer protected message from a SEPP in one PLMN to a SEPP in another PLMN. Such forwarding may involve RIs on path.

- If RIs are on the path from SEPP in PLMN A to SEPP in PLMN B, the forwarding on the N32-f interface may involve the insertion of content modification instructions which the receiving SEPP applies after verifying the integrity of such modification instructions.

4.3 Protocol Stack

4.3.1 General

The protocol stack for the N32 interface is shown below in Figure 4.3.1-1.

Application (PRINS may be used for security)
HTTP/2
TLS (Conditional)
ТСР
IP
L2
L1

Figure 4.3.1-1: N32 Protocol Stack

The N32 interfaces (N32-c and N32-f) use HTTP/2 protocol (see clause 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, respectively) with JSON (see clause 4.2.4) as the application layer serialization protocol. For the security protection at the transport layer, the SEPPs shall support TLS as specified in clause 13.1.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6].

For the N32-f interface, the application layer (i.e the JSON content) encapsulates the complete HTTP/2 message between the NF service consumer and the NF service producer, by transforming the HTTP/2 headers and the body into specific JSON attributes as specified in clause 6.2. For the scenarios when there are RIs between SEPPs, see clause 4.3.2 for TLS/PRINS usage.

4.3.2 HTTP/2 Protocol

4.3.2.1 General

HTTP/2 as described in IETF RFC 9113 [7] shall be used for N32 interface.

4.3.2.2 HTTP standard headers

The HTTP request standard headers and the HTTP response standard headers that shall be supported on the N32 interface are defined in Table 4.3.2.2-1 and in Table 4.3.2.2-2 respectively.

Table 4.3.2.2-1: Mandatory to support HTTP request standard headers

Name	Reference	Description
Accept	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header is used to specify response media types that are acceptable.
Accept-Encoding	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header may be used to indicate what response content- encodings (e.g gzip) are acceptable in the response.
Content-Length	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header is used to provide the anticipated size, as a decimal number of octets, for a potential content.
Content-Type	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header is used to indicate the media type of the associated representation.
Via	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header is used to indicate the intermediate proxies in the service request path. Please refer to clause 6.10.8 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] for encoding of the via header

Table 4.3.2.2-2: Mandatory to support HTTP response standard headers

Name	Reference	Description
Content-Length	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header may be used to provide the anticipated size, as a decimal number of octets, for a potential content.
Content-Type	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header shall be used to indicate the media type of the associated representation.
Content-Encoding	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header may be used in some responses to indicate to the HTTP/2 client the content encodings (e.g gzip) applied to the response body beyond those inherent in the media type.
Via	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header is used to indicate the intermediate proxies in the service response path. Please refer to clause 6.10.8 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] for encoding of the via header.
Server	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header is used to indicate the originator of an HTTP error response.

4.3.2.3 HTTP custom headers

The HTTP custom headers specified in clause 5.2.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] shall be supported on the N32 interface.

4.3.2.4 HTTP/2 connection management

Each SEPP initiates HTTP/2 connections towards its peer SEPP for the following purposes

- N32-c interface
- N32-f interface

The scope of the HTTP/2 connection used for the N32-c interface is short-lived. Once the initial handshake is completed the connection is torn down as specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]. The HTTP/2 connection used for N32-c is end to end between the SEPPs and does not involve an RI to intercept the HTTP/2 connection, though an RI may be involved for IP level routing.

NOTE: Roaming Hubs as Roaming Intermediaries may disallow the establishment of the N32-c connection (see clause 5.5.2).

The scope of the HTTP/2 connection used for the N32-f interface is long-lived. The N32-f HTTP/2 connection at a SEPP can be:

- Case A: Towards a SEPP of another PLMN without involving any RI or involving RI where RI does not require modification or observation of the information; or
- Case B: Towards a SEPP of another PLMN via RI where RI requires modification or observation of the information. In this case, the HTTP/2 connection from a SEPP terminates at the next hop RI with the RI acting as a HTTP proxy.

For the N32-f interface the HTTP/2 connection management requirements specified in clause 5.2.6 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] shall be applicable. The URI scheme used for the N32-f JOSE protected message forwarding API

shall be "http". If confidentiality protection of all IEs for the N32-f JOSE protected message forwarding procedure is required, then:

- For case A, the security between the SEPPs shall be ensured by means of an IPSec or TLS connection;
- For case B, hop-by-hop security between the SEPP and the RIs should be established on N32-f. This hop-by-hop security shall be established using an IPSec or TLS connection.

4.3.3 Transport Protocol

The Transmission Control Protocol as described in IETF RFC 793 [11] shall be used as transport protocol as required by HTTP/2 (see IETF RFC 9113 [7]).

When there is no RI between the SEPPs or RI(s) are offering only IP routing service without modification or observation of the content, TLS shall be used for security protection (see clause 13.1.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]). When there is RI between the SEPPs and RI requires modification or observation of the content, TLS or NDS/IP should be used for security protection as specified in clause 13.1.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6].

NOTE: When using TCP as the transport protocol, an HTTP/2 connection is mapped to a TCP connection.

4.3.4 Serialization Protocol

The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format as described in IETF RFC 8259 [8] shall be used as the serialization protocol.

5 N32 Procedures

5.1 Introduction

The procedures on the N32 interface are split into two categories:

- Procedures that happen end to end between the SEPPs on the N32-c interface;
- Procedures that are used for the forwarding of messages on the service based interface between the NF service consumer and the NF service producer via the SEPP across the N32-f interface.

Table 5.1-1 summarizes the corresponding APIs defined for this specification.

Table 5.1-1: API Descriptions

Service Name	Clause	Description	OpenAPI Specification File	apiName	Annex
N32 Handshake	6.1	N32-c Handshake Service	TS29573_N32_Handshake. yaml	n32c- handshake	A.2
JOSE Protected Message Forwarding	6.2	N32-f Message Forwarding Service	TS29573_JOSEProtectedM essageForwarding.yaml	n32f- forward	A.3
Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN _Mapping	6.3	SEPP Telescopic FQDN Mapping	TS29573_SeppTelescopicF qdnMapping.yaml	nsepp- telescopic	A.4

5.2 N32 Handshake Procedures (N32-c)

5.2.1 General

The N32 handshake procedure is used between the SEPPs in two PLMNs to mutually authenticate each other and negotiate the security mechanism to use over N32-f along with associated security configuration parameters.

A HTTP/2 connection shall be established between the initiating SEPP and the responding SEPP end to end over TLS. The following N32 handshake procedures are specified in the clauses below.

- Security Capability Negotiation Procedure
- Parameter Exchange Procedure
- N32-f Context Termination Procedure
- N32-f Error Reporting Procedure

5.2.2 Security Capability Negotiation Procedure

The initiating SEPP shall initiate a Security Capability Negotiation procedure towards the responding SEPP to agree on a security mechanism to use for protecting NF service related signalling over N32-f. An end to end TLS connection shall be setup between the SEPPs before the initiation of this procedure. This procedure may also be used to tear down the N32-f TLS connection if the remote SEPP indicated support of the feature NFTLST during the setup of the N32-c connection. The procedure is described in Figure 5.2.2-1 below.




Figure 5.2.2-1: Security Capability Negotiation Procedure

- 1. The initiating SEPP issues a HTTP POST request towards the responding SEPP with the request body containing the "SecNegotiateReqData" IE carrying the following information:
 - Supported security capabilities (i.e., PRINS and/or TLS);
 - Whether the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot HTTP header is supported, if TLS security is supported;
 - Sender PLMN ID(s) or SNPN ID(s);
 - Target PLMN ID or SNPN ID;
 - Purpose of the intended usage of N32 connection;
 - The senderN32fFqdn IE, if both the initiating SEPP and the responding SEPP support the SNDN32F feature and the initiating SEPP wishes the responding SEPP to establish the N32-f connection towards a specific FQDN (of the initiating SEPP);
 - The senderN32fPortList IE, if both the initiating SEPP and the responding SEPP support the SNDN32F feature and the initiating SEPP wishes the responding SEPP to establish the N32-f connection using a specific port number. When present, the list shall contain one port number per supported security capability (i.e., PRINS and/or TLS);

- The n32HandshakeId IE, if the N32 handshake identifier is supported by the initiating SEPP, that may be used to correlate the N32-f connection to the parent N32-c context for TLS security (see clause 5.3.3.2). If the responding SEPP supports the N32 handshake identifier, the responding SEPP shall include the received N32 handshake identifier in TLS protected message forwarding procedure via correlated N32-f connection(s) towards the initiating SEPP and the subsequent N32-c signaling request related to this N32-c context (e.g. to request to tear down the N32-f TLS connection).

If different PLMNs or SNPNs are represented by different PLMN IDs or SNPN IDs (respectively) supported by a SEPP, then the SEPP shall use separate N32-connections for each pair of local and remote PLMN or SNPN. Both SEPPs shall store the mapping between the N32 connections and their pair of PLMN IDs or SNPN IDs.

NOTE 1: If SEPPs support separate FQDN per PLMN or SNPN, then Target PLMN Id or Target SNPN Id is not required as target PLMN or SNPN can be selected by the FQDN.

To tear down the N32-f connection when negotiated security scheme is TLS, the "SecNegotiateReqData" IE shall contain:

- Supported security capability set to "NONE"
- 2a. On successful processing of the request, the responding SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with a "200 OK" status code and a POST response body that contains "SecNegotiateRspData" IE carrying the following information:
 - Selected security capability (i.e., PRINS or TLS);
 - Whether the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot HTTP header is supported, if TLS security is selected;
 - Sender PLMN ID(s) or SNPN ID(s).
 - Purpose of the accepted usage of N32 connection.
 - The senderN32fFqdn IE, if the responding SEPP wishes the initiating SEPP to establish the N32-f connection towards a specific FQDN (of the responding SEPP).
 - The senderN32fPort IE, if the responding SEPP wishes the initiating SEPP to establish the N32-f connection using a specific port number.
 - The n32HandshakeId IE, if the N32 handshake identifier was received in the request and the responding SEPP supports the N32 handshake identifier. The initiating SEPP shall include the received N32 handshake identifier in TLS protected message forwarding procedure via correlated N32-f connection(s) towards the responding SEPP and the subsequent N32-c signaling request related to this N32-c context (e.g. to request to tear down the N32-f TLS connection).

NOTE 2: Same SEPP endpoints can serve all accepted purposes over the same N32-f connection established as the result of request/response messages.

The responding SEPP compares the initiating SEPP's supported security capabilities to its own supported security capabilities and selects, based on its local policy, a security mechanism, which is supported by both the SEPPs. If the selected security capability indicates any other capability other than PRINS, then the HTTP/2 connection initiated between the two SEPPs for the N32 handshake procedures shall be terminated. The negotiated security capability shall be applicable on both the directions. If the selected security capability is PRINS, then the two SEPPs may decide to create (if not available) / maintain HTTP/2 connection(s) where each SEPP acts as a client towards the other (which acts as a server). This may be used for later signalling of N32-f error reporting procedure (see clause 5.2.5) and N32-f context termination procedure (see clause 5.2.4).

If different PLMNs or SNPNs are represented by different PLMN IDs or SNPN IDs (respectively) supported by a SEPP, then the SEPP shall use separate N32-connections for each pair of local and remote PLMN or SNPN. Both SEPPs shall store the mapping between the N32 connections and their pair of PLMN IDs or SNPN IDs.

The SEPP shall select the PLMN or SNPN from the list of supported PLMN(s) or SNPN(s) based on the received Target PLMN ID or SNPN ID, or based on PLMN or SNPN specific FQDN used in the request, and provide the selected PLMN's PLMN Id(s) in the plmnIdList or the selected SNPN's SNPN Id(s) in the snpnIdList.

In case no purposes are exchanged, the receiving SEPP shall assume by default that purposes are for Roaming and inter-PLMN mobility as described in clause 6.1.5.3.9.

The initiating SEPP and/or responding SEPP may enable the establishment of an N32 connection for the purpose of Disaster Roaming only during disaster conditions.

When the request is for tearing down the existing N32-f TLS connection, the "SecNegotiateRspData" IE shall contain:

- Supported security capability set to "NONE"

and, subsequently, both SEPP shall terminate the N32-c and N32-f TLS connection.

If the initiating SEPP receives the indication that the responding SEPP supports the feature SNDN32F in the response, the initiating SEPP shall consider that the responding SEPP supports and has accepted the senderN32fFqdn IE and/or senderN32fPortList sent by the initiating SEPP in the request message. Otherwise, the initiating SEPP shall consider that the responding SEPP has ignored the senderN32fFqdn IE and/or senderN32fPortList sent by the initiating SEPP. If the initiating SEPP supports the feature SNDN32F and receives the senderN32fFqdn IE and/or the senderN32fPort IE from the responding SEPP, the initiating SEPP shall establish the N32-f connection towards the responding SEPP using the received N32-f FQDN and/or the senderN32fPort IE.

If the responding SEPP receives the indication that the initiating SEPP supports the feature SNDN32F in the request, the responding SEPP shall consider that the initiating SEPP supports receiving the senderN32fFqdn IE and/or senderN32fPort from the responding SEPP in the response message. Otherwise, the responding SEPP shall consider that the initiating SEPP does not support the senderN32fFqdn IE and/or senderN32fPort, and the responding SEPP shall not send these attributes to initiating SEPP. If the responding SEPP supports the feature SNDN32F and receives the senderN32fFqdn IE and/or the senderN32fPortList IE from the initiating SEPP, the responding SEPP shall establish the N32-f connection towards the initiating SEPP using the received N32-f FQDN and/or the N32-f port number received in the senderN32fPortList IE corresponding to the selected security capability (i.e., TLS or PRINS).

If the N32-f context exists between the peer SEPPs, and the N32 exchange capability request is not for tearing down the N32-f connections, the responding SEPP shall:

- stop sending any further messages over the N32-f towards the initiating SEPP;
- delete the current N32-f context and terminate any N32-f connection with the initiating SEPP; and
- process the received exchange capability request.

2b. On failure or redirection, the responding SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with an appropriate status code as specified in clause 6.1.4.2.

If the responding SEPP has sent an outgoing Security Capability Negotiation request to the initiating SEPP, the responding SEPP shall compare the FQDN of the initiating SEPP that has been received in the incoming Security Capability Negotiation request message with the FQDN of the responding SEPP that has been sent in the outgoing Security Capability Negotiation request. If the responding SEPP's FQDN lexicographically precedes, it shall reject the incoming HTTP request message with the cause "N32C_EXCHANGE_CAPABILITY_ONGOING" and it shall continue with its initiated procedure and vice versa.

EXAMPLE: assuming SEPP A's FQDN is "sepp.5gc.mnc345.mcc012.3gppnetwork.org" and SEPP B's FQDN is "sepp.5gc.mnc346.mcc012.3gppnetwork.org", then SEPP A's FQDN precedes SEPP B's FQDN and SEPP A proceeds with its exchange capability procedure.

A SEPP may be configured to accept an HTTP request from a given PLMN and not to send an HTTP request for exchange capability towards that PLMN.

5.2.3 Parameter Exchange Procedure

5.2.3.1 General

The parameter exchange procedure shall be executed if the security capability negotiation procedure selected the security capability as PRINS. The parameter exchange procedure is performed to:

- Agree on a cipher suite to use for protecting NF service related signalling over N32-f; and

- Optionally, exchange the protection policies to use for protecting NF service related signalling over N32.

5.2.3.2 Parameter Exchange Procedure for Cipher Suite Negotiation

The parameter exchange procedure for cipher suite negotiation shall be performed after the security capability negotiation procedure if the selected security policy is PRINS. If there is a change in the cipher suite and the SEPP wants to renegotiate it, then the SEPP may reuse the parameter exchange procedure to override what was exchanged before.

The procedure is described in Figure 5.2.3.2-1 below.



Figure 5.2.3.2-1: Parameter Exchange Procedure for Cipher Suite Negotiation

- 1. The initiating SEPP issues a HTTP POST request towards the responding SEPP with the request body containing the "SecParamExchReqData" IE carrying the following information
 - Supported cipher suites;

The supported cipher suites shall be an ordered list with the cipher suites mandated by 3GPP TS 33.501 [6] appearing at the top of the list.

The initiating SEPP also provides a N32-f context identifier for the responding SEPP to use towards the initiating SEPP for subsequent JOSE Protected Message Forwarding procedures over N32-f (see clause 5.3.3) when the responding SEPP acts as the forwarding SEPP.

- 2a. On successful processing of the request, the responding SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with a "200 OK" status code and a POST response body that contains the following information
 - Selected cipher suite

The responding SEPP compares the initiating SEPP's supported cipher suites to its own supported cipher suites and selects, based on its local policy, a cipher suite, which is supported by both the SEPPs. The responding SEPP's supported cipher suites shall be an ordered list with the cipher suites mandated by 3GPP TS 33.501 [6] appearing at the top of the list. The selected cipher suite is applicable for both the directions of communication between the SEPPs.

The responding SEPP also provides a N32-f context identifier for the initiating SEPP to use towards the responding SEPP for subsequent JOSE Protected Message Forwarding procedures over N32-f (see clause 5.3.3) when the initiating SEPP acts as the forwarding SEPP.

If the receiving SEPP already has a previously negotiated cipher suite, the SEPP shall overwrite it with the new one.

2b. On failure, the responding p-SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with an appropriate 4xx/5xx status code as specified in clause 6.1.4.3. If the SEPP already has a previously negotiated cipher suite, the SEPP shall continue to use the same.

NOTE: If a SEPP already has a previously negotiated cipher suite and a new cipher suite is also received, the SEPP starts applying the new cipher suite immediately and also continues with the old cipher suite for a limited time period. This allows messages with old policies to be completed gracefully.

If the initiating SEPP receives a security parameter exchange request from the responding SEPP before receiving a response for its request (i.e security parameter exchange procedure collision), the initiating SEPP shall compare its FQDN that was sent in its request with the FQDN of the responding SEPP that is received in the security parameter exchange request message. If the initiating SEPP's FQDN lexicographically precedes, it shall reject the incoming HTTP request message with the cause "SECURITY_PARAM_EXCHANGE_COLLISION" and it shall continue with its initiated procedure and vice versa.

EXAMPLE:

Assuming SEPP A's FQDN is "sepp.5gc.mnc345.mcc012.3gppnetwork.org" and SEPP B's FQDN is "sepp.5gc.mnc346.mcc012.3gppnetwork.org", then SEPP A's FQDN precedes SEPP B's FQDN and SEPP A proceeds with its security parameter exchange procedure.

5.2.3.3 Parameter Exchange Procedure for Protection Policy Exchange

The parameter exchange procedure for protection policy exchange may be performed after the Parameter Exchange Procedure for Cipher Suite Negotiation (see clause 5.2.3.2). If a HTTP/2 connection does not exist towards the peer SEPP at the time of initiating this procedure, the HTTP/2 connection shall be established. If there is a change in the protection policy exchange and the SEPP wants to renegotiate it, then the SEPP may reuse the parameter exchange procedure for the protection policy exchange to override what was exchanged before. If the parameter exchange procedure for the protection policy exchange is not performed, then the protection policies between the SEPP shall be exchanged out of bands.

The procedure is described in Figure 5.2.3.3-1 below.




Figure 5.2.3.3-1: Parameter Exchange Procedure for Protection Policy Exchange

- 1. The initiating SEPP issues a HTTP POST request towards the responding SEPP with the request body containing the "SecParamExchReqData" IE carrying the following information:
 - Protection policy information

The protection policy information contains:

- API to IE mapping containing the mapping information of list of leaf IEs and recursive non-leaf IEs for each:
 - Request/response and Subscribe / Unsubscribe service operation, identified by the API URI and method;
 and/or
 - Callbacks (e.g Notification service operation), identified by the value of the 3GPP custom HTTP header "3gpp-Sbi-Callback" (see clause 5.2.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]).
- List of IE types that are to be protected across N32-f (i.e the data type encryption policy as specified in clause 13.2.3.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]); and
- Modification policy: Against each leaf IE and recursive non-leaf IEs in the API to IE mapping information, a boolean flag indicating whether that IE is allowed to be modified by an RI on the side of the SEPP sending the protection policy information.

Alternatively, if both the initiating SEPP and the responding SEPP support the PSEPRO feature (PRINS Security Profiles Support, see clause 6.1.7), the initiating SEPP may include a candidate list of security profiles instead of Protection policy information in the parameter exchange request message towards the responding SEPP.

NOTE 1: The definition of security profiles is out of scope of 3GPP.

- 2a. On successful processing of the request, the responding SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with a "200 OK" status code and a POST response body that contains the following information
 - Selected protection policy information

The Selected protection policy information contains the IEs allowed to be modified by an RI on the side of the responding SEPP. If the responding SEPP connects to several RIs, an isModifiable IE may be included to indicate an IE is allowed to be modified by all RI(s) or an map type of isModifiableByIpx IE may be included to indicate an IE is allowed to be modified by an RI identified by the key of ipxProviderId IE if this IE is allowed to be modified by some of (but not all) the RI(s), as specified in clause 13.2.3.4 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6].

The initiating SEPP shall store the modification policy which are sent from responding SEPP in selected protection policy information and the responding SEPP shall store the modification policy which are sent from the initiating SEPP in the protection policy information. The SEPP receiving the subsequent message transfers over N32-f shall check whether the modifications performed by the RIs were permitted by the respective modification policy.

The SEPPs shall store the encryption policy in selected protection policy information and shall apply this policy for subsequent message transfers over N32-f. The encryption policy in selected protection policy is applicable for both the directions of communication between the SEPPs.

Alternatively, the responding SEPP shall return the selected security profiles to the initiating SEPP, if the responding SEPP supports the PSEPRO feature, and the initiating SEPP sent a candidate list of security profiles in the exchange parameter request message to the responding SEPP.

The protection policy to apply for a recursive non-leaf IE shall be the same as the protection policy defined for the ancestor attribute with the same data type. Accordingly, the IeList signaled over N32-c shall not repeat/include the protection policies of the child attributes of the recursive non-leaf IE (see example in Annex F).

If the receiving SEPP already has a previously negotiated protection policy information, the SEPP shall overwrite it with the new one.

The HTTP/2 connection used for the N32 handshake procedures may be terminated after the completion of this procedure.

- 2b. On failure, the responding SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with an appropriate 4xx/5xx status code as specified in clause 6.1.4.3. If the SEPP already has previously negotiated protection policy information, the SEPP shall continue to use the same.
- NOTE 2: If a SEPP already has a previously negotiated cipher suite and a new cipher suite is also received, the SEPP starts applying the new cipher suite immediately and also continues with the old cipher suite for a limited time period. This allows messages with old policies to be completed gracefully.

An illustration of how the protection policy is stored and looked up in the SEPP is provided in figure 5.2.3.3-2




Figure 5.2.3.3-2: Protection Policy Storage and Lookup in SEPP

During the N32-f message forwarding, the SEPP looks at a HTTP request or response it receives from an NF service consumer or NF service producer and then uses the above tables to decide which IEs and headers in the message it shall cipher and integrity protect and which IEs it shall allow the RIs to modify.

5.2.3.4 Parameter Exchange Procedure for Security Information list Exchange

The initiating SEPP shall initiate a Security Information list exchange procedure towards the responding SEPP to exchange the Security Information lists that contain information on RI public keys or certificates that are needed to verify RI modifications at the receiving SEPP as specified in clause 13.2.2.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]. If there is a change

in the security information list and the SEPP wants to renegotiate it, then the SEPP may reuse the parameter exchange procedure for the security information list exchange to override what was exchanged before.

The procedure is described in Figure 5.2.3.4-1 below.




Figure 5.2.3.4-1: Parameter Exchange Procedure for Security Information List exchange

- 1. The initiating SEPP issues a HTTP POST request towards the responding SEPP with the request body containing the "SecParamExchReqData" IE carrying the following information:
- RI identifier connected to the initiating SEPP;
- List of raw public keys or certificates for that RI.
- 2a. On successful processing of the request, the responding SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with a "200 OK" status code and a POST response body that contains the "SecParamExchRspData" IE carrying the following information:
- RI identifier connected to the responding SEPP;
- List of raw public keys or certificates for that RI.

If the receiving SEPP already has a previously negotiated security information list, the SEPP shall overwrite it with the new one.

2b. On failure, the responding SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with an appropriate 4xx/5xx status code as specified in clause 6.1.4.3. If the SEPP already has previously negotiated security information list, the SEPP shall continue to use the same.

NOTE: If a SEPP already has a previously negotiated cipher suite and a new cipher suite is also received, the SEPP starts applying the new cipher suite immediately and also continues with the old cipher suite for a limited time period. This allows messages with old policies to be completed gracefully.

5.2.4 N32-f Context Termination Procedure

After the completion of the security capability negotiation procedure and/or the parameter exchange procedures, an N32-f context is established between the two SEPPs. The "n32fContextId" of each SEPP is provided to the other SEPP. This context identifier shall be stored in each SEPP until the context is explicitly terminated by the N32-f context termination procedure. The SEPP that is initiating the N32-f context termination procedure shall use the HTTP method POST on the URI: {apiRoot}/n32c-handshake/<apiVersion>/n32f-terminate. If a HTTP/2 connection does not exist towards the receiving SEPP, a HTTP/2 connection shall be created before initiating this procedure. The procedure is shown below in Figure 5.2.4-1.




Figure 5.2.4-1: N32f Context Termination Procedure

- 1. The initiating SEPP issues a HTTP POST request towards the responding SEPP with the request body containing the N32-f context id information that is to be terminated.
- 2a. On success, the responding SEPP, shall:
 - stop sending any further messages over the N32-f towards the initiating SEPP;
 - once all the ongoing N32-f message exchanges with the initiating SEPP are completed or timed out, delete the N32-f context identified by the "n32fContextId" provided in the request.

The N32-f HTTP/2 connections from the responding SEPP shall not be deleted if they terminate at an RI, since that HTTP/2 connection may carry traffic towards other PLMN SEPPs as well. The responding SEPP shall return the status code "200 OK" together with an N32ContextInfo content that carries the "n32fContextId" of the initiating SEPP that the responding SEPP has stored.

The initiating SEPP shall:

- stop sending any further messages over the N32-f towards the responding SEPP;
- once all the ongoing N32-f message exchanges with the responding SEPP are completed or timed out, delete the local N32-f context identified by this "n32fContextId".

If the initiating SEPP receives a N32-f termination request from the responding SEPP before receiving a response for its request (i.e N32-f Context Termination Procedure collision), the initiating SEPP shall process the received N32-f termination request from the responding SEPP and shall return the status code "200 OK" together with an N32ContextInfo content that carries the "n32fContextId" of the responding SEPP that the initiating SEPP has stored. The initiating SEPP shall behave as specified above without waiting for a response from the responding SEPP for its N32-f Context Termination request.

2b. On failure, the responding SEPP shall return an appropriate 4xx/5xx status code together with the "ProblemDetails" JSON body.

5.2.5 N32-f Error Reporting Procedure

When a SEPP is not able to process a message it received over the N32-f interface due to errors, the error information is conveyed to the sending SEPP by using the N32-f error reporting procedure over the N32-c interface. The SEPP that is initiating the N32-f error reporting procedure shall use the HTTP method POST on the URI: {apiRoot}/n32c-handshake/<apiVersion>/n32f-error. If a HTTP/2 connection does not exist towards the receiving SEPP, a HTTP/2 connection shall be created before initiating this procedure. The procedure is shown below in Figure 5.2.5-1.




Figure 5.2.5-1: N32f Error Reporting Procedure

- 1. The initiating SEPP issues a HTTP POST request towards the responding SEPP with the request body containing the N32-f error information that is to be reported.
- 2a. On success, the responding SEPP, shall:
 - log that the N32-f request / response message identified by the "n32fMessageId" is not processed by the receiving SEPP;

The responding SEPP shall return the status code "204 No Content".

2b. On failure, the responding SEPP shall return an appropriate 4xx/5xx status code together with the "ProblemDetails" JSON body.

5.3 Message Forwarding Procedure on N32 (N32-f)

5.3.1 Introduction

The N32-f interface is used between two SEPPs for:

- The forwarding of JOSE protected HTTP/2 messages between the NF service consumer and the NF service producer across two PLMNs, when PRINS is the negotiated security policy. The message forwarding on N32-f shall be based on the negotiated security capability and the exchanged security parameters between the two SEPPs (see clause 5.2).
- Forwarding of the HTTP/2 messages between the NF service consumer and the NF service producer without any reformatting and application layer protection, when TLS is the negotiated security policy.

5.3.2 Use of Application Layer Security

5.3.2.1 General

If the negotiated security capability between the two SEPPs is PRINS, one or more HTTP/2 connections between the two SEPPs for the forwarding of JOSE protected message shall be established, which may involve RIs on path. The forwarding of messages over the N32-f interface involves the following steps at the sending SEPP:

- 1. Identification of the protection policy applicable for the API being invoked (i.e either a request/response NF service API or a subscribe/unsubscribe service API or a notification API).
- 2. Message reformatting as per the identified protection policy.
- 3. Forwarding of the reformatted message over the N32 interface.

The processing of a message received over the N32-f interface at the receiving RI involves the following steps:

1. Apply the modifications in the "modificationsBlock" appended by the sending RI as JSON patches in the DataToIntegrityProtectBlock (from the decoded "aad" part), if the "modificationsBlock" is received in the message.

- 2. Determine further modifications required based on modification policy and insert the modification entries in "modificationsBlock".
- 3. Forwarding the received message with the above inserted modification entries in "modificationsBlock" over the N32 interface.

The processing of a message received over the N32-f interface at the receiving SEPP involves the following steps.

- 1. Identify the N32-f context using the N32-f context Id received in the message.
- 2. Verify the integrity protection of the message using the keying material obtained from the TLS layer during the parameter exchange procedure for that N32-f context (see 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]). The TLS connection from which the keying material is obtained is the N32-c TLS connection used for the parameter exchange procedure.
- 3. Decrypt the ciphertext part of the received JWE message. Decode the "aad" part of the JWE message using BASE64URL decoding.
- 4. For each entry in the "modificationsBlock" of the received message:
 - First verify the integity protection of that entry using the keying material applicable for the RI that inserted that block (using the "identity" IE in the "modificationsBlock");
 - Identify the modifications policy exchanged during the parameter exchange procedure with the sending SEPP if the RI that inserted the modificationsBlock is from the sending SEPP side; else identify the modifications policy applicable for the RI based on local configuration;
 - Check if the inserted modifications are as per the identified modifications policy;
 - Apply the modifications as a JSON patch in the DataToIntegrityProtectBlock (from the decoded "aad" part).
- 5. Form the original JSON request / response body from the decrypted ciphertext and the decoded integrity verified "aad" block possibly modified as described in step 4.
- 6. If the reconstructed HTTP message has an "Authorization" header, then the SEPP shall check whether the service consumer's PLMN ID or SNPN ID is present in the Bearer token contained in the Authorization header (see 3GPP TS 29.510 [18], clause 6.3.5.2.4) and if it matches with the "Remote PLMN ID" or "Remote SNPN ID" of the N32-f context. If they do not match, the SEPP shall respond to the sending SEPP with "403 Forbidden" status code with the application specific cause set as "PLMNID_MISMATCH" or "SNPNID MISMATCH".
- NOTE 1: In this case, the N32-f Error Reporting procedure specified in clause 5.2.5 is not used since the processing of the complete N32-f message fails at the receiving SEPP.
- NOTE 2: If the service consumer's PLMN ID or SNPN ID is present in the reconstructed HTTP message, then the receiving SEPP compares this with the sending SEPP's PLMN ID or SNPN ID, which is retrieved from N32f Context (see clause 5.9.3 in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]). See the above step 6 for the receiving SEPP behaviour. If the service consumer's PLMN ID and SNPN ID are not present, the comparison is not done.

SEPPs and RI should support gzip coding (see IETF RFC 1952 [23]) in HTTP requests and responses and indicate so in the Accept-Encoding header, as described in clause 6.9 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] and clause 6.2.2.2.3.

5.3.2.2 Protection Policy Lookup

When a SEPP receives a HTTP/2 request or response message intended to be routed towards another PLMN, the sending SEPP shall identify the protection policy as given below

- 1. Identify the target PLMN from the ":aurthority" part of the message using the format specified in clause 6.1.4.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].
- 2. Check if the incoming HTTP/2 message has the "3gpp-Sbi-Callback" header. When present, the SEPP shall select the data encryption and modification policy applicable for the specific notification type, identified by the value of the "3gpp-Sbi-Callback" header and the target PLMN, using the notification type list stored as specified in subclase 5.2.3.3.

- 3. Else, if it is a HTTP/2 request message, then from the ":authority" and ":path" part of the received HTTP/2 request message, form the API URI. For the identified PLMN, check if a protection policy exists for the API URI using the table stored as specified in clause 5.2.3.3.
- 4. Else, if it is a HTTP/2 response message, then based on the HTTP/2 stream ID on which the response is received, identify the corresponding request that was sent by the SEPP and the protection policy applicable for that request, as specified in step 3.
- 5. If an entry is not found, then it means that either the particular API has no protection policy exchanged.

Once a protection policy is identified, the SEPP shall apply the application layer security as per the identified protection policy.

5.3.2.3 Message Reformatting

A SEPP on the sending side PLMN applies message reformatting in the following cases:

- When it receives a HTTP/2 request message from an NF service consumer to a an NF service producer in another PLMN;
- When it receives a response HTTP/2 response message from an NF service producer to an NF service consumer in another PLMN.
- When it receives a HTTP/2 notification request message from an NF service producer to an NF service consumer in another PLMN;
- When it receives a HTTP/2 notification response message from an NF service consumer to an NF service producer in another PLMN

The SEPP shall reformat the HTTP/2 message by encapsulating the whole message into the body of a new HTTP POST message. The body of the HTTP POST request / response message shall contain the reformatted original HTTP/2 request/response message respectively. The HTTP POST request/response body shall be encoded as the "N32fReformattedReqMsg"/"N32fReformattedRspMsg" JSON bodies respectively, as specified in clause 6.2.5.

 $The \ "N32fReformattedReqMsg"/"N32fReformattedRspMsg" \ are \ structured \ as \ given \ below:$




Figure 5.3.2.3-1 JSON representation of a reformatted HTTP message

The "cipherText" part of the reformatted message in FlatJweJson shall be prepared as given below




Figure 5.3.2.3-2 Transformation of HTTP Header and Content to Encrypt into CipherText

- 1. Based on the protection policy exchanged between the SEPPs, the sending SEPP prepares an input for the JWE ciphering and integrity protection as an array of arbitrary types in the "DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipher" block with each entry containing either a HTTP header value or the value of a JSON payload IE of the API message being reformatted. The index value "encBlockIdx" in the contentpart of DataToIntegrityProtectBlock shall point to the index of a header value or IE value in this input array.
- 2. The input block is fed into an encryption function along with the other required inputs for JWE as specified in IETF RFC 7516 [14].
- 3. The encryption function outputs the cipher text information. This cipher text is then subjected to BASE64URL transformation as specified in IETF RFC 4648 [15] clause 5.

4. The output of the BASE64URL transform is them encoded as the ciphertext part of FlatJweJson IE specified in clause 6.2.5.2.11.

5.3.2.4 Message Forwarding to Peer SEPP

Once a SEPP reformats the HTTP/2 message into the "N32ReformattedReqMsg"/"N32ReformattedRspMsg" JSON object as specified in clause 5.3.2, the SEPP forwards the message to the receiving SEPP by invoking a HTTP POST method as shown in figure 5.3.2.4-1 below.




Figure 5.3.2.4-1 Message Forwarding between SEPP on N32-f

- 1. The initiating SEPP issues a HTTP POST request towards the responding SEPP with the request body containing the "N32ReformattedReqMsg" IE carrying the reformatted HTTP/2 message. The request message shall contain the "n32fContextId" information provided by the responding SEPP to the initiating SEPP earlier during the parameter exchange procedure (see clause 5.2.3). The responding SEPP shall use the "n32fContextId" information to:
 - Locate the agreed cipher suite and protection policy;
 - Locate the n32ContextId to be used in the response.

If the HTTP request/response message to be forwarded over N32-f includes an 3gpp-Sbi-Message-Priority header, the initiating/responding SEPP should additionally insert a 3gpp-Sbi-Message-Priority header in the N32-f message with the same contents as the 3gpp-Sbi-Message-Priority header encoded within the "N32ReformattedReqMsg"/ N32ReformattedRspMsg IE respectively.

NOTE 1: Replicating the information in a N32-f message header enables the receiving SEPP to determine the priority of the forwarded HTTP request/response without having to parse the N32-f message content.

The HTTP request content may be compressed hop by hop over N32-f, if the initiating SEPP or RI and its next hop (RI or SEPP) support gzip coding (see IETF RFC 1952 [23]).

2a. On successful processing of the request, the responding SEPP shall:

- decompress the N32-f HTTP request content, if it is compressed;
- reconstruct the HTTP/2 message towards the NF service producer;
- compress the reconstructed HTTP request if the reconstructed HTTP content contains a Content-Encoding header indicating gzip compression;
- forward the reconstructed HTTP/2 message to the NF service producer;
- wait for the response from the NF service producer; and then
- once the response from the NF service producer is received, respond to the initiating SEPP with a "200 OK" status code and a POST response body that contains the "N32ReformattedRspMsg". The "N32ReformattedRspMsg" shall contain the reformatted HTTP response message from the responding PLMN. The response message shall contain the "n32fContextId" information provided by the initiating SEPP to the responding SEPP earlier during the parameter exchange procedure (see clause 5.2.3).

NOTE 2: For unsuccessful processing of the request with "PLMNID_MISMATCH", see clause 5.3.2.1.

The responding SEPP shall be able to map the response received from the NF service producer to the HTTP/2 stream ID for the corresponding response it needs to generate towards the initiating SEPP. The HTTP/2 stream ID and the HTTP/2 connection information on either side shall be used to derive this mapping.

The HTTP response content may be compressed hop by hop over N32-f, if the responding SEPP or RI and its next hop (RI or SEPP) support gzip coding (see IETF RFC 1952 [23]).

2b. On failure or unsuccessful processing of the request, the responding SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with an appropriate 4xx/5xx status code, the message body shall contain a ProblemDetails structure with the "cause" attribute set to one of the application error as specified in clause 6.2.4.2. The "cause" attribute shall be set to "UNSPECIFIED", if the responding SEPP fails to process the reconstructed message, and the error is reported by N32f error reporting procedure as specified in clause 5.2.5.

5.3.2.5 JOSE Protected Forwarding Options

The JOSE Protected Forwarding Options is used by the sending SEPP or RI to discover the communication options supported by its next hop (RI or SEPP) for N32-f message processing.




Figure 5.3.2.5-1: Procedure for the discovery of communication options supported by the next hop

- 1. The sending SEPP or RI shall send an OPTIONS request to discover the communication options supported by its next hop (RI or SEPP) for N32-f message processing.
- 2. If the request is accepted, the next hop (RI or SEPP) shall respond with the status code 204 No Content and include an Accept-Encoding header (as described in IETF RFC 9110 [9]).

On failure, the next hop shall return one of the HTTP status code listed in Table 6.2.4.3.2.1-3.

5.3.3 Message Forwarding to Peer SEPP when TLS is used

5.3.3.1 General

When the negotiated security policy between the SEPPs is TLS, then the procedures described in clause 5.3.2 shall not be applied. Messages shall be forwarded to the peer SEPP as specified in clause 6.1.4.3.4 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

5.3.3.2 Correlation of N32-c context and N32-f Connection for TLS Security

This clause addresses the correlation between a N32-f connection and its parent N32-c context when the negotiated security mode is TLS. When TLS Security is used, the correlation between a N32-f connection to its parent N32-c context shall be identified with following mechanism:

- When there is only one N32-c context successfully negotiated between a pair of SEPPs, one SEPP shall correlate a N32-f connection to its N32-c context by matching the peer SEPP's identifier (i.e. the FQDN of the peer SEPP) in the received TLS certificate with the FQDN(s) of the peer SEPP in the corresponding N32-c context (i.e. the FQDNs carried in the "sender" IE and/or the "senderN32fFqdn" IE); or

NOTE: If the received certificate contains FQDNs for different SEPPs (e.g. one common certificate used for all the SEPPs in the whole network), one SEPP can use the peer SEPP FQDN in the Via header (see clause 6.10.10.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]) of the incoming N32-f HTTP message to perform the matching with the FQDN in the corresponding N32-c context.

- When multiple N32-c contexts were successfully negotiated between a pair of SEPPs, then
 - if the N32 Handshake Ids were exchanged during the N32-c negotiation, one SEPP shall correlate the N32-f connection to its parent N32-c context by matching the N32 Handshake Id in the incoming N32-f HTTP messages (carried in the "3gpp-Sbi-N32-Handshake-Id" header) with the received N32 Handshake Id (carried in the "n32HandshakeId" IE) in corresponding N32-c context; or
 - if the N32 Handshake Ids were not successfully exchanged during the N32-c negotiation (i.e. if at least one SEPP did not signal its N32 Handshake Id during the Security Capability Negotiation Procedure) and if different N32 purposes were successfully negotiated for N32-c contexts, one SEPP shall correlate the N32-f connection to its parent N32-c context by matching the N32 purpose of the incoming N32-f HTTP messages (as stated in the "3gpp-Sbi-Interplmn-Purpose" HTTP header if present or as "ROAMING" if the "3gpp-Sbi-Interplmn-Purpose" HTTP header is not present, see clause 6.14 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]) with the supported N32 purpose(s) in the corresponding N32-c context.

5.3.3.3 3gpp-Sbi-N32-Handshake-Id

This header contains the N32 Handshake ID that is negotiated during the N32-c handshake, when TLS security is used. This header is included in the N32-f request by the sending SEPP and removed from the N32-f request by the receiving SEPP.

The encoding of the header follows the ABNF as defined in IETF RFC 9110 [9].

```
Sbi-N32-Handshake-Id-Header = "3gpp-Sbi-N32-Handshake-Id:" OWS n32HandshakeId OWS n32HandshakeId = 16HEXDIG
```

EXAMPLE: 3gpp-Sbi-N32-Handshake-Id: 955cac631f953ed8

5.3.3.4 Error Handling

On failure or unsuccessful processing of the incoming N32-f request, the responding SEPP shall respond to the initiating SEPP with an appropriate 4xx/5xx status code including a ProblemDetails structure with the "cause" attribute set to one of the following application errors as specified in Table 5.3.3.4-1.

Table 5.3.3.4-1: Protocol and application errors generated by SEPP

Protocol or application Error	HTTP status code	Description
"CONTEXT_NOT_FOUND"	403 Forbidden	The N32-f request which was received over TLS connection is rejected due to having no related N32-c context.
		For correlation of a N32-f connection to its parent N32-c context, please refer to clause 5.3.3.2.

5.3.4 Void

5.4 Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN_Mapping Service

5.4.1 General

The Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN_Mapping service is used between any Network Function and the SEPPs in the same PLMN, if TLS protection between the Network Function and the SEPP relies on using telescopic FQDN. See

clause 28.5.2 of 3GPP TS 23.003 [19] and clause 6.1.4.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]) for the definition and use of Telescopic FQDN.

5.4.2 Foreign FQDN to Telescopic FQDN Mapping Procedure

This procedure is initiated by an NF Service Consumer (typically an NRF or an NSSF) that needs to interact with a NF in a foreign PLMN (typically the corresponding NRF or NSSF), and to do so, it needs to build a telescopic FQDN of said NF (i.e. concatenation of the FQDN of the foreign FQDN, and the FQDN of the local SEPP), and then the resulting telescopic FQDN needs to be "flattened" (i.e. the FQDN of the NF in the foreign PLMN needs to be converted to a singel label). The procedure is described in Figure 5.4.2-1 below.




Figure 5.4.2-1: Foreign FQDN to Telescopic FQDN Mapping Procedure

- 1. The NF Service Consumer issues an HTTP GET request towards the local SEPP with a query parameter "foreign-fqdn" containing the FQDN of the NF in the foreign PLMN, that needs to be transformed into a flattened telescopic FQDN.
- 2a. On successful processing of the request, the responding SEPP shall respond to the NF Service Consumer with a "200 OK" status code and a response body that contains a JSON object of type "TelescopicMapping", containing as attributes the label to be used as first label in the telescopic FQDN, and the domain of the local SEPP to be appended after such first label. The resulting FQDN shall be used by the NF Consumer to setup a TLS session terminated in the local SEPP, where the SEPP shall present a server certificate with a wildcard domain matching the returned telescopic FQDN.

5.4.3 Telescopic FQDN to Foreign FQDN Mapping Procedure

This procedure is initiated by an NF Service Consumer (typically another SEPP) that has received a service request with an unknown first label of a telescopic FQDN. Typically, this SEPP may interact with other SEPPs in the same PLMN in order to determine if there is an existing mapping for a given label to an FQDN of a foreign FQDN; this procedure is only expected to be used when multiple SEPPs are deployed in a PLMN. The procedure is described in Figure 5.4.3-1 below.




Figure 5.4.3-1: Foreign FQDN to Telescopic FQDN Mapping Procedure

1. The NF Service Consumer issues an HTTP GET request towards another SEPP with a query parameter "telescopic-label" containing the first label of a given telescopic FQDN, whose mapping towards an FQDN of an NF in a foreign PLMN needs to be verified.

2a. On successful processing of the request, the responding SEPP shall respond to the NF Service Consumer with a "200 OK" status code and a response body that contains a JSON object of type "TelescopicMapping", containing as attribute "foreignFqdn", containing the FQDN of the NF in the foreign PLMN.

5.5 Support of Roaming Intermediaries

5.5.1 General

Roaming services providers provide the technical and commercial means to facilitate the deployment and operation of roaming services between a client operator and a set of selected connected operators (see clause 6.45 of 3GPP TS 22.261 [28]).

The communication between two SEPPs may pass up to two RIs. The changes made by RIs to messages originated by a SEPP, based on the originating PLMNs policy, shall be identifiable by the receiving SEPP.

- NOTE 1: In this release of the specification, the descriptions in clause 5.5 are provided for Roaming Hubs as Roaming Intermediary, only.
- NOTE 2: The requirements specified in this clause for supporting Roaming Intermediaries can be applicable to SEPPs starting from Release 16. It is implementation specific how to support scenarios where the Release 16 and 17 SEPP of the roaming partners are not aligned regarding the support of Roaming Hub/Intermediaries.

5.5.2 N32-c connection establishment via RIs

5.5.2.1 N32-c connection establishment using HTTP CONNECT

5.5.2.1.1 General

This clause specifies the requirements that apply in scenarios where a PLMN SEPP makes use of RIs and support messages generated by RIs as specified in clause 5.9.3.2a of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6].

The N32 Handshake procedures specified in clause 5.2 shall apply between the c-SEPP and p-SEPP with the following additions:

- Prior to establishing the (end-to-end) N32-c TLS connection with the pSEPP, the c-SEPP shall send an HTTP CONNECT Request to the RI to request the RI to set up a TCP connection towards the p-SEPP as specified in clause 5.5.2.1.2 (with one RI between the SEPPs) and clause 5.5.2.1.3 (with two RIs between the SEPPs); upon receipt of a successful HTTP CONNECT response, the c-SEPP shall establish the N32-c TLS connection and proceed with the N32 Handshake procedures;
- If a RI disallows the establishment of the N32-c connection, the RI shall reject the HTTP CONNECT request as specified in clause 5.5.2.2.

5.5.2.1.2 Successful N32-c connection establishment via one RI

Figure 5.5.2.1.2-1 depicts the successful establishment of the N32-c connection between c-SEPP and p-SEPP via one RI (RI-A).




Figure 5.5.2.1.2-1: Successful N32-c connection establishment via one RI

- 1. The c-SEPP shall establish a TCP connection with the RI-A.
- 2. The c-SEPP shall send an HTTP CONNECT request to the RI-A to request the RI-A to establish a TCP connection towards the p-SEPP. The authority of the HTTP CONNECT request shall contain the p-SEPP's FQDN.

The c-SEPP shall include the following information in the 3gpp-Connect-Req-Info header in the HTTP CONNECT request:

- the HTTP connect purpose set to "n32c" to indicate that the TCP connection requested to be established is to set up an N32-c connection between the c-SEPP and p-SEPP;
- the c-SEPP's PLMN ID or SNPN ID; and
- the c-SEPP's FQDN.

The c-SEPP may also include the following information in the HTTP CONNECT request in the 3gpp-Connect-Req-Info header:

- the intended N32 purpose(s) of the N32 connection.

The HTTP CONNECT request shall not contain any content (i.e. payload).

- 3. The RI shall determine whether to (dis)allow the N32-c connection establishment based on its roaming contractual agreements and the following parameters:
 - the source PLMN ID or SNPN-ID; and
 - the target PLMN ID or SNPN ID.

The RI may also consider the following information for the above determination:

- the HTTP connect purpose, e.g. the RI may accept an HTTP CONNECT request only for the purpose of establishing a N32-c connection; and/or
- the intended N32 purposes, e.g. the RI may accept to establish the N32-c connection between the two PLMNs only for specific purposes.

- 4. If the RI-A allows the establishment of the N32-c connection, it shall establish the TCP connection towards the p-SEPP.
- 5. On successful processing of the request and establishment of the TCP connection towards the p-SEPP, the RI-A shall respond to the c-SEPP with a "200 OK" status code and may include the following information in the 3gpp-Connect-Resp-Info header in the HTTP CONNECT response:
 - the allowed N32 purposes for the N32 connection, which may be a subset of the N32 purposes signalled in the request; and/or.
 - the p-SEPP FQDN, if the RI has overwritten the p-SEPP FQDN received from the c-SEPP that the c-SEPP should use for sending its N32-c requests to the p-SEPP.
- 6 The c-SEPP shall establish the (end to end) N32-c TLS connection with the p-SEPP.
- 7. The c-SEPP shall proceed with the N32-c Handshake procedures specified in clause 5.2.

5.5.2.1.3 Successful N32-c connection establishment via two RIs

Figure 5.5.2.1.3-1 depicts the successful establishment of the N32-c connection between c-SEPPs and p-SEPP via two RI's (RI-A and RI-B).




Figure 5.5.2.1.3-1: Successful N32-c connection establishment via 2 RIs

Steps 1 to 3: same as steps 1 to 3 of Figure 5.5.2.1.2-1.

- 4. If the RI-A allows the establishment of the N32-c connection, it shall establish a TCP connection towards the RI-B and send an HTTP CONNECT request to the RI-B, as described in for step 2 but with the following modification:
 - the RI-A shall include the RI-A's FQDN in the 3gpp-Connect-Req-Info header, instead of including the c-SEPP's FQDN.

steps 5 and 6: same as steps 3 and 4 of Figure 5.5.2.1.2-1.

Steps 7a and 7b: same as step 5 of Figure 5.5.2.1.2-1. The RI-A shall send the response to the c-SEPP only upon receiving the 200 OK response from the RI-B.

Steps 8 and 9: same as steps 6 and 7 of Figure 5.5.2.1.2-1.

5.5.2.2 Error messages originated by RIs over the N32-c interface

5.5.2.2.1 General

The RI may reject an N32-c connection establishment request by rejecting the HTTP CONNECT request.

The following error scenarios are supported and further detailed in the following clauses.

1) Errors determined upon receipt of the HTTP CONNECT request

Examples: RI rejecting an HTTP CONNECT request due to:

- the N32-c connection cannot be setup due to contractual reasons;
- the N32-c connection cannot be setup due to a connectivity issue.

5.5.2.2.2 N32-c connection establishment rejection by RI A




Figure 5.5.2.2.2-1: N32-c connection establishment rejection by RIs

- 1. The c-SEPP shall send an HTTP CONNECT request message as specified in step 2 of Figure 5.5.2.1.2-1.
- 2. On failure, if the RI A determines that an N32 connection shall not or cannot be established e.g. due to contractual reasons or connectivity issues, the RI shall return an 4xx or 5xx response with the ProblemDetails providing details on the N32 related error for the c-SEPP.

5.5.2.2.3 N32-c connection establishment rejection by RI B




Figure 5.5.2.2.3-1: N32-c connection establishment rejection by RIs

- Steps 1 and 2: same as steps 2 and 4 of Figure 5.5.2.1.3-1.
- Steps 3 and 4: same as step 2 of Figure 5.5.2.2.2-1. The RI-A shall send the response to the c-SEPP only upon receiving the 4xx or 5xx response from the RI-B.

5.5.3 N32-f messages forwarding or origination via RIs

5.5.3.1 Error messages originated by (or related to) RIs over the N32-f interface

5.5.3.1.1 General

Error messages may be originated from either PLMN SEPPs or RIs to adjacent RIs or adjacent PLMN SEPPs, in an identifiable way. Furthermore, if allowed by the PLMN policy, the SEPP shall be able to send error messages on the N32 interface to a RI via the N32-f. See clause 5.9.3.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]).

The following error scenarios are supported and further detailed in the following clauses.

1) N32-f related error determined upon receipt of an N32-f request

Examples: RI rejecting an N32-f request due to:

- the N32-f connection cannot be setup due to contractual reasons;
- the N32-f connection cannot be setup due to a connectivity issue;
- incompatible encryption/plain information in the request (e.g. an IE is encrypted while it was expected in clear);
- N32-f request not delivered due contractual reasons.
- 2) N32-f related error determined upon receipt of an N32-f response

Example:

- incompatible encryption/plain information in the N32-f response (e.g. an IE is encrypted while it was expected in clear).
- 3) Applicative (i.e. SBI related) error determined upon receipt of an N32-f request

Example:

- RI rejecting a UE Registration on behalf of the involved PLMNs based on roaming agreements.

5.5.3.2 N32-f related error determined upon receipt of an N32-f request

5.5.3.2.1 Error message originated by RI via N32-f





Figure 5.5.3.2.1-1: Error message originated by RI via N32-f

- 1. The cSEPP receives a service request (HTTP request) message from cNF.
- 2. The cSEPP sends an N32-f request using PRINS security (i.e. JOSE protected message) to forward the service request message to the pSEPP.
- 3. The RI detects an N32-f related error and returns an N32-f error response, e.g. "403 Forbidden" response, with the ProblemDetails data providing details on the N32-f related error for the cSEPP. If the error is due to an encryption policy mismatch, the ProblemDetails may include the invalidParams attribute indicating which IEs were received ciphered when they were expected to be received in clear, and vice-versa. The N32-f error response may additionally contain a suggested status code (e.g. "504 Gateway Timeout") and a suggested application error (e.g. "TARGET_PLMN_NOT_REACHABLE") that the RI suggests the cSEPP to forward in the error response to the cNF, if the cSEPP cannot or does not attempt to re-send the N32-f request taking into account the N32-f error information.
- 4. If the cSEPP cannot or does not attempt to re-send the N32-f request taking into account the N32-f error information, the cSEPP sends an error response to the cNF. The cSEPP may use the suggested status code and/or suggested application error for the error response sent to the cNF (e.g. the cSEPP may send a "504 Gateway timeout" response with the cause "TARGET_PLMN_NOT_REACHABLE" in the ProblemDetails).

- 5. Alternatively, the cSEPP may re-send the N32-f request taking into account the N32-f error information that was received from the RI. For instance, if the cSEPP receives an error message with the application error "POLICY_MISMATCH", the cSEPP may change the data type encryption policy to 'Parameter shall be encrypted' or 'Parameter shall not be encrypted', if this is allowed by local policies, and if necessary, re-negotiate the data type encryption policy with the peer SEPP. After that, the cSEPP may re-send the N32-f Request based on the updated data type encryption policy to the RI.
- 6-9. The rest of procedures are processed accordingly.

5.5.3.2.2 Error message originated by pSEPP on N32-f (and optionally N32-c)



- 1. The cSEPP receives a service request (HTTP request) message from cNF.
- 2. The cSEPP sends an N32-f request using PRINS security (i.e. JOSE protected message) to forward the service request message to the pSEPP.
- 3. The pSEPP detects an N32-f related error and returns an N32-f error response, e.g. "403 Forbidden" response, with the ProblemDetails data providing details on the N32-f related error for the cSEPP. If the error is due to an encryption policy mismatch, the ProblemDetails may include the invalidParams attribute indicating which IEs were received ciphered when they were expected to be received in clear, and vice-versa. The N32-f error response may additionally contain a suggested status code (e.g. "504 Gateway Timeout") and a suggested application error (e.g. "TARGET_PLMN_NOT_REACHABLE") that the pSEPP suggests the cSEPP to forward

in the error response to the cNF, if the cSEPP cannot or does not attempt to re-send the N32-f request taking into account the N32-f error information.

- 4. The pSEPP may also send an N32-c request (HTTP POST request) towards the cSEPP with the content containing the N32-f error information that is to be reported (see clause 5.2.5).
- 5. The cSEPP shall return the status code "204 No Content" as the response to the N32-f Error Reporting. (see clause 5.2.5)
- 6. If the cSEPP cannot or does not attempt to re-send the N32-f request taking into account the N32-f error information, the cSEPP sends an error response to the cNF. The cSEPP may use the suggested status code and/or suggested application error for the error response to the cNF (e.g. the cSEPP may send a"504 Gateway timeout" response with the cause "TARGET_PLMN_NOT_REACHABLE" in the ProblemDetails).
- 7. Alternatively, the cSEPP may re-send the N32-f request taking into account the N32-f error information that was received from the pSEPP. For instance, if the cSEPP receives an error message with the application error "POLICY_MISMATCH", the cSEPP may change the data type encryption policy to 'Parameter shall be encrypted' or 'Parameter shall not be encrypted', if this is allowed by local policies, and if necessary, re-negotiate the data type encryption policy with the peer SEPP. After that, the cSEPP may re-send the N32-f Request based on the updated data type encryption policy to the RI.
- 8-11. The rest of procedures are processed accordingly.
- 5.5.3.3 N32-f related error determined upon receipt of an N32-f response
- 5.5.3.3.1 Error message originated by RI via N32-f interface

The procedure below describes the situation in which RI B detects an error in the response.




Figure 5.5.3.3.1-1: Error message originated by RI upon receipt of an N32-f response

- 1. The c-SEPP receives a service request (HTTP request) message from cNF.
- 2. The c-SEPP sends an N32-f request using PRINS security (i.e. JOSE protected message) to forward the service request message to the p-SEPP.
- 3. The pSEPP send the service request to the pNF (see clause 5.3.2.3)
- 4. The pNF returns the service response (e.g. 200 OK response) to the p-SEPP.
- 5. The p-SEPP encapsulates the service reponse in an N32-f response (i.e. JOSE protected message) and forwards the message to the c-SEPP (see clause 5.3.2.3).
- 6-8. As the RI B detects an N32-f related error (e.g. an IE is received ciphered while it should be in clear), depending on the RI's policy, the RI B may forward the response message (200 OK) encapsulating the service response to the c-SEPP and the c-SEPP sends the Service Response to the cNF.
- NOTE: In case the RI decides not to forward the response message to c-SEPP, NF consumers and NF producers can end up with de-synchronized status in case of a non-safe/idempotent operation. Mechanisms specified for 5GC SBI can be used for handling such situation (e.g. to detect the re-transmitted request).
- 9. The RI B sends a new N32-f request encapsulating an N32-c "N32-f Error Reporting request" message towards p-SEPP to report the error, as specified in clause 5.5.3.3.2. For instance, the Roaming Intermediary B reports the error "POLICY_MISMATCH" to the p-SEPP to indicate that IEs that should have been received unprotected have been ciphered.

Upon receipt of an N32-f request encapsulating an N32-c message with a dummy N32-c apiRoot, the receiving N32-f service instance of the p-SEPP looks up for a N32-c service instance that can support the N32-f connection (identified by the n32fContextId received in the N32-f request), substitutes the dummy N32-c apiRoot of the N32-c message with the apiRoot of that N32-c service instance and forwards the N32-c message

towards that N32-c service instance. The receiving N32-f service instance of the p-SEPP may also determine the message in which the error occurred, based on the messageId received in the N32-f request.

- 10. The p-SEPP returns "204 No Content" to the RI B.
- 11. The p-SEPP logs the error and, if possible and allowed by local policies, considers it for further N32-f messages the p-SEPP sends towards the c-SEPP (e.g. if the error indicated that IEs that should have been received unprotected have been ciphered, the p-SEPP may send the IEs in clear in further messages it forwards towards the c-SEPP).
- 12. The cNF may repeat its service request in case no response is being received from the c-SEPP.
- 13. The c-SEPP forwards the (repeated) service request from the cNF, if any. Alternatively, the c-SEPP may resend its N32-f request to the p-SEPP due to no response being received from the p-SEPP.
- 14. The pSEPP forwards the service request towards the pNF.
- 15. The pNF returns the service response (e.g. 200 OK response).
- 16. The p-SEPP encapsulates the service response in an N32-f response (i.e. JOSE protected message) and forwards the message to the c-SEPP, taking into account any error information earlier received from the cSEPP or RI, if possible and allowed by local policies (e.g. the IE previously reported in error in clear).
- 17. The c-SEPP send the service response to the cNF.

The procedure is identical if the RI A detects an error.

5.5.3.3.2 Error message formatting by the RI

If a RI needs to generate an N32-f related error message upon receiving an N32-f response, the RI shall construct a new N32-f request as defined in clause 5.3.2.3 for a SEPP with the following modifications:

- the DataToIntegrityProtectBlock (see Table 6.2.5.2.2-1) shall only contain the MetaData with the n32fContextId and messageId of the N32-f response message for which an error was detected.
- the patch instructions in the modificationsBlock (see Table 6.2.5.2.2-1) shall be based on an DataToIntegrityProtectBlock only containing the MetaData with the n32fContextId and messageId.
- the modifications in the "modificationsBlock" shall result in encoding a N32-c request for N32-f Error Reporting, i.e. it shall contain patch instructions:
 - adding the requestLine to form an HTTP POST request "{n32c-apiRoot}/n32c-handshake/v1/n32f-error"; the {n32c-apiRoot} shall be set to a dummy N32-c apiRoot defined as the N32-f apiRoot with the authority part prepended with the label "n32c".

EXAMPLE: If the n32-f apiRoot is https://sepp-n32f.5gc.mnc203.mcc422.3gppnetwork.org:443, the dummy N32-c apiRoot is:

 $\underline{https://n32c.sepp-n32f.5gc.mnc203.mcc422.3gppnetwork.org:443}$

NOTE: The dummy N32-c apiRoot in the N32-c message encapsulated in the N32-f request needs not contain addressing information of any actual N32-c service instance of the p-SEPP. Instead, this indicates to the receiving N32-f service instance of the p-SEPP that it needs to look up for a N32-c service instance and route the request towards that N32-c service instance. See step 9 of clause 5.5.3.3.1.

- adding headers, if applicable; and
- adding the payload that shall be the content of the N32-f Error Reporting Request, i.e N32fErrorInfo.
- the modificationsBlock shall contain the JWS signature of the RI.

The RI shall then send its N32-f request towards the p-SEPP, (using the same N32-f apiRoot as the one that was used in the original N32-f request sent to the p-SEPP) possibly via another intermediate RI.

5.5.3.4 Applicative (i.e. SBI related) error determined upon receipt of an N32-f request

5.5.3.4.1 Applicative error originated by RI via N32-f




Figure 5.5.3.4.1-1: Applicative (i.e. SBI related) error originated by RI via N32-f

- 1. The c-SEPP receives a service request (HTTP request) message from cNF.
- 2. The c-SEPP sends an N32-f request using PRINS security (i.e. JOSE protected message) to forward the service request message to the p-SEPP.
- 3. The RI detects an applicative error within the service request encapsulated in the N32-f request, e.g. the UE registration needs to be rejected on behalf of the involved PLMNs. The RI responds back with a successful N32-f response encapsulating a service error response instead of forwarding the N32-f request to the p-SEPP, as defined in clause 5.5.3.2.
- 4. The c-SEPP forwards the service error response towards the cNF.

5.5.3.4.2 Error message formatting by the RI

If a RI needs to generate a service error message upon receiving an N32-f request, the RI shall construct a service error response (to be sent within a successful N32-f response) as defined in clause 5.3.2.3 for a SEPP with the following modifications:

- the DataToIntegrityProtectBlock (see Table 6.2.5.2.3-1) shall only contain metadata with messageId and n32fContextId of the N32-f request message;
- the patch instructions in the modificationsBlock (see Table 6.2.5.2.3-1) shall be based on the intermediary originated DataToIntegrityProtectBlock only containing the MetaData with the messageId and n32fContextId.
- the modifications in the "modificationsBlock" shall result in encoding the service error response, i.e. it shall contain patch instructions;
 - adding the statusLine to form the desired service error response (e.g. 403 Forbidden response);
 - adding SBI headers, if applicable; and
 - adding the payload that shall be the content of the service error response (e.g. ProblemDetails with the reason why the registration request is rejected);
- the modificationsBlock shall contain the JWS signature of the RI.

The RI shall then send its N32-f response towards the c-SEPP, possibly via another intermediate RI, encapsulating the service error response.

5.5.3.5 Handling of applicative events trigger determined by RI

5.5.3.5.1 Applicative request message originated by RI via N32-f

The procedure below describes the situation in which RI detects an event where there are no immediate N32-f messages corresponding to react on. An independent request message is initiated by the RI.




Figure 5.5.3.5.1-1: Applicative request message originated by RI via N32-f

1. The RI detects an applicative event regarding the status of roaming where the RI requires to change the status on specific NF.

NOTE 1: How the RI becomes aware of n32fContextId is outside the scope of this specification.

- 2. The RI shall create a new N32-f request encapsulating a request for the appropriate NF as specified in clause 5.5.3.5.2, and shall send the request towards pSEPP for the message targeted to NF Producer.
- NOTE 2: The encapsulated message itself is not in scope of N32 definition. Here only the transport is defined, the content is application specific.
- 3a. The p-SEPP shall verify that the RI is allowed to generate the given request according to operator policy. If allowed by the policy, the p-SEPP shall reconstruct the request to be forwarded to the NF and forward the request to the target NF.
- 3b. If the message is not allowed by the policy as in step 3a, then the responding SEPP shall return an appropriate 4xx/5xx status code together with the "ProblemDetails" in the content of the response.
- 4. The target NF shall return an appropriate response to the p-SEPP.
- 5. The pSEPP shall forward the response using PRINS security to RI. Since the RI is the NF consumer of the request, the response is not forwarded to any other entity from the RI.
- NOTE 3: Step 5 does not prohibit the RI to initiate any further signalling corresponding to the received HTTP response.

The procedure is analogous if the RI detects an event that is required on NF beyond the other RI. In this case the request is routed via the other RI to the p-SEPP.

NOTE 4: As there can only be two RIs between two SEPPs, the scenario described above refers to the case when the RI needs to send to the SEPP connected via the other RI.

5.5.3.5.2 Originated request message formatting by the RI

If a RI needs to generate an applicative request message, the RI shall construct a new N32-f request as defined in clause 5.5.3.3.2, with the difference that the procedure applies to request instead of response. However, the

modifications in the "modificationsBlock" shall result in encoding a request for NF API the i.e. it shall contain patch instructions:

- adding the requestLine to form an HTTP POST request for the target NF the request is intended for;
- adding headers, if applicable; and
- adding the content that shall be the content of the requested NF service operation.

NOTE: The present document does not specify how the RI knows the apiRoot of the NF service.

5.5.4 N32-f Context and/or N32-f Connection termination initiated by the RI

5.5.4.1 General

The RI may need to instruct the SEPP to terminate or re-establish an N32-f connection and/or an N32-f context.

The RI may do so either by:

- sending an N32-f error reporting request encapsulated in a N32-f reformatted request message (e.g. when no N32-f messages are being received when the event triggering this procedure occurs); or
- sending an N32-f error response message upon receiving an N32-f request.

In either case, the RI should indicate, in the error information, the cause of the error and whether the SEPP should terminate or re-establish the N32-f connection and/or the N32-f context. The RI may also indicate an alternative RI entity (from the same RI operator) through which the N32-f context or N32-f connection should be re-established.

NOTE: A RI can trigger the above procedures towards a local SEPP or a remote SEPP.

5.5.4.2 N32-f error reporting request encapsulated in a N32-f request

The RI may instruct the SEPP to terminate or re-establish an N32-f connection and/or an N32-f context by encapsulating an N32-f error reporting request within an N32-f request message.

The N32-f error reporting request message serves as an error notification to the SEPP and based or the reported error information (error cause and indication to release or re-establish the N32-f context and/or N32-f connection), the SEPP shall take the appropriate action e.g. by terminating or re-establishing the N32-f connection and/or N32-f context if so requested by the RI. If the RI requested to re-establish the N32-f context and/or the N32-f connection and provided an alternative RI entity in the error information, the SEPP should re-establish the N32-f connection and/or the N32-f context via the alternative RI entity.




Figure 5.5.4.2.-1: N32-f Error Reporting Request encapsulated in a N32-f request

- 1. The RI-B decides to terminate the N32-f context. The RI-B sends an N32-f request message encapsulating an N32-f Error Reporting Request towards p-SEPP to report the error. The error message signals to the SEPP that the N32-f context is requested to be terminated.
- 2. The p-SEPP N32-f service instance sends the N32-c request message (i.e. N32-f Error Reporting Request) towards the target N32-c service instance, including the RI sender identity (so that the SEPP N32-c instance can determine the RI that originated the error and take the proper decision based the contract or the agreement between the SEPP and the RI).

Based on the error information received from the RI, the p-SEPP terminates the N32-f connection and/or the N32-f context (the latter is depicted in the figure).

The p-SEPP returns "200 OK response" to the RI-B, encapsulating a 204 No Content response message (i.e. the N32-f Error Reporting Response).

3. The p-SEPP initiates the N32-f Context Termination Procedure by sending N32-f context termination request message towards the c-SEPP based on the received error information from the RI-B.

If the RI requests to re-establish the N32-f context and/or the N32-f connection and provides an alternative RI entity in the error information, the SEPP should re-establish the N32-f connection and/or N32-f context via the alternative RI entity (not depicted in the figure).

5.5.4.3 Using N32-f error response

The RI may send error information in response to an incoming N32-f request message, in which case it rejects the N32-f request message with an 4xx or 5xx response message including the error information.




Figure 5.5.4.3.-1: The RI-B sends 4XX/5XX response to tear down the N32-f context

- 1. The RI-B receives an N32-f request message. The RI-B determines to terminate the N32-f context.
- 2. The RI-B sends a 4XX/5XX response to the p-SEPP including error information signalling to the SEPP that the N32-f context is requested to be terminated.

The p-SEPP initiates the N32-f Context Termination Procedure by sending a N32-f context termination request message towards the c-SEPP based on the error information received from the RI-B.

6 API Definitions

6.1 N32 Handshake API

6.1.1 API URI

The N32 Handshake Procedures shall use the N32 Handshake API.

The API URI of the N32 Handshake API shall be:

{apiRoot}/<apiName>/<apiVersion>

The request URIs used in HTTP requests from the initiating SEPP towards the responding SEPP shall have the Resource URI structure defined in clause 4.4.1 of 3GPP TS 29.501 [5], i.e.:

{apiRoot}/<apiName>/<apiVersion>/<apiSpecificResourceUriPart>

with the following components:

- The {apiRoot} shall be set as described in 3GPP TS 29.501 [5].
- The <apiName> shall be "n32c-handshake".
- The <apiVersion> shall be "v1".
- The <apiSpecificResourceUriPart> shall be set as described in clause 6.1.4.

6.1.2 Usage of HTTP

6.1.2.1 General

HTTP/2, as defined in IETF RFC 9113 [7], shall be used as specified in clause 4.3.2.1.

HTTP/2 shall be transported as specified in clause 4.3.3.

HTTP messages and bodies for the N32 handshake API shall comply with the OpenAPI [27] specification contained in Annex A.

6.1.2.2 HTTP standard headers

6.1.2.2.1 General

The HTTP standard headers as specified in clause 4.3.2.2 shall be supported for this API.

6.1.2.2.2 Content type

The following content types shall be supported:

- the JSON format (see IETF RFC 8259 [8]). The use of the JSON format shall be signalled by the content type "application/json". See also clause 5.3.4.
- the Problem Details JSON Object (see IETF RFC 9457 [22]). The use of the Problem Details JSON object in a HTTP response body shall be signalled by the content type "application/problem+json".

6.1.2.3 HTTP custom headers

6.1.2.3.1 General

In this release of the specification, no specific custom headers are defined for the N32 handshake API.

For 3GPP specific HTTP custom headers used across all service based interfaces, see clause 4.3.2.3.

6.1.3 Resources

6.1.3.1 Overview

There are no resources in this version of the N32 handshake API. All the operations are realized as custom operations without resources.

6.1.4 Custom Operations without Associated Resources

6.1.4.1 Overview

Table 6.1.4.1-1: Custom operations without associated resources

Operation Name	Custom operation URI	Mapped HTTP method	Description
Security Capability Negotiation	/exchange-capability	POST	This is the N32 capability exchange API used to negotiate the security capabilities between SEPPs or tear down the N32-f TLS connection.
Parameter Exchange	/exchange-params	POST	This is the N32 parameter exchange API used to exchange the cipher suites and protection policies.
N32-f Context Terminate	/n32f-terminate	POST	This is the N32-f context termination procedure API.
N32-f Error Reporting	/n32f-error	POST	This is the N32-f error reporting procedure API.

6.1.4.2 Operation: Security Capability Negotiation

6.1.4.2.1 Description

This custom operation is used between the SEPPs to negotiate their security capabilities or to tear down the N32-f connection when negotiated security scheme is TLS. The HTTP method POST shall be used on the following URI:

URI: {apiRoot}/n32c-handshake/<apiVersion>/exchange-capability

This operation shall support the resource URI variables defined in table 6.1.4.2.1-1.

Table 6.1.4.2.1-1: Resource URI variables for this Operation

Name	Data type	Definition
apiRoot	string	See clause 6.1.1.

6.1.4.2.2 Operation Definition

This operation shall support the request data structures and response codes specified in tables 6.2.4.2.2-1 and 6.2.4.2.2-2

Table 6.1.4.2.2-1: Data structures supported by the POST Request Body

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
SecNegotiateReq	М	1	The IE shall contain the security capabilities of the initiating SEPP.
Data			

Table 6.1.4.2.2-2: Data structures supported by the POST Response Body on this resource

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Response codes	Description
SecNegotiateRspData	M	1	200 OK	This represents the successful processing of the requested security capabilities. The responding SEPP shall provide the security capabilities that it has selected, in the response.
ExtRedirectResponse	0	01	307 Temporary Redirect	Temporary redirection. See clause 6.1.8.
ProblemDetails	0	01	403 Forbidden	The "cause" attribute may be used to indicate one of the following application errors: - REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED When the receiving SEPP fails to negotiate the security capability, the "cause" attribute shall be set to "NEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED".
ProblemDetails	0	01	409 Conflict	The "cause" attribute may be used to indicate one of the following application errors: - N32C_EXCHANGE_CAPABILITY_ONGOING, when the receiving SEPP receives an N32-c exchange capability request from a peer SEPP while it is waiting for an N32-c exchange capability response message from the same peer SEPP as specified in clause 5.2.2.
	0 [4]	other than the	ose specified	e POST method listed in Table 5.2.7.1-1 of in the table above also apply, with a ProblemDetails data

Table 6.1.4.2.2-3: Headers supported by the 307 response code on this resource

Name	Data type	P	Cardinality	Description
Location	string	М	1	The URI of the SEPP towards which the request is redirected. See clause 6.1.8.

6.1.4.3 Operation: Parameter Exchange

6.1.4.3.1 Description

This custom operation is used between the SEPPs to exchange the parameters for the N32-f connection. The HTTP method POST shall be used on the following URI:

URI: {apiRoot}/n32c-handshake/<apiVersion>/exchange-params

This operation shall support the resource URI variables defined in table 6.1.4.3.1-1.

Table 6.1.4.3.1-1: Resource URI variables for this Operation

Name	Data type	Definition		
apiRoot	string	See clause 6.1.1.		

6.1.4.3.2 Operation Definition

This operation shall support the request data structures and response codes specified in tables 6.1.4.3.2-1 and 6.1.4.3.2-2.

Table 6.1.4.3.2-1: Data structures supported by the POST Request Body

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
SecParamExchR	М	1	The IE shall contain the parameters requested by the requesting SEPP.
eqData			

Table 6.1.4.3.2-2: Data structures supported by the POST Response Body on this resource

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Response codes	Description	
SecParamExchRspData	M	1	200 OK	This represents the successful processing of the requested parameters. The SEPP shall provide the selected parameters (i.e selected cipher suite and/or selected data type encryption policy) depending on what was requested by the requesting SEPP and what is supported by the responding SEPP, or the SEPP shall provide the modification policy and/or security information lists of the connected RIs.	
ProblemDetails		01		The "cause" attribute may be used to indicate one of the following application errors: - REQUESTED_PARAM_MISMATCH - SECURITY_PARAM_EXCHANGE_COLLISION, when the receiving SEPP receives a security parameter exchange request from a peer SEPP while it is waiting for a security parameter exchange response message from the same peer SEPP as specified in clause 5.2.3.2.	
NOTE: The mandatory HTTP error status codes for the POST method listed in Table 5.2.7.1-1 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] other than those specified in the table above also apply, with a ProblemDetails data					
type (see clause 5.2.7 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]).					

type (see clause 5.2.7 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]).

6.1.4.4 Operation: N32-f Context Terminate

6.1.4.4.1 Description

This custom operation is used between the SEPPs to terminate an N32-f context. The HTTP method POST shall be used on the following URI:

URI: {apiRoot}/n32c-handshake/<apiVersion>/n32f-terminate

This operation shall support the resource URI variables defined in table 6.1.4.3.1-1.

Table 6.1.4.4.1-1: Resource URI variables for this Operation

Name	Data type	Definition
apiRoot	string	See clause 6.1.1.

6.1.4.4.2 Operation Definition

This operation shall support the request data structures and response codes specified in tables 6.1.4.4.2-1 and 6.1.4.4.2-2.

Table 6.1.4.4.2-1: Data structures supported by the POST Request Body

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
N32fContextInfo	М	1	The IE shall contain the information about the N32-f context requested to be
			terminated by the requesting SEPP.

Table 6.1.4.4.2-2: Data structures supported by the POST Response Body on this resource

Data type	P	Cardinality	Response codes	Description
N32fContextInfo	М	1		This represents the successful deletion of the request N32-f context. The responding SEPP shall return the "n32fContextId" it had towards the initiating SEPP, in this IE.
NOTE: The mandatory HTTP error status codes for the POST method listed in Table 5.2.7.1-1 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] other than those specified in the table above also apply, with a ProblemDetails data type (see clause 5.2.7 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]).				

6.1.4.5 Operation: N32-f Error Reporting

6.1.4.5.1 Description

This custom operation is used between the SEPPs to report errors identified while processing the messages received on N32-f. The HTTP method POST shall be used on the following URI:

URI: {apiRoot}/n32c-handshake/<apiVersion>/n32f-error

This operation shall support the resource URI variables defined in table 6.1.4.5.1-1.

Table 6.1.4.5.1-1: Resource URI variables for this Operation

Name	Data type	Definition
apiRoot	string	See clause 6.1.1.

6.1.4.5.2 Operation Definition

This operation shall support the request data structures and response codes specified in tables 6.1.4.5.2-1 and 6.1.4.5.2-2

Table 6.1.4.5.2-1: Data structures supported by the POST Request Body

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
N32fErrorInfo	М		The IE shall contain the information about the N32-f message that failed to process at the SEPP initiating the N32-f error reporting procedure, together with information related to the nature of the error.

Table 6.1.4.5.2-2: Data structures supported by the POST Response Body on this resource

Data	type	Р	Cardinality	Response codes	Description			
				204 No	This represents the successful processing of the N32-f error			
				Content	report at the receiving SEPP.			
NOTE:	NOTE: The mandatory HTTP error status codes for the POST method listed in Table 5.2.7.1-1 of							
3GPP TS 29.500 [4] other than those specified in the table above also apply, with a ProblemDetails data type (see clause 5.2.7 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]).								

6.1.5 Data Model

6.1.5.1 General

This clause specifies the application data model supported by the API.

Table 6.1.5.1-1 specifies the data types defined for the N32 interface.

Table 6.1.5.1-1: N32 specific Data Types

Data type	Clause defined	Description
SecNegotiateReqData	6.1.5.2.2	Defines the security capabilities of a SEPP sent to a receiving SEPP.
SecNegotiateRspData	6.1.5.2.3	Defines the selected security capabilities by a SEPP.
SecurityCapability	6.1.5.3.3	Enumeration of security capabilities.
SecParamExchReqData	6.1.5.2.4	Request data structure for parameter exchange
SecParamExchRspData	6.1.5.2.5	Response data structure for parameter exchange
ProtectionPolicy	6.1.5.2.6	The protection policy to be negotiated between the SEPPs.
ApileMapping	6.1.5.2.7	API URI to IE mapping on which the protection policy needs to be applied.
leInfo	6.1.5.2.8	Protection and modification policy for the IE
ApiSignature	6.1.5.2.9	API URI of the service operation
N32fContextInfo	6.1.5.2.10	N32-f context information
N32fErrorInfo	6.1.5.2.11	N32-f error information.
FailedModificationInfo	6.1.5.2.12	Information on N32-f modifications block that failed to process.
N32fErrorDetail	6.1.5.2.13	Details about the N32f error.
CallbackName	6.1.5.2.14	Callback Name.
IpxProviderSecInfo	6.1.5.2.15	Defines the security information list of a RI.
IntendedN32Purpose	6.1.5.2.16	Defines the intended N32 establishment purpose.
RiErrorInformation	6.1.5.2.17	RI error information.
ExtRedirectResponse	6.1.5.2.18	Extension of the redirection response
RedirectResponseAddInfo	6.1.5.2.19	Additional information in the redirection response
HttpMethod	6.1.5.3.4	Enumeration of HTTP methods.
IeТуре	6.1.5.3.5	Enumeration of types of IEs (i.e kind of IE) to specify the protection policy.
IeLocation	6.1.5.3.6	Location of the IE in a HTTP message.
N32fErrorType	6.1.5.3.7	Type of error while processing N32-f message.
FailureReason	6.1.5.3.8	Reason for failure to reconstruct a HTTP/2 message from N32-f message.
N32Purpose	6.1.5.3.9	Usage purpose of establishing N32 connectivity
N32ReleaseIndication	6.1.5.3.10	N32-f connection or N32-f context release instructions.

Table 6.1.5.1-2 specifies data types re-used by the N32 interface protocol from other specifications, including a reference to their respective specifications and when needed, a short description of their use within the N32 Handshake service based interface.

Table 6.1.5.1-2: N32 re-used Data Types

Data type	Reference	Comments
Fqdn	3GPP TS 29.571 [12]	
SupportedFeatures	3GPP TS 29.571 [12]	Used to negotiate the applicability of the features defined in
		table 6.1.7-1.

6.1.5.2 Structured data types

6.1.5.2.1 Introduction

This clause defines the structures to be used in the N32 Handshake API.

6.1.5.2.2 Type: SecNegotiateReqData

Table 6.1.5.2.2-1: Definition of type SecNegotiateReqData

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description	Applicability
sender	Fqdn	М	1	This IE shall uniquely identify the SEPP that is	
				sending the request. This IE is used to identify	
				and store the negotiated security capability against the right SEPP.	
n32Handshakeld	string	С	01	This IE shall be present if the initiating SEPP	
I I O Z I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	ouring		01	support N32 handshake identifier and the N32	
				handshake identifier may be used to correlate the	
				N32-f connection to the parent N32-c context for	
				TLS security (see clause 5.3.3.2).	
				141 IF I II 4 1 1 100	
				When present, this IE shall contain the N32	
				handshake identifier to be used by the responding SEPP, if TLS security is negotiated,	
				for:	
				- TLS protected message forwarding procedure	
				over N32-f towards the initiating SEPP	
				- subsequent N32-c signalling request related to	
				this N32-c connection (e.g. to request to tear	
				down the N32-f TLS connection)	
				The n32Handshakeld shall encode a 64-bit	
				integer in hexadecimal representation. Each	
				character in the string shall take a value of "0" to	
				"9" or "A" to "F" and shall represent 4 bits. The	
				most significant character representing the 4	
				most significant bits of the N32 handshake Id	
				shall appear first in the string, and the character	
				representing the 4 least significant bit of the N32	
				handshake Id shall appear last in the string.	
				Pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}\$'	
				Example: "0600AD1855BD6007".	
supportedSecCa	array(Sec	М	1N	This IE shall contain the list of security	
pabilityList	urityCapa			capabilities that the requesting SEPP supports.	
	bility)			To tear down the N32-f TLS connection and to	
				reset N32-c context (as identified by the	
				n32Handshakeld IE, if present), this IE shall set	
3GppSbiTargetA	boolean	С	01	SecurityCapability as "NONE". This IE should be present and indicate that the	
piRootSupported	boolean		01	3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot HTTP header is	
pirtootoupportou				supported, if TLS security is supported for N32f	
				message forwarding.	
				When present, it shall indicate if TLS security	
				using the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot HTTP header	
				is supported: - true: supported	
				- false (default): not supported	
				(NOTE 1)	
plmnldList	array(Plm	0	1N	A list of PLMN IDs associated with the SEPP,	
	nld) `			which is sending the request. The list to be stored	
				by the receiving SEPP in a N32-f Context (see	
annulal :-+			4 N	clause 5.9.3 in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6])	
snpnldList	array(Plm nldNid)	0	1N	A list of SNPN IDs associated with the SEPP, which is sending the request. The list to be stored	
	individ)			by the receiving SEPP in a N32-f Context (see	
				clause 5.9.3 in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6])	
targetPlmnId	Plmnld	0	1	When present, this IE shall contain a PLMN ID of	
				the target SEPP.	
				Con playing 5 2 2 ptop 4	
torgotCoopld	DimpidNid		01	See clause 5.2.2 step 1.	
targetSnpnId	PlmnldNid	0	U I	When present, this IE shall contain a SNPN ID of the target SEPP. See clause 5.2.2 step 1.	
intendedUsageP	array(Inte	0	1N	This attribute notifies the list of requested usage	
urpose	ndedN32P			purpose the N32 is established for.	
1 .	urpose)	i	1	I' '	1

supportedFeatur	Supported	С	01	This IE shall be present if at least one feature	
es	Features			defined in clause 6.1.7 is supported	
senderN32fFqdn	Fqdn	0	01	This IE may be present if the sending SEPP wishes the receiving SEPP to establish the N32-f connection towards a specific FQDN. (NOTE 2)	SNDN32F
senderN32fPortL ist	array(Uint eger)	0	1N	This IE may be present if the sending SEPP wishes the receiving SEPP to establish the N32-f connection using a specific port number. The N32-f ports list shall contain one port number per security capability encoded in the supportedSecCapabilityList IE and it shall be ordered in the same order as the security capabilities list. For example, if TLS is the first security capability in the supportedSecCapabilityList, then the first N32-f port in the senderN32fPortList shall be for TLS. (NOTE 3)	SNDN32F

- NOTE 1: The attribute name does not follow the naming conventions specified in 3GPP TS 29.501 [5]. The attribute name is kept though as defined in the current specification for backward compatibility reason.
- NOTE 2: If the senderN32fFqdn IE is absent, the receiving SEPP establishes the N32-f connection towards the sending SEPP using the N32-c FQDN and/or local configuration.

 NOTE 3: If the senderN32fPortList IE is absent, the receiving SEPP shall use a locally configured port if any,
- NOTE 3: If the senderN32fPortList IE is absent, the receiving SEPP shall use a locally configured port if any, otherwise the default HTTPs port number, i.e., TCP port 443 for "https" URIs as specified in IETF RFC 9113 [7].

6.1.5.2.3 Type: SecNegotiateRspData

Table 6.1.5.2.3-1: Definition of type SecNegotiateRspData

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description	Applicability
sender	Fqdn	М	1	This IE shall uniquely identify the SEPP	
				that is sending the response. This IE is	
				used to identify and store the negotiated security capability against the right SEPP.	
selectedSecCap	SecurityCapabil	М	1	This IE shall contain the security capability	
ability	ity			selected by the responding SEPP.	
				When the request is for tearing down the	
				N32-f TLS connection, the responding	
				SEPP shall add SecurityCapability as "NONE".	
n32HandshakeId	string	С	01	This IE shall be present, if the N32	
	J9			handshake identifier to was received in the	
				request and the responding SEPP	
				supports the N32 handshake identifier.	
				When present, this IE shall contain the	
				N32 handshake identifier to be used by	
				the initiating SEPP for:	
				- TLS protected message forwarding	
				procedure over N32-f towards the	
				responding SEPP - subsequent N32-c signalling request	
				related to this N32-c connection (e.g. to	
				request to tear down the N32-f TLS	
				connection)	
				TI 0011 11 11 11 11	
				The n32Handshakeld in the response may have a different value than the	
				n32Handshakeld received in the request.	
				no-rangenamena recented in the requesti	
				The n32Handshakeld shall encode a 64-	
				bit integer in hexadecimal representation.	
				Each character in the string shall take a value of "0" to "9" or "A" to "F" and shall	
				represent 4 bits. The most significant	
				character representing the 4 most	
				significant bits of the N32 handshake Id	
				shall appear first in the string, and the	
				character representing the 4 least significant bit of the N32 handshake Id	
				shall appear last in the string.	
				onal appear last in the stillig.	
				Pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}\$'	
				Example: "0600AD1855BD6007".	
3GppSbiTargetA	boolean	С	01	This IE should be present and indicate	
piRootSupported				that the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot HTTP header is supported, if TLS security is	
				negotiated for N32f message forwarding	
				and the initiating SEPP indicated support	
				of this header.	
				When present it shall indicate if TLO	
				When present, it shall indicate if TLS security using the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-	
				apiRoot HTTP header is supported:	
				- true: supported	
				- false (default): not supported	
nlmnldl ist	orroy/Dlass (4)	_	1 N	(NOTE 1)	
plmnldList	array(Plmnld)	0	1N	A list of PLMN IDs of a single PLMN associated with the SEPP, which is	
				sending the response. The list to be stored	
				by the receiving SEPP in a N32-f Context	
				(see clause 5.9.3 in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]).	
				If different PLMNs are represented by	
				different PLMN IDs supported by a SEPP, then the SEPP shall select the PLMN as	
				specified in clause 5.2.2 step 2a.	
<u> </u>	I.	l	1	1-1-1	

snpnIdList	array(PlmnldNi d)	0	1N	A list of SNPN IDs of a single SNPN associated with the SEPP, which is sending the response. The list to be stored by the receiving SEPP in a N32-f Context (see clause 5.9.3 in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]). If different SNPNs are represented by different SNPN IDs supported by a SEPP, then the SEPP shall select the SNPN as specified in clause 5.2.2 step 2a.	
allowedUsagePu rpose	array(Intended N32Purpose)	0	1N	This attribute notifies the list of allowed usage purpose the N32 is established for. IntendedN32Purpose shall not include attribute "cause".	
rejectedUsagePu rpose	array(Intended N32Purpose)	0	1N	This attribute notifies the list of rejected usage purpose the N32 is established for. Shall only be present if any of the requested usage purpose is rejected.	
supportedFeatur es	SupportedFeat ures	С	01	This IE shall be present if at least one feature defined in clause 6.1.7 is supported	
senderN32fFqdn	Fqdn	0	01	This IE may be present if the sending SEPP wishes the receiving SEPP to establish the N32-f connection towards a specific FQDN. (NOTE 2)	SNDN32F
senderN32fPort	Uinteger	0	01	This IE may be present if the sending SEPP wishes the receiving SEPP to establish the N32-f connection using a specific port number. (NOTE 3)	SNDN32F

NOTE 1: The attribute name does not follow the naming conventions specified in 3GPP TS 29.501 [5]. The attribute name is kept though as defined in the current specification for backward compatibility reason.

NOTE 2: If the senderN32fFqdn IE is absent, the receiving SEPP establishes the N32-f connection towards the sending SEPP using the N32-c FQDN and/or local configuration.

NOTE 3: If the senderN32fPort number is absent, the receiving SEPP shall use a locally configured port, if any, otherwise the default HTTPs port number, i.e., TCP port 443 for "https" URIs as specified in IETF RFC 9113 [7].

6.1.5.2.4 Type: SecParamExchReqData

Table 6.1.5.2.4-1: Definition of type SecParamExchReqData

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardin ality	Description	Applicability
n32fContextId	string	M	1	This IE shall contain the context identifier to be used by the responding SEPP for subsequent JOSE protected message forwarding procedure over N32-f towards the initiating SEPP. The initiating SEPP shall use this context identifier to locate the cipher suite and protection policy exchanged and agreed to be used with the responding SEPP, for the message forwarding procedure over N32-f.	
				The n32fContextId shall encode a 64-bit integer in hexadecimal representation. Each character in the string shall take a value of "0" to "9" or "A" to "F" and shall represent 4 bits. The most significant character representing the 4 most significant bits of the N32-f context Id shall appear first in the string, and the character representing the 4 least significant bit of the N32-f context Id shall appear last in the string.	
				Pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}\$' Example: "0600AD1855BD6007".	
jweCipherSuiteLi st	array(string)	С	1N	This IE shall be present during the parameter exchange procedure for cipher suite negotiation (see clause 5.2.3.2). When present, this IE shall contain the ordered list of JWE cipher suites supported by the requesting SEPP. Valid values for the string are as specified in clause 5.1 of IETF RFC 7518 [13].	
jwsCipherSuiteLi st	array(string)	С	1N	This IE shall be present during the parameter exchange procedure for cipher suite negotiation (see clause 5.2.3.2). When present, this IE shall contain the ordered list of JWS cipher suites supported by the requesting SEPP. Valid values for the string are as specified in clause 3.1 of IETF RFC 7518 [13].	
protectionPolicyI nfo	ProtectionPoli cy	С	01	Either this IE or the secProfiles IE shall be present during the parameter exchange procedure for protection policy exchange(see clause 5.2.3.3). When present, this IE shall contain the data type encryption policy requested by the requesting SEPP and/or the modification policy supported by the RI(s) on the side of the requesting SEPP.	
secProfiles	array(string)	С	1N	Either this IE or the protectionPolicyInfo IE shall be present during the parameter exchange procedure for protection policy exchange(see clause 5.2.3.3). When present, this IE shall indicate the candidate list of security profiles that the initiating SEPP is supporting for PRINS. The list may contain up to 256 profiles.	PSEPRO
ipxProviderSecInf oList	array(IpxProvi derSecInfo)	С	1N	This IE includes the list of RI security information.	
sender	Fqdn	С	01	This IE shall be present if the Parameter Exchange request is sent on a different N32-c HTTP connection than the one used to perform the Security Capability Negotiation procedure. It may be present otherwise.	
				When present, it shall uniquely identify the SEPP that is sending the request. This IE is used to store the exchanged parameters against the right SEPP.	

6.1.5.2.5 Type: SecParamExchRspData

Table 6.1.5.2.5-1: Definition of type SecParamExchRspData

Attribute name	Data type	P	Car dina lity	Description	Applicability
n32fContextId	string	M	1	This IE shall contain the context identifier to be used by the initiating SEPP for subsequent JOSE protected message forwarding procedure over N32-f towards the responding SEPP. The responding SEPP shall use this context identifier to locate the cipher suite and protection policy exchanged and agreed to be used with the initiating SEPP, for the message forwarding procedure over N32-f. The n32fContextId shall encode a 64-bit integer in hexadecimal representation. Each character in the string shall take a value of "0" to "9" or "A" to "F" and shall represent 4 bits. The most significant character representing the 4 most significant bits of the N32-f context Id shall appear first in the string, and the character representing the 4 least significant bit of the N32-f context Id shall appear last in the string. Pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}\$' Example: "0600AD1855BD6007".	
selectedJweCipherSuite	string	С	1	This IE shall be present during the parameter exchange procedure for cipher suite negotiation (see clause 5.2.3.2). When present, this IE shall contain the JWE cipher suite selected by the	
selectedJwsCipherSuite	string	С	1	responding SEPP. This IE shall be present during the parameter exchange procedure for cipher suite negotiation (see clause 5.2.3.2). When present, this IE shall contain the JWS cipher suite selected by the responding SEPP.	
selProtectionPolicyInfo	ProtectionP olicy	С	01	This IE shall be present during the parameter exchange procedure for protection policy exchange (see clause 5.2.3.3) if the initiating SEPP included the protectionPolicyInfo IE in the exchange parameter request message to the responding SEPP. When present, this IE shall contain the data type encryption policy selected by the responding SEPP and/or the modification policy supported by the RI(s) on the side of the responding SEPP.	
selSecProfiles	array(string)	С	1N	This IE shall indicate the list of selected security profiles applicable for messages forwarding over N32-f if the initiating SEPP sent a candidate list of security profiles in the exchange parameter request message to the responding SEPP. The list may contain up to 256 profiles.	PSEPRO
ipxProviderSecInfoList	array(IpxPro viderSecInf o)	С	1N	This IE includes the list of RI security information.	
sender	Fqdn	С	01	This IE shall be present if the Parameter Exchange response is sent on a different N32-c HTTP connection than the one used to perform the Security Capability Negotiation procedure. It may be present otherwise. When present, it shall uniquely identify the SEPP that is sending the response. This IE is used to store the exchanged parameters against the right SEPP.	

6.1.5.2.6 Type: ProtectionPolicy

Table 6.1.5.2.6-1: Definition of type ProtectionPolicy

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
apileMappingList	array(ApileMappi ng)	M	1N	Contains an array of API URI to IE type - IE name mapping. The mapping includes an indication against each IE whether that IE is allowed to be modified by the RI on the side of the SEPP or not.
dataTypeEncPolicy	array(leType)	С	1N	This IE shall be present when the SEPPs need to exchange the IE protection policies. When present, this IE shall contain the list of IE types that the SEPP intends to protect by ciphering.

6.1.5.2.7 Type: ApileMapping

Table 6.1.5.2.7-1: Definition of type ApileMapping

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
apiSignature	ApiSignature	M	1	This IE shall contain: - The API URI of the NF service operations following request/response semantic; or - The API URI of the subscribe / unsubscribe service operation
apiMethod	HttpMethod	М	1	This IE shall contain the HTTP method used by the API.
leList	array(leInfo)	М	1N	This IE shall contain the array of les in the API. (NOTE 1, NOTE 2)

NOTE 1: The attribute name does not follow the naming conventions specified in 3GPP TS 29.501 [5]. The attribute name is kept though as defined in the current specification for backward compatibility reason.

NOTE 2: The protection policy to apply for a recursive non-leaf IE shall be the same as the protection policy defined for the ancestor attribute with the same data type. Accordingly, the IeList signaled over N32-c shall not repeat/include the protection policies of the child attributes of the recursive non-leaf IE (see examples in Annex F).

6.1.5.2.8 Type: leInfo

Table 6.1.5.2.8-1: Definition of type lelnfo

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
ieLoc	leLocation	M	1	This IE shall contain the location of the IE mentioned in "reqle" or "rsple" (i.e Variable in URI path or URI query parameter or HTTP header or JSON body or multipart message)
іеТуре	IeType	М	1	This IE shall contain the type of the IE, representing the nature of the information the IE is carrying.
reqle	string	C	01	This IE shall be included when the les in HTTP/2 request messages of an API need to be protected when forwarded over N32-f. When present, this IE shall contain: - The JSON pointer representation of the IE to be protected, if the "ieLoc" indicates "BODY". Only the JSON pointer of the leaf IEs and recursive non-leaf IEs are included; - The name of the Variable in URI path to be protected, if the "ieLoc" indicates "URI_PATH"; e.g. the name "{ueld}" can be used to protect
				the UE ID in the following API URI: "/nNf-service/v1/(ueld)/service-operation-1"
				- The name of the URI query parameter to be protected, if the "ieLoc" indicates "URI_PARAM";
				- The name of the HTTP header, if the "ieLoc" indicates "HEADER";
				- The JSON pointer representation of the attribute defined with the RefToBinaryData type if the "ieLoc" indicates "MULTIPART_BINARY". It shall be encoded as: <json attribute="" defined="" of="" pointer="" reftobinarydata="" the="" type="" with="">/data.</json>
rsple	string	С	01	This IE shall be included when the IEs in HTTP/2 response messages of an API need to be protected when forwarded over N32-f. When present, this IE shall contain: - The JSON pointer representation of the IE to be protected, if the "ieLoc" indicates "BODY". Only the JSON pointer of the leaf IEs and recursive non-leaf IEs are included;
				- The name of the HTTP header, if the "ieLoc" indicates "HEADER";
				 The JSON pointer representation of the attribute defined with the RefToBinaryData type if the "ieLoc" indicates "MULTIPART_BINARY". It shall be encoded as: <json of="" pointer="" the<br="">attribute defined with the RefToBinaryData type>/data.</json>

isModifiable	boolean	С	01	This IE shall be included if the IE is allowed to be modified by all RI(s) on the side of the SEPP sending the API IE mapping. When present, - true, indicates that the IE is allowed to be modified by all RI(s) on the side of the SEPP; - false, indicates that the IE is not allowed to be modified by any RI on the side of the SEPP; - default is false. When the IE is not included, the default value shall be applied. (NOTE 1, NOTE 2)
isModifiableBylpx	map(boolean)	С	01	This IE shall be included if the IE is allowed to be modified by some of (but not all) the RI(s) on the side of the SEPP sending the API IE mapping. The key of the map is the <i>ipxProviderId</i> for which the boolean applies. When present, each element carries the isModifiable indication for the RI indicated by the key.
ancestorle	string	С	01	(NOTE 1, NOTE 2) This IE shall be included when the IE type is RECURSIVE_NON_LEAF. When present, this IE shall contain a JSON pointer of the ancestor IE. See Annex F.3.

NOTE 1: Either isModifiable or isModifiableBylpx may be present, but not both.

NOTE 2: When the IE type is RECURSIVE_NON_LEAF, if any of its child attributes is modifiable, the recursive non-leaf IE shall be set to be modifiable (see examples in Annex F).

6.1.5.2.9 Type: ApiSignature

Table 6.1.5.2.9-1: Definition of type ApiSignature as a list of "mutually exclusive alternatives"

Data type	Cardinality	Description	Applicability
Uri	1	API URI of a request/response or subscribe/unsubscribe NF service operation as specified in the respective API specification with the variable parts other than {apiVersion} unresolved. Examples: "{apiRoot}/nsmf-pdusession/v1/smcontexts", for the SMF PDUSession Create SM Context service operation. "{apiRoot}/nsmf-pdusession/v1/sm-responsessio	Аррисавшту
		contexts/{smContextRef}/modify", for the SMF PDUSession Update SM Context service operation.	
CallbackName	1	A value identifying the type of callback.	

6.1.5.2.10 Type: N32fContextInfo

Table 6.1.5.2.10-1: Definition of type N32fContextInfo

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
n32fContextId	Data type string	M M	1	This IE shall contain the N32-f context identifier of the receiving SEPP. The n32fContextld shall encode a 64-bit integer in hexadecimal representation. Each character in the string shall take a value of "0" to "9" or "A" to "F" and shall represent 4 bits. The most significant character representing the 4 most significant bits of the N32-f context Id shall appear first in the string, and the character representing the 4 least significant bit of the N32-f context Id shall appear last in the string. Pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}\$'
				Example: "0600AD1855BD6007".

6.1.5.2.11 Type: N32fErrorInfo

Table 6.1.5.2.11-1: Definition of type N32fErrorInfo

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
n32fMessageId	string	М	1	This IE shall contain the N32-f message identifier
				received over N32-f (see clause 6.2.5.2.9).
n32fErrorType	N32fErrorType	M	1	This IE shall contain the type of processing error
				encountered by the SEPP or the RI initiating the
n32fContextId	otring	С	01	N32-f error reporting procedure. This IE shall be present if available.
nsziconiextia	string		0 1	When present, this IE shall contain the
				n32fContextId of the SEPP receiving N32-f error
				reporting message, which is exchanged between the
				SEPPs during the parameter exchange procedure
				(see clause 5.2.3).
				The n32fContextId shall encode a 64-bit integer in
				hexadecimal representation. Each character in the
				string shall take a value of "0" to "9" or "A" to "F" and
				shall represent 4 bits. The most significant character
				representing the 4 most significant bits of the N32-f
				context Id shall appear first in the string, and the character representing the 4 least significant bit of
				the N32-f context Id shall appear last in the string.
				Pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}\$'
	(= 11 11 11 11			Example: "0600AD1855BD6007".
failedModificationList	array(FailedModif	С	1N	This IE shall be present if the n32ErrorType is "INTEGRITY_CHECK_ON_MODIFICATIONS_FAIL
	icationInfo)			ED" or
				"MODIFICATIONS_INSTRUCTIONS_FAILED".
				When present this IE shall contain a list of FQDNs of
				the RIs whose inserted modifications failed to
				process at the SEPP initiating the N32-f error
				reporting procedure, together with the reason for the
errorDetailsList	array(N32fErrorD	0	1N	failure to process. This IE may be included when the n32ErrorType IE
enorbetalistist	etail)		118	indicates
	J. 13)			"MESSAGE_RECONSTRUCTION_FAILED ". When
				present, this IE shall contain a list of JSON pointers
				to the IEs that failed to process together with the
11 A41 (1111)	(1 1:15		4 1	reason for the failure to process that IE.
policyMismatchList	array(InvalidPara	0	1N	This IE may be included when n32ErrorType is
	m)			"POLICY_MISMATCH". When present, this IE shall indicate a list of JSON pointers to the IEs and the
				type of mismatch.
				- If the parameter was sent in plain while it
				should have been encrypted, the value
				"Parameter shall be encrypted" shall be set
				as the reason.
				- If the parameter was sent confidentiality
				protected when required without confidentially
				protected, value "Parameter shall not be encrypted" shall be set as the reason.
riErrorInformation	RiErrorInformatio	0	01	This IE may be included by a RI when it indicates an
	n			error to the SEPP. When present, it shall instruct the SEPP to terminate or re-establish the N32-f
				connection and/or N32-f context (see clause 5.5.4).
	1	<u> </u>	1	1001.11001.011 4110/01 1102 1 0011toxt (000 010000 0.0.4).

6.1.5.2.12 Type: FailedModificationInfo

Table 6.1.5.2.12-1: Definition of type FailedModificationInfo

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
ipxld	Fqdn	М	1	This IE shall identify the RI.
n32fErrorType	N32fErrorType	M	1	This IE shall contain the type of processing error on the modifications block, encountered by the SEPP initiating the N32-f error reporting procedure. The value shall be one of the following: INTEGRITY_CHECK_ON_MODIFICATIONS_FAILED; MODIFICATIONS_INSTRUCTIONS_FAILED

6.1.5.2.13 Type: N32fErrorDetail

Table 6.1.5.2.13-1: Definition of type N32fErrorDetail

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
attribute	string	M	1	Contains either a HTTP header name or the JSON pointer of an attribute within the N32-f message that failed to reconstruct. The value shall be one of the values of the iePath attribtue (see clause 6.2.5.2.8) in the received N32-f message.
msgReconstructFailRea	FailureReason	М	1	Indicates the reason for the failure to reconstruct the
son				attribute.

6.1.5.2.14 Type: CallbackName

Table 6.1.5.2.14-1: Definition of type CallbackName

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
callbackType	string	М	1	This IE shall contain a string identifying the type of callback. The value shall be one of the values
				specified in 3GPP 29.500 [4], Annex B.

6.1.5.2.15 Type: IpxProviderSecInfo

Table 6.1.5.2.15-1: Definition of type IpxProviderSecInfo

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
ipxProviderId	Fqdn	М	1	This IE shall uniquely identify the RI.
rawPublicKeyList	array(string)	С	1N	This IE includes the list of raw public keys for the RI.
				When present, each array item shall contain a raw
				public key for the RI, with textual encoding as
				specified in clause 13 of IETF RFC 7468 [21].
certificateList	array(string)	С	1N	This IE includes the list of certificates for the RI.
				When present, each array item shall contain a
				certificate for the RI, with textual encoding as
				specified in IETF RFC 7468 [21].
NOTE: Either the rawPublicKeyList attribute, or the certificateList attribute, shall be present.				

6.1.5.2.16 Type: IntendedN32Purpose

Table 6.1.5.2.16-1: Definition of type IntendedN32Purpose

Attribute name	Data type	P	Cardinality	Description
usagePurpose	N32Purpose	М	1	This attribute provides the one purpose of the
				intended N32 establishment.
additionalInfo	String	0	01	This attribute provides any additional information
				necessary to characterize the intention for N32
				establishment.
cause	String	0	01	This attribute, if present, provided the reason for the
				reject for the purpose described in other attributes
				are rejected (e.g. "NO_CONTRACT").
				This attribute shall be absent if the intended purpose
				is allowed.

6.1.5.2.17 Type: RiErrorInformation

Table 6.2.5.2.17-1: Definition of type RiErrorInformation

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
n32fConnectionRelInd	N32ReleaseInd ication	C	01	When present, this IE shall instruct the SEPP to only terminate or re-establish the N32-f connection (see
	loation			clause 5.5.4). (NOTE)
n32fContextRelInd	N32ReleaseInd	С	01	When present, this IE shall instruct the SEPP to
	ication			terminate or re-establish the N32-f context and N32-f
				connection (see clause 5.5.4). (NOTE)
alternativeRi	Fqdn	0	01	This IE may be present if the n32fConnectionRelInd
				or n32fContextRelInd is present and instructs the
				SEPP to re-establish the N32-f connection or N32-f
				context.
				When present, this IE shall indicate the FQDN of the
				alternative RI entity that the SEPP should use to re-
				establish the N32-f context or the N32-f connection
				towards the peer SEPP.
NOTE: Either the n32fCd	NOTE: Either the n32fConnectionRelInd IE or the n32fContextRelInd IE may be present.			

6.1.5.2.18 Type: ExtRedirectResponse

Table 6.1.5.2.18-1: Definition of type ExtRedirectResponse as a list of to be combined data types

Data type	Cardinality	Description	Applicability
RedirectResponse	1	Redirection response	
RedirectResponseAddInfo	1	Additional information in the redirection	
		response	

6.1.5.2.19 Type: RedirectResponseAddInfo

Table 6.1.5.2.19-1: Definition of type RedirectResponseAddInfo

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
seppFqdnForDiscovery	Fqdn	C	01	FQDN of the SEPP towards which an N32 interface
				HTTP request is redirected with target SEPP
				discovery.
				This IE shall be present when the cause is set to
				"SEPP_REDIRECTION_WITH_DISCOVERY".

6.1.5.3 Simple data types and enumerations

6.1.5.3.1 Introduction

This clause defines simple data types and enumerations that can be referenced from data structures defined in the previous clauses.

6.1.5.3.2 Simple data types

The simple data types defined in table 6.1.5.3.2-1 shall be supported.

Table 6.1.5.3.2-1: Simple data types

Type Name	Type Definition	Description

6.1.5.3.3 Enumeration: SecurityCapability

Table 6.1.5.3.3-1: Enumeration SecurityCapability

Enumeration value	Description	Applicability
"TLS"	TLS security.	
"PRINS"	PRotocol for N32 INterconnect Security.	
"NONE"	N32-f TLS connection termination	NFTLST

6.1.5.3.4 Enumeration: HttpMethod

Table 6.1.5.3.4-1: Enumeration HttpMethod

Enumeration value	Description
"GET"	HTTP GET Method.
"PUT"	HTTP PUT Method.
"POST"	HTTP POST Method.
"DELETE"	HTTP DELETE Method.
"PATCH"	HTTP PATCH Method.
"HEAD"	HTTP HEAD Method.
"OPTIONS"	HTTP OPTIONS Method.
"CONNECT"	HTTP CONNECT Method.
"TRACE"	HTTP TRACE Method.

6.1.5.3.5 Enumeration: leType

Table 6.1.5.3.5-1: Enumeration leType

Enumeration value	Description
	•
"UEID"	These are IEs which carry the UE identity (i.e. SUPI and GPSI).
	This also includes the long-lasting identity Charging ID.
	An example of a UEID IE is gpsi IE defined in
## 0.0 A THOUSE	3GPP TS 29.518 [25].
"LOCATION"	These are IEs which carry location information (i.e. cell-id and TAI).
	An example of a LOCATION IE is ncgi IE defined in
	3GPP TS 29.571 [12].
"KEY_MATERIAL"	These are IEs which carry keying material as KSEAF and UPU
	related information.
	An example of a KEY_MATERIAL IE is upulnfo IE defined in
	3GPP TS 29.503 [26].
"AUTHENTICATION_MATERIAL"	These are IEs which carry authentication material like
	authentication vectors and EAP payload.
	An example of an AUTHENTICATION_MATERIAL IE is
	authenticationVector IE defined in 3GPP TS 29.503 [26].
"AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN"	These are IEs which carry authorization Token. The oauth2
	access_token would be of this type.
	An example of an AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN IE is access_token
	IE defined in 3GPP TS 29.510 [18].
"RECURSIVE_NON_LEAF"	These are recursive non-leaf IEs (see definition in clause 3.1).
"OTHER"	These are IEs which do not fall into one of the above types, but
	they would be considered sensitive, and which protection policies
	may wish to apply confidentiality protection.
"NONSENSITIVE"	These are IEs which carry information that are not sensitive. A
	protection policy would not normally encrypt (confidentiality
	protect) these.

6.1.5.3.6 Enumeration: leLocation

Table 6.1.5.3.6-1: Enumeration leLocation

Enumeration value	Description
"URI_PARAM"	IE is located in the URI query parameters.
"HEADER"	IE is located in the HTTP header.
"BODY"	IE is located in the body.
"MULTIPART_BINARY"	IE is located in the message body but encoded as a multipart
	message information in binary format.
"URI_PATH"	IE is located in the URI path excluding query parameters.

Enumeration: N32fErrorType 6.1.5.3.7

Table 6.1.5.3.7-1: Enumeration N32fErrorType

Enumeration value	Description
"INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED"	The integrity check verification on the received N32-f message failed.
"INTEGRITY_CHECK_ON_MODIFICATIONS_FAILED"	The integrity check verification on the modifications block of the received N32-f message failed.
"MODIFICATIONS_INSTRUCTIONS_FAILED"	Failed to apply the JSON patch instructions in the modifications block of the received N32-f message, e.g. the references to encBlockIndex are inserted or relocated by RI (see clause 5.9.3.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]).
"DECIPHERING_FAILED"	The deciphering of the encrypted block of the received N32-f message failed.
"MESSAGE_RECONSTRUCTION_FAILED"	The reconstruction of the original HTTP/2 message from the received N32-f message failed.
"CONTEXT_NOT_FOUND"	The n32fContextId is unknown in the receiving SEPP. (NOTE 1)
"INTEGRITY_KEY_EXPIRED"	The integrity keys in the receiving SEPP have expired.
"ENCRYPTION_KEY_EXPIRED"	The encryption keys in the receiving SEPP have expired.
"POLICY_MISMATCH"	The encryption policy verification on the received N32-f message has failed, e.g. protected IEs are not ciphered, or unprotected IEs are ciphered.
"NETWORK_MAINTENANCE"	Network maintenance is going on at the RI. (NOTE 2)
"INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES"	There is an on-going resources exhaustion at the RI (e.g., memory, CPU, or network bandwidth). (NOTE 2)
"NO_CONNECTION_DUE_TO_CONTRACT"	The RI decides to no longer facilitate communication with a specific PLMN due to business reasons (e.g., contract termination or fraudulent behaviour). (NOTE 2)
"IDLE_N32F_CONNECTION"	The N32-f connection has been found inactive by the RI. (NOTE 2)
"SWITCHING_TO_ANOTHER_RI"	The service is being taken over by another RI, e.g. due to the RI shutting down. (NOTE 2)
"NO_CONNECTION_DUE_TO_CONNECTIVITY"	The RI observes connectivity issues with one of the SEPPs. (NOTE 2)
NOTE 1: This enumeration value is deprecated and sha over the N32-c interface.	
NOTE 2: This cause may be sent by a RI together with	

context and/or the N32-f connection (see clause 5.5.4).

6.1.5.3.8 Enumeration: FailureReason

Table 6.1.5.3.8-1: Enumeration FailureReason

Enumeration value	Description
"INVALID_JSON_POINTER"	The JSON pointer value in iePath attribute (see clause 6.2.5.2.8) is invalid.
"INVALID_INDEX_TO_ENCRYPTED_BLOCK"	The value part of the HttpPayload attribute (see clause 6.2.5.2.8) or HttpHeader attribute (see clause 6.2.5.2.7) is pointing to an invalid index to the encrypted block.
"INVALID_HTTP_HEADER"	The name of the header in the received HttpHeader attribute is invalid.

6.1.5.3.9 Enumeration: N32Purpose

Table 6.1.5.3.9-1: Enumeration N32Purpose

Enumeration value	Description
"ROAMING"	Usage dedicated to roaming
"INTER_PLMN_MOBILITY"	Usage corresponding to any inter-mobility transactions
"SMS_INTERCONNECT"	Usage dedicated to SMS interconnect, e.g. SMS sent between subscribers of two different networks
"ROAMING_TEST"	Usage dedicated to roaming, and allowed only for tests, e.g. to allow traffic for test subscribers/SUPI or sessions
"INTER_PLMN_MOBILITY_TEST"	Usage corresponding to any inter-mobility transactions and allowed only for tests, e.g. to allow traffic for test subscribers/SUPI or sessions
"SMS_INTERCONNECT_TEST"	Usage dedicated to SMS interconnect, e.g. SMS sent between subscribers of two different networks, and allowed only for tests, e.g. to allow traffic for test subscribers/SUPI or sessions
"SNPN_INTERCONNECT"	Usage dedicated to an interconnection with an SNPN
"SNPN_INTERCONNECT_TEST"	Usage corresponding to any interconnection with an SNPN and allowed only for tests, e.g. to allow traffic for test subscribers/SUPI or sessions
"DISASTER_ROAMING"	Usage dedicated to Disaster Roaming (see clause 5.40 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [2]).
"DISASTER_ROAMING_TEST"	Usage dedicated to Disaster Roaming (see clause 5.40 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [2]) and allowed only for tests, e.g. to allow traffic for test subscribers/SUPI or sessions.
"DATA_ANALYTICS_EXCHANGE"	Usage dedicated to exchanging data or analytics (see clause 4.3 of 3GPP TS 23.288 [29]).
"DATA_ANALYTICS_EXCHANGE_TEST"	Usage dedicated to exchanging data or analytics (see clause 4.3 of 3GPP TS 23.288 [29]) and allowed only for tests, e.g. to allow traffic for test subscribers/SUPI or sessions.

6.1.5.3.10 Enumeration: N32ReleaseIndication

Table 6.1.5.3.10-1: Enumeration N32ReleaseIndication

Enumeration value	Description
"RELEASE_REESTABLISHMENT_ALLOWED"	Indicates a request to the SEPP to terminate the N32-f context or N32-f connection. The SEPP may re-establish the N32-f context or N32-f connection later, if needed.
"RELEASE_REESTABLISHMENT_NOT_ALLOWED"	Indicates a request to the SEPP to terminate the N32-f context or N32-f connection. The SEPP should not attempt to re-establish the N32-f context or N32-f connection later.
"REESTABLISH"	Indicates a request to the SEPP to release and reestablish the N32-f context or N32-f connection.

6.1.5.4 Binary data

There are no multipart/binary part used on the N32-c API(s) in this release of this specification.

6.1.6 Error Handling

6.1.6.1 General

HTTP error handling shall be supported as specified in clause 5.2.4 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

6.1.6.2 Protocol Errors

Protocol Error Handling shall be supported as specified in clause 5.2.7.2 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

6.1.6.3 Application Errors

The common application errors defined in the Table 5.2.7.2-1 in 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] may also be used for the N32-c Handshake service. The following application errors listed in Table 6.1.6.3-1 are specific for the N32-c Handshake service.

Table 6.1.6.3-1: Application errors

Application Error	HTTP status code	Description
REQUESTED_PARAM_MISMATCH	409 Conflict	This represents a parameter mismatch has been detected by the receiving SEPP, i.e. received data-type encryption or modification policy conflict with the one manually configured for the specific roaming partner, interconnect partner and RI
REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED	403 Forbidden	This represents that all the requested purposes included in the request was rejected by the receiving SEPP.
NEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED	403 Forbidden	This represents a security capability negotiation failure at the receiving SEPP, i.e., the received security capability from the peer SEPP is not configured to be supported at the receiving SEPP.
N32C_EXCHANGE_CAPABILITY_ONGOING	409 Conflict	This represents a security capability negotiation failure at the receiving SEPP, i.e., the SEPP receives an N32-c exchange capability request from a peer SEPP while it is expecting an exchange capability response from the same peer SEPP as specified in clause 5.2.2.
SECURITY_PARAM_EXCHANGE_COLLISION	409 Conflict	This represents a Parameter Exchange Procedure for Cipher Suite Negotiation failure at the receiving SEPP, i.e., the SEPP receives a security parameter exchange request from a peer SEPP while it is expecting a security parameter exchange response from the same peer SEPP as specified in clause 5.2.3.2.

6.1.7 Feature Negotiation

The feature negotiation mechanism specified in clause 6.6 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] shall be used to negotiate the features applicable between the c-SEPP and the p-SEPP, for the N32 Handshake service, if any.

The c-SEPP shall indicate the features it supports for the N32 Handshake service, if any, by including the supportedFeatures attribute in the HTTP POST request message for following service operations:

- Security Capability Negotiation procedure, as specified in clause 5.2.2 to negotiate the security capability;

The p-SEPP shall determine the supported features for the requested network as specified in clause 6.6 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] and shall indicate the supported features by including the supportedFeatures attribute in content of the HTTP response for the service operation.

The syntax of the supportedFeatures attribute is defined in clause 5.2.2 of 3GPP TS 29.571 [12].

The following features are defined for the N32 Handshake service.

Table 6.1.7-1: Features of supportedFeatures attribute used by N32 Handshake service

Feature Number	Feature	M/O	Description
1	NFTLST	0	N32-f TLS Connection Termination Support A SEPP that supports this feature shall support handling of Security Capability Negotiation procedure to tear down the N32-f TLS connection as specified in clause 5.2.2).
2	PSEPRO	0	PRINS Security Profiles Support A SEPP that supports this feature shall support the negotiation of security profiles as specified in clause 5.2.3.3.
3	PSIU	M	Protection of Sensitive Information in URI (Path and Query Parameters) A SEPP that complies with this release of the specification shall support this feature, i.e. the protection of sensitive information in URI path and query parameters in HTTP messages to be forwarded.
4	SNDN32F	0	Support of N32-f FQDN and N32-f Port. A SEPP that supports this feature: - may signal an N32-f FQDN and Port within the Security Capability Negotiation towards the remote SEPP; - shall support receiving a N32-f FQDN and Port(s) within the Security Capability Negotiation from the remote SEPP - shall support forwarding the N32-f traffic towards the N32-f FQDN and Port received from the peer SEPP.

Feature number: The order number of the feature within the supportedFeatures attribute (starting with 1).

Feature: A short name that can be used to refer to the bit and to the feature.

M/O: Defines if the implementation of the feature is mandatory ("M") or optional ("O").

Description: A clear textual description of the feature.

6.1.8 HTTP redirection

6.1.8.1 HTTP redirection to a dedicated SEPP

An N32 HTTP request may be redirected to a different SEPP service instance located within the same PLMN.

If e.g. a SEPP-A1 in PLMN-A receives a N32 HTTP request from another, e.g. SEPP-B that is in PLMN-B and redirects the request to another SEPP-A2 in PLMN-A, the SEPP-A1 shall send 307 Temporary Redirect response to the SEPP-B and may include a RedirectResponse data structure (see 3GPP TS 29.571 [12]) in the response, where the "cause" attribute shall not be set to "SEPP_REDIRECTION" and the "targetSepp" attribute shall be absent. The Location header shall contain the URI of the SEPP-A2.

- NOTE 1: A sender that receives a redirectResponse with the cause "SEPP_REDIRECTION" ignores the Location header as specified in clause 6.10.9.1 in 3GPP TS 29.500 [4], accordingly this cause is not used for redirecting N32 request for which the location header is used to convey the URI of the SEPP to which the request is redirected.
- NOTE 2: For non N32 interfaces, if a SEPP receives a service request from a HTTP client e.g. an NF or an SCP, from the same PLMN and redirects the service request to a different SEPP in the same PLMN, the SEPP sends 307 Temporary Redirect or 308 Permanent Redirect response to the HTTP client including a RedirectResponse data structure (see 3GPP TS 29.571 [12]), where the "cause" attribute sets to "SEPP_REDIRECTION" and the "targetSepp" attribute contains the apiRoot of the SEPP towards which the request is redirected. The content of the Location header field is ignored by the receiver. See clause 6.10.9.1 in 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

6.1.8.2 HTTP redirection to target SEPPs with a new discovery

An N32 HTTP request may be redirected to a list of possible new target SEPPs service instance located within the same PLMN.

If e.g. a SEPP-A1 in PLMN-A receives a N32 HTTP request from another, e.g. SEPP-B that is in PLMN-B, and redirects the request to another SEPP in PLMN-A that is to be discovered by SEPP-B, the SEPP-A1 shall send a 307 Temporary Redirect response to the SEPP-B and shall also include the ExtRedirectResponse data structure in the response, where the "cause" attribute shall be set to "SEPP_REDIRECTION_WITH_DISCOVERY" and the "seppFqdnForDiscovery" attribute shall contain a FQDN that can be resolved by DNS based SEPP discovery. The Location header shall be ignored.

NOTE 1: The response as described in clause 6.1.8.1 provides the receiving SEPP "SEPP-B" with a host FQDN that can be resolved to a target SEPP IP address. The response as described in clause 6.1.8.2 provides an FQDN that can be used by SEPP-B to send a DNS NAPTR query to discover the target SEPP.

NOTE 2: The FQDN in the "seppFqdnForDiscovery" attribute will be used by the SEPP that receives the HTTP redirection response to issue a DNS NAPTR query. This enables automated target SEPP discovery as defined in GSMA PRD IR.67 [30].

6.2 JOSE Protected Message Forwarding API on N32

6.2.1 API URI

The JOSE Protected Message Forwarding Procedure on N32 shall use the JOSE Protected Message Forwarding API on N32-f API.

The API URI of the JOSE Protected Message Forwarding API on N32-f API shall be:

{apiRoot}/<apiName>/<apiVersion>

The request URIs used in HTTP requests from the initiating SEPP towards the responding SEPP shall have the Resource URI structure defined in clause 4.4.1 of 3GPP TS 29.501 [5], i.e.:

{apiRoot}/<apiName>/<apiVersion>/<apiSpecificResourceUriPart>

with the following components:

- The {apiRoot} shall be set as described in 3GPP TS 29.501 [5].
- The <apiName> shall be "n32f-forward".
- The <apiVersion> shall be "v1".
- The <apiSpecificResourceUriPart> shall be set as described in clause 6.2.4.

The apiRoot to use towards a SEPP of the target PLMN shall be configured at the SEPP. The URI scheme of the API shall be "http". The apiName part of the URI shall be as specified here for homogeneity of the API across PLMNs.

6.2.2 Usage of HTTP

6.2.2.1 General

HTTP/2, as defined in IETF RFC 9113 [7], shall be used as specified in clause 4.3.2.1.

HTTP/2 shall be transported as specified in clause 4.3.3.

HTTP messages and bodies for the JOSE protected message forwarding API on N32-f shall comply with the OpenAPI [27] specification contained in Annex A.

6.2.2.2 HTTP standard headers

6.2.2.2.1 General

The HTTP standard headers as specified in clause 4.3.2.2 shall be supported for this API.

6.2.2.2.2 Content type

The following content types shall be supported:

- the JSON format (see IETF RFC 8259 [8]). The use of the JSON format shall be signalled by the content type "application/json". See also clause 5.3.4.
- the Problem Details JSON Object (see IETF RFC 9457 [22]). The use of the Problem Details JSON object in a HTTP response body shall be signalled by the content type "application/problem+json".

6.2.2.2.3 Accept-Encoding

SEPPs and RI should support gzip coding (see IETF RFC 1952 [23]) in HTTP requests and responses and indicate so in the Accept-Encoding header, as described in clause 5.3.2.1.

6.2.2.3 HTTP custom headers

6.2.2.3.1 General

In this release of the specification, no specific custom headers are defined for the JOSE protected message forwarding API on N32.

For 3GPP specific HTTP custom headers used across all service based interfaces, see clause 4.3.2.3.

6.2.3 Resources

6.2.3.1 Overview

There are no resources in this version of this API. All the operations are realized as custom operations without resources.

6.2.4 Custom Operations without associated resources

6.2.4.1 Overview

Table 6.2.4.1-1: Custom operations without associated resources

Operation Name	Custom operation URI	Mapped HTTP method	Description
JOSE Protected Forwarding	/n32f-process		This is the N32f forwarding API used to forward a reformatted and JOSE protected message to a receiving SEPP.
JOSE Protected Forwarding Options	/n32f-process		Discover the communication options supported by the next hop (RI or SEPP) for N32-f message processing.

6.2.4.2 Operation: JOSE Protected Forwarding

6.2.4.2.1 Description

This custom operation is used between the SEPPs to forward the reformatted and JOSE protected HTTP/2 message on N32-f. The HTTP method POST shall be used on the following URI:

URI: {apiRoot}/n32f-forward/<apiVersion>/n32f-process

This operation shall support the resource URI variables defined in table 6.1.4.2.1-1.

Table 6.2.4.2.1-1: Resource URI variables for this Operation

Name	Data type	Definition
apiRoot	string	See clause 6.2.1.

6.2.4.2.2 Operation Definition

This operation shall support the request data structures and response codes specified in tables 6.2.4.2.2-1 and 6.2.4.2.2-2.

Table 6.2.4.2.2-1: Data structures supported by the POST Request Body on this resource

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
N32fReformatted	М	1	This IE shall contain the reformatted HTTP/2 message comprising the plain
ReqMsg			text part, encrypted information, meta data and modification chain
			information. See clause 6.2.5.2.2.

Table 6.2.4.2.2-2: Data structures supported by the POST Response Body on this resource

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Response codes	Description
N22fPoformattodPcpMcq	Ν./	1		This represents the successful processing of the
N32fReformattedRspMsg	M	1		This represents the successful processing of the reformatted JOSE protected message at the responding SEPP. The responding SEPP shall provide the reformatted and JOSE protected content of the corresponding HTTP/2 response message received from the NF service producer, or the HTTP/2 notification response message received from the NF
				service consumer.

ProblemDetailsMsgForwarding	0	01	403 Forbidden	When the receiving SEPP fails to process the reconstructed message due to PLMN ID or SNPN ID verification failure, the "cause" attribute shall be set to "PLMNID_MISMATCH" or "SNPNID_MISMATCH". When the receiving SEPP receives HTTP requests over N32-f with purpose, marked using 3gpp-Sbi-Interplmn-Purpose header as specified in 3GPP TS 29.500 [4], that does not match with any of the purposes exchanged via the Security Capability Negotiation procedure, then the "cause" attribute shall be set to "REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED". When the receiving SEPP fails to process the reconstructed message due to the n32fContextId is unknown, the "cause" attribute shall be set to "CONTEXT_NOT_FOUND". When the receiving SEPP fails to process the reconstructed message, and the error is reported by N32f error reporting procedure as specified in clause 5.2.5, the "cause" attribute shall be set to "UNSPECIFIED". When the RI or receiving SEPP receives HTTP requests over N32-f and detects an encryption policy mismatch, e.g. protected IEs are not ciphered, or unprotected IEs are ciphered, the "cause" attribute shall be set to "POLICY_MISMATCH". In this case, the ProblemDetails may include the invalidParams attribute indicating which IEs were received ciphered when they were expected to be received in clear, and vice-versa, with the reason attribute for each invalid parameter shall not be encrypted" if the IE was sent with confidential protection. When the RI or receiving SEPP receives HTTP requests, but the N32 connection cannot be setup due to contractual reasons, the "cause" attribute shall be set to "NO_CONNECTION_DUE_TO_CONTRACT". When the RI receives HTTP requests but the N32 connection cannot be setup due to a connectivity issue, the "cause" attribute shall be set to "NO_CONNECTION_DUE_TO_CONTRACT". When the RI receives HTTP requests over N32-f but the message was not delivered due to contractual reasons, the "cause" attribute shall be set to "NO_CONNECTION_DUE_TO_CONTRACT".
ProblemDetailsMsgForwarding	0	01	503 Service Unavailable	When the RI receives HTTP requests over N32-f but the message cannot be delivered due to one of the following application errors: - SWITCHING_TO_ANOTHER_RI - INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES - NETWORK_MAINTENANCE

NOTE:	The mandatory HTTP error status codes for the POST method listed in Table 5.2.7.1-1 of
	3GPP TS 29.500 [4] other than those specified in the table above also apply, with a ProblemDetails data
	type (see clause 5.2.7 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]).

Table 6.2.4.2.2-3: Headers supported by the POST method on this resource

Name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
3gpp-Sbi- Message-Priority	string	0		3gpp-Sbi-Message-Priority header, defined in 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

Table 6.2.4.2.2-4: Headers supported by 200 Response Code on this endpoint

Name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
3gpp-Sbi-	string	0	01	3gpp-Sbi-Message-Priority header, defined in
Message-Priority	-			3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

6.2.4.3 Operation: JOSE Protected Forwarding Options

6.2.4.3.1 Description

This service operation queries the communication options supported by the next hop (RI or SEPP) for N32-f message processing (see clauses 5.3.2.4 and 5.3.4).

The HTTP method OPTIONS shall be used on the following URI:

URI: {apiRoot}/n32f-forward/<apiVersion>/n32f-process

This operation shall support the resource URI variables defined in table 6.2.4.3.1-1.

Table 6.2.4.3.1-1: Resource URI variables for this Operation

Name	Data type	Definition
apiRoot	string	See clause 6.1.1.

6.2.4.3.2 Operation Definition

6.2.4.3.2.1 OPTIONS

This method shall support the URI query parameters specified in table 6.2.4.3.2.1-1.

Table 6.2.4.3.2.1-1: URI query parameters supported by the OPTIONS method

Name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
n/a				

This method shall support the request data structures specified in table 6.2.4.3.2.1-2 and the response data structures and response codes specified in table 6.2.4.3.2.1-3.

Table 6.2.4.3.2.1-2: Data structures supported by the OPTIONS Request Body on this resource

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
n/a			

Table 6.2.4.3.2.1-3: Data structures supported by the OPTIONS Response Body on this resource

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Response codes	Description				
n/a			204 No Content					
ProblemDetails	0	01	405 Method Not					
			Allowed					
ProblemDetails	0	01	501 Not					
			Implemented					
NOTE: The man	NOTE: The mandatory HTTP error status codes for the OPTIONS method listed in Table 5.2.7.1-1 of							
3GPP TS 29.500 [4] other than those specified in the table above also apply, with a ProblemDetails data								
type (see	e clause 5.2	.7 of 3GPP TS 29	.500 [4]).					

Table 6.2.4.3.2.1-4: Headers supported by the 204 Response Code on this resource

Name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
Accept-Encoding	string	0	01	Accept-Encoding, described in IETF RFC 9110 [9]

6.2.5 Data Model

6.2.5.1 General

This clause specifies the application data model supported by the API.

Table 6.2.5.1-1 specifies the data types defined for the N32 interface.

Table 6.2.5.1-1: N32 specific Data Types

Data type	Clause defined	Description
N32fReformattedReqMsg	6.2.5.2.2	Contains the reformatted HTTP/2 request message
N32fReformattedRspMsg	6.2.5.2.3	Contains the reformatted HTTP/2 response message
DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock	6.2.5.2.4	HTTP header to be encrypted or the value of a JSON attribute to be encrypted
DataToIntegrityProtectBlock	6.2.5.2.5	Data to be integrity protected
RequestLine	6.2.5.2.6	Contains the request line of the HTTP API request being reformatted and forwarded over N32-f
HttpHeader	6.2.5.2.7	Contains the encoding of HTTP headers in the API request / response
HttpPayload	6.2.5.2.8	Contains the encoding of JSON content in the API request / response
MetaData	6.2.5.2.9	Contains the meta data information needed for replay protection
Modifications	6.2.5.2.10	Information on inserting of the modifications entry
FlatJweJson	6.2.5.2.11	Contains the integrity protected reformatted block
FlatJwsJson	6.2.5.2.12	Contains the modification from IPXes on path
IndexToEncryptedValue	6.2.5.2.13	Index to the encrypted value
EncodedHttpHeaderValue	6.2.5.2.14	HTTP header value or index to the HTTP header value
ProblemDetailsMsgForwarding	6.2.5.2.15	N32-f message forwarding Error Detail
AdditionInfoMsgForwarding	6.2.5.2.16	Problem Details extensions for N32-f message forwarding

Table 6.2.5.1-2 specifies data types re-used by the N32 interface protocol from other specifications, including a reference to their respective specifications and when needed, a short description of their use within the JOSE Protected Message Forwarding API on N32 service based interface.

Table 6.2.5.1-2: N32 re-used Data Types

Data type	Reference	Comments
HttpMethod	6.1.5.3.5	
IeLocation	6.1.5.3.6	
RiErrorInformation	6.1.5.2.17	RI error information
PatchItem	3GPP TS 29.571 [12]	
UriScheme	3GPP TS 29.571 [12]	
Fqdn	3GPP TS 29.571 [12]	

6.2.5.2 Structured data types

6.2.5.2.1 Introduction

This clause defines the structures to be used in the JOSE Protected Message Forwarding API on N32.

6.2.5.2.2 Type: N32fReformattedReqMsg

Table 6.2.5.2.2-1: Definition of type N32fReformattedReqMsg

Attribute name	Data type	P	Cardinality	Description
reformattedData	FlatJweJson	M	1	This IE shall contain the integrity protected reformatted block as well as the ciphered part of the reformatted block of the HTTP/2 request message sent between NF service producer and consumer. The SEPP shall reformat the HTTP/2 request message as: - The part of original HTTP/2 request message headers and the content that needs to be only integrity protected is first reformatted into "DataToIntegrityProtectBlock" and then fed as input for the "aad" parameter of the FlatJweJson after subjecting to BASE64URL encoding.
				The part of the original HTTP/2 request message headers and content that require integrity protection and ciphering is first reformatted into "DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock" and then fed as input for JWE ciphering and the JWE ciphered block is then BASE64URL encoded and set into the "ciphertext" parameter of the FlatJweJson.
modificationsBlock	array(FlatJwsJso n)	С	1N	This IE shall be included if the RIs on path are allowed to apply modification policies and if they have any specific modification to be applied on the message contained in the DataToIntegrityProtectBlock. This IE shall also be included if a RI on the path originates a N32-f Request (see clause 5.5.3).

6.2.5.2.3 Type: N32fReformattedRspMsg

Table 6.2.5.2.3-1: Definition of type N32fReformattedRspMsg

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
reformattedData	FlatJweJson	M	1	This IE shall contain the integrity protected reformatted block as well as the ciphered part of the reformatted block of the HTTP/2 response message sent between NF service producer and consumer. The SEPP shall reformat the HTTP/2 response message as: - The part of original HTTP/2 response message headers and the content that needs to be only integrity protected is first reformatted into "DataToIntegrityProtectBlock" and then fed as input for the "aad" parameter of the FlatJweJson after subjecting to BASE64URL encoding. - The part of the original HTTP/2 response message headers and content that require integrity protection and ciphering is first reformatted into "DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock" and then fed as input for JWE ciphering and
				the JWE ciphered block is then BASE64URL encoded and set into the "ciphertext" parameter of the FlatJweJson.
modificationsBlock	array(FlatJwsJso n)	С	1N	This IE shall be included if the RIs on path are allowed to apply modification policies and if they have any specific modification to be applied on the message contained in the DataToIntegrityProtectBlock. This IE shall also be included if a RI on the path originates an N32-f Response (see clause 5.5.3).

6.2.5.2.4 Type: DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock

Table 6.2.5.2.4-1: Definition of type DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
dataToEncrypt	array(Any Type)	M	1N	This IE shall contain the input for ciphering as a
				JSON object block containing an array of values with
				arbitrary types. Each entry of the array shall contain
				the value of a HTTP header to be encrypted or the
				value of a JSON attribute to be encrypted.

6.2.5.2.5 Type: DataToIntegrityProtectBlock

Table 6.2.5.2.5-1: Definition of type DataToIntegrityProtectBlock

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
metaData	MetaData	С	01	This IE shall be included if the SEPP encodes additional information for replay protection. When present this IE shall contain the meta data information needed for replay protection. This IE shall also be included if the RI originates a N32-f Request or an N32-f Response (see clause 5.5.3)
requestLine	RequestLine	С	1	This IE shall be included when a JOSE protected API "request" is forwarded over N32-f. When present, this IE shall contain the request line of the HTTP API request being reformatted and forwarded over N32-f.
statusLine	string	С	01	This IE shall be included when a JOSE protected API "response" is forwarded over N32-f. When present, this IE shall contain the status line of the HTTP API response being reformatted and forwarded over N32-f.
headers	array(HttpHeader)	С	1N	This IE shall be included when a JOSE protected API request / response contains HTTP headers. When present this IE shall contain the encoding of HTTP headers in the API request / response.
payload	array(HttpPayloa d)	С	1N	This IE shall be included when a JOSE protected API request / response contains JSON content that needs to be sent in clear text. When present this IE shall contain the encoding of JSON content in the API request / response.

6.2.5.2.6 Type: RequestLine

Table 6.2.5.2.6-1: Definition of type RequestLine

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
method	HttpMethod	М	1	This IE shall contain the HTTP method of the HTTP
				request encapsulated in the N32-f Request.
scheme	UriScheme	М	1	This IE shall contain the HTTP scheme of the API.
authority	string	М	1	This IE shall contain the authority part of the URI of the API being invoked.
path	string	М	1	This IE shall contain the path part of the URI of the API being invoked, excluding the query and fragment components.
				The string value of this IE may contain one or more IndexToEncryptedValue structures (encoded with JSON format) specified in clause 6.2.5.2.13 if there are Variables in URI path to be encrypted.
protocolVersion	string	М	1	This IE shall contain the HTTP protocol version. The version shall be 2 in this release of this specification.
queryFragment	string	С	01	This IE shall contain the query component of the URI of the API if available.
				The string value of this IE may contain one or more IndexToEncryptedValue structures (encoded with JSON format) specified in clause 6.2.5.2.13 if the values of certain URI query parameters are to be encrypted.
pathQueryProtectInd	array(leLocation)	С	12	This IE shall be present when IE(s) with sensitive information in the URI path and/or query parameters were protected with encryption.
				When present, this IE shall indicate the location(s) of the protected IE(s), i.e. "URI_PATH" and/or "URI_PARAM".

6.2.5.2.7 Type: HttpHeader

Table 6.2.5.2.7-1: Definition of type HttpHeader

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
header	string	М	1	This IE shall contain the name of the HTTP header
				to encoded.
value	EncodedHttpHea	М	1	This IE shall contain the value of the HTTP header.
	derValue			The value of the HTTP header shall be encoded as:
				 value field of the EncodedHttpHeaderValue
				structure specified in clause 6.2.5.2.14 if the
				HTTP header is not to be encrypted.
				- IndexToEncryptedValue structure specified
				in clause 6.2.5.2.13 if the value of the HTTP
				header is to be encrypted.

6.2.5.2.8 Type: HttpPayload

Table 6.2.5.2.8-1: Definition of type HttpPayload

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
iePath	string	M	1	This IE identifies the JSON pointer representation (see IETF RFC 6901 [17]) of full JSON path of the IE to be encoded. IEs that are of type object shall be flattened into each individual attribute's full JSON path and the HttpPayload IE shall only contain the final leaf attribute IE path and its corresponding value.
ieValueLocation	leLocation	M	1	This IE shall identify where the IE value is located - i,e in the JSON body or in the multipart message part.

volue	object	NA IA	This IE shall contain the value of the IE
value	object	M 1	This IE shall contain the value of the IE corresponding to "iePath", encoded as a free form
			object.
			If the value of this IE is encrypted, then the value
			part shall be encoded as
			[{
			"encBlockIndex": <array in<="" index="" td=""></array>
			<pre>DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock> }</pre>
			(see clause 6.2.5.2.4).
			(666 6.6666 6.2.6.2.1.).
			If the value of this IE is a RefToBinary data type (see
			3GPP TS 29.571 [12], then value shall contain the
			value of the Content-ID header field of the
			referenced binary body part.
			The referenced binary body part of the
			multipart/related message shall be either encrypted
			or not encrypted depending on the protection policy
			exchanged between the SEPPs.
			If the referenced binary body part is required to be
			encrypted, then the binary part is first base64
			encoded into a byte array and then inserted into the
			"DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock". Then two HttpPayload instances with the following values shall
			be added immediately after this HttpPayload
			instance in the "DataToIntegrityProtectBlock"
			{
			"iePath": <json attribute<="" of="" pointer="" td="" the=""></json>
			defined with theRefToBinaryData type
			>/contenttype "ieValueLocation": "MULTIPART_BINARY"
			"value": <value content="" of="" of<="" td="" the="" type=""></value>
			multipart binary>
			\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
			"iePath": <json attribute<="" of="" pointer="" td="" the=""></json>
			defined with the RefToBinaryData
			type>/data,
			<pre>"ieValueLocation": "MULTIPART_BINARY" "value": {"encBlockIndex": <array in<="" index="" pre=""></array></pre>
			DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock that
			contains the byte array>}
			}
			If the referenced binary body part is not required to
			be encrypted, then the binary part is first base64
			encoded into a byte array and then inserted as new
			instance of HttpPayload IE in "
			DataToIntegrityProtectBlock" as
			ſ
			{ "iePath": <json attribute<="" of="" pointer="" td="" the=""></json>
			defined with the RefToBinaryData
			type>/contenttype
			"ieValueLocation": "MULTIPART_BINARY" "value": <value content="" of="" of<="" td="" the="" type=""></value>
			multipart binary>
			},
			{
			"iePath": <json attribute="" defined="" of="" path="" reftobinarydata<="" td="" the="" with=""></json>
			type>/data,
			"ieValueLocation": "MULTIPART_BINARY"
			"value": <base64 array="" byte="" encoded=""></base64>
			}
			See NOTE 1.
NOTE 1: In this rele	ase of this specification	n only N16 interfa	ce has binary content and there is no sensitive

NOTE 1: In this release of this specification only N16 interface has binary content and there is no sensitive information carried over N16 interface. Consequently ciphering of binary part is not required in this release of this specification. The encoding specified here is to provide a N32-f framework in a future proof manner so that if a binary part need to be encrypted in future this structure can be used.

6.2.5.2.9 Type: MetaData

Table 6.2.5.2.9-1: Definition of type MetaData

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
n32fContextId	string	M	1	This IE shall contain the n32fContextId of the SEPP receiving the message, which is exchanged between the SEPPs during the parameter exchange procedure (see clause 5.2.3).
				The n32fContextId shall encode a 64-bit integer in hexadecimal representation. Each character in the string shall take a value of "0" to "9" or "A" to "F" and shall represent 4 bits. The most significant character representing the 4 most significant bits of the N32-f context Id shall appear first in the string, and the character representing the 4 least significant bit of the N32-f context Id shall appear last in the string. Pattern: '\[A-Fa-f0-9]\{16\}\]
				Example: "0600AD1855BD6007".
messageId	string	М	1	This IE identifies a particular request that is transformed by the SEPP. The value of this IE shall be encoded in hexadecimal representation of a 64 bit integer. This identifier is used in the N32-f error reporting procedure as specified in clause 6.1.4.5.
authorizedlpxld	string	М	1	Pattern: ^[a-fA-F0-9]{1, 16}\$ This IE identifies the first hop RI that is authorized to insert modifications block. The identifier of the RI shall be an FQDN. When there is no RI that's authorized to update, the value of this IE is set to the string "NULL". This IE shall be set to the empty string "", if the RI originates a message as defined in clause 5.5.3.
riFqdn	Fqdn	С	01	This IE shall be present, If the originator of the N32-f request message is the Roaming Intermediary. When present, the IE shall contain the FQDN of the Roaming Intermediary originating the N32-f request. When present, the riFqdn together with the messageId shall uniquely identify a N32-f message
				received over the N32-f connection.

6.2.5.2.10 Type: Modifications

Table 6.2.5.2.10-1: Definition of type Modifications

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
operations	array(PatchItem)	С	1N	This IE shall be included if an RI inserts modification
				instructions on the JSON data carried in the
				"DataToIntegrityProtectBlock" part of the N32-f
				forwarded message. For the first modifications entry,
				this IE shall not be included, since the first entry is
				inserted by the SEPP.
				This IE shall also be included if a RI originates a
				message as defined in clause 5.5.3.
identity	Fqdn	М	1	This IE shall contain the identity of the entity
				inserting the modifications entry. The identity shall
				be encoded in the form of an URI.
tag	string	С	01	This IE shall be present when the JWE
				Authentication Tag value is non-empty as specified
				in IETF RFC 7515 [16]. When present, this IE shall
				contain the BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag).

6.2.5.2.11 Type: FlatJweJson

Table 6.2.5.2.11-1: Definition of type FlatJweJson

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
protected	string	С	01	This IE shall be present if there is a JWE Protected Header part of the JOSE header to encode as specified in IETF RFC 7516 [14]. When present, this IE shall contain the BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) encoding of the JWE protected header.
unprotected	object	С	01	This IE shall be present if there is a JWE unprotected header part of the JOSE header that is shared across recipients, to encode as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [16]. This value is represented as an unencoded free form JSON object, rather than as a string. These Header Parameter values are not integrity protected.
header	object	С	01	This IE shall be present if there is a JWE unprotected header part of the JOSE header that is specific for the recipient, to encode as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [16]. This value is represented as an unencoded free form JSON object, rather than as a string. These Header Parameter values are not integrity protected.
encrypted_key	string	С	01	This IE shall be present when the JWE Encrypted Key for the recipient is non empty. When present this IE shall contain BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key). (NOTE)
aad	string	С	01	This IE shall be present when the JWE AAD value is non-empty as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [16]. When present, this IE shall contain BASE64URL encoding of the DataToIntegrityProtectBlock JSON object (see clause 6.2.5.2.5).
iv	string	С	01	This IE shall be present when the JWE Initialization Vector is non-empty as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [16]. When present, this IE shall contain the BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector).
ciphertext	string	M	1	This IE shall contain BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext). The input for JWE ciphering is the DataToIntegrityProtecAndCiphertBlock (see clause 6.2.5.2.5).
tag	string	С	01	This IE shall be present when the JWE Authentication Tag value is non-empty as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [16]. When present, this IE shall contain the BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag).

NOTE: The attribute name does not follow the naming conventions specified in 3GPP TS 29.501 [5]. The attribute name is kept though as defined in the current specification for backward compatibility reason.

6.2.5.2.12 Type: FlatJwsJson

Table 6.2.5.2.12-1: Definition of type FlatJwsJson

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
payload	string	М	1	This IE shall contain the BASE64URL encoding of the Modifications JSON object (see clause 6.2.5.2.10).
protected	string	С	01	This IE shall be present if there is a JWS Protected Header part of the JOSE header to encode as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [16]. When present, this IE shall contain the BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) encoding of the JWS protected header.
header	object	С	01	This IE shall be present if there is a JWS unprotected header part of the JOSE header to encode as specified in IETF RFC 7515 [16]. This value is represented as an unencoded free form JSON object, rather than as a string. These Header Parameter values are not integrity protected.
signature	string	М	1	This IE shall contain the BASE64URL encoded value of the calculated JWS signature.

6.2.5.2.13 Type: IndexToEncryptedValue

Table 6.2.5.2.13-1: Definition of type IndexToEncryptedHttpHeader

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description	
encBlockIndex	Uinteger	М	1	Index to the value in	
				DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock	

6.2.5.2.14 Type: EncodedHttpHeaderValue

Table 6.2.5.2.14-1: Definition of type EncodedHttpHeaderValue as a list of "mutually exclusive alternatives"

Data type	Cardinality	Description	Applicability
string	1	HTTP header value.	
IndexToEncryptedValue		Index to encrypted HTTP header in the DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBl ock	

6.2.5.2.15 Type: ProblemDetailsMsgForwarding

Table 6.2.5.2.15-1: Definition of type ProblemDetailsMsgForwarding as a list of to be combined data types

Data type	Cardinality	Description	Applicability
ProblemDetails	1		
AdditionInfoMsgForwarding	1		

6.2.5.2.16 Type: AdditionInfoMsgForwarding

Table 6.2.5.2.16-1: Definition of type AdditionInfoMsgForwarding

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
suggestedStatusCode	integer	0	01	When present, this IE shall indicate a status code that is suggested to be sent to cNF if the cSEPP cannot or does not resend the N32-f request taking
				into account the N32-f error information.
suggestedProblemDetails	ProblemDetails	0	01	When present, this IE shall indicate suggested ProblemDetails to be sent to cNF if the cSEPP cannot or does not resend the N32-f request taking into account the N32-f error information.
riErrorInformation	RiErrorInformat ion	0	01	This IE may be included by a RI. When present, this IE shall provide instructions to the SEPP to terminate or re-establish the N32-f connection and/or the N32-f context.

6.2.5.3 Simple data types and enumerations

6.2.5.3.1 Introduction

This clause defines simple data types and enumerations that can be referenced from data structures defined in the previous clauses.

6.2.5.3.2 Simple data types

The simple data types defined in table 6.1.5.3.2-1 shall be supported.

Table 6.2.5.3.2-1: Simple data types

Type Name	Type Definition	Description

6.2.5.3.3 Void

6.2.5.3.4 Void

6.2.6 Error Handling

6.2.6.1 General

HTTP error handling shall be supported as specified in clause 5.2.4 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

6.2.6.2 Protocol Errors

Protocol Error Handling shall be supported as specified in clause 5.2.7.2 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

6.2.6.3 Application Errors

The application errors defined for the JOSE protected message forwarding API on N32-f are listed in Table 6.2.6.3-1.

Table 6.2.6.3-1: Application errors

Application Error	HTTP status code	Description
PLMNID_MISMATCH	403 Forbidden	The PLMN ID in the Bearer token carried in the "Authorization" header of the reconstructed message
SNPNID_MISMATCH	403 Forbidden	does not match the PLMN ID of the N32-f context. The SNPN ID in the Bearer token carried in the "Authorization" header of the reconstructed message does not match the SNPN ID of the N32-f context.
REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED	403 Forbidden	The purpose indicated in 3gpp-Sbi-Interplmn-Purpose header as specified in 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] of the reconstructed message does not match with any of the purposes exchanged via the Security Capability Negotiation procedure.
CONTEXT_NOT_FOUND	403 Forbidden	The n32fContextId is unknown in the receiving SEPP.
UNSPECIFIED	403 Forbidden	The receiving SEPP fails to process the reconstructed message, and the error is reported by N32f error reporting procedure as specified in clause 5.2.5.
POLICY_MISMATCH	403 Forbidden	The encryption policy verification on the received N32-f message has failed, e.g. protected IEs are not ciphered, or unprotected IEs are ciphered.
NO_CONNECTION_DUE_TO_CONTRACT	403 Forbidden	The message failed to be delivered as N32 connection cannot be setup due to contractual reasons.
NO_CONNECTION_DUE_TO_CONNECTIVITY	403 Forbidden	The message failed to be delivered as N32 connection cannot be setup due to a connectivity issue.
MSG_NOT_DELIVERED_DUE_TO_CONTRACT	403 Forbidden	The message was not delivered due to contractual reasons.
INVALID_RI_JWS_SIGNATURE	403 Forbidden	The error reporting request generated by the RI was not delivered because the JWS signature of the RI is invalid.
SWITCHING_TO_ANOTHER_RI	503 Service Unavailable	The message was not delivered due to the service being taken over by another RI, e.g. when the RI is shutting down.
INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES	503 Service Unavailable	The message was not delivered due to resource exhaustion at the RI (e.g., memory, CPU, or network bandwidth).
NETWORK_MAINTENANCE	503 Service Unavailable	The message was not delivered due to network maintenance at the RI.

6.3 Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN_Mapping API

6.3.1 API URI

The Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN_Mapping Service shall use the SEPP Telescopic FQDN Mapping API.

The API URI of the SEPP Telescopic FQDN Mapping API shall be:

{apiRoot}/<apiName>/<apiVersion>

The request URIs used in HTTP requests from the NF service consumer towards the SEPP shall have the Resource URI structure defined in clause 4.4.1 of 3GPP TS 29.501 [5], i.e.:

{apiRoot}/<apiName>/<apiVersion>/<apiSpecificResourceUriPart>

with the following components:

- The {apiRoot} shall be set as described in 3GPP TS 29.501 [5].

- The <apiName> shall be "nsepp-telescopic".
- The <apiVersion> shall be "v1".
- The <apiSpecificResourceUriPart> shall be set as described in clause 6.3.3.

6.3.2 Usage of HTTP

6.3.2.1 General

HTTP/2, as defined in IETF RFC 9113 [7], shall be used as specified in clause 5 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

HTTP/2 shall be transported as specified in clause 5.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

HTTP messages and bodies for the Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN_Mapping service shall comply with the OpenAPI [27] specification contained in Annex A.

6.3.2.2 HTTP standard headers

6.3.2.2.1 General

The HTTP standard headers as specified in clause 4.3.2.2 shall be supported for this API.

6.3.2.2.2 Content type

The following content types shall be supported:

- JSON, as defined in IETF RFC 8259 [9]. The use of the JSON format shall be signalled by the content type "application/json". See also clause 5.4 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].
- The Problem Details JSON Object (IETF RFC 9457 [22]. The use of the Problem Details JSON object in a HTTP response body shall be signalled by the content type "application/problem+json".

6.3.2.3 HTTP custom headers

6.3.2.3.1 General

In this release of this specification, no custom headers specific to the Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN_Mapping service are defined. For 3GPP specific HTTP custom headers used across all service-based interfaces, see clause 5.2.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

6.3.3 Resources

6.3.3.1 Overview




Figure 6.3.3.1-1: Resource URI structure of the nsepp-telescopic API

Table 6.3.3.1-1 provides an overview of the resources and applicable HTTP methods.

Table 6.3.3.1-1: Resources and methods overview

Resource name	Resource URI	HTTP method or custom operation	Description
Mapping	/mapping		Retrieve the mapping between the FQDN in a foreign PLMN and a telescopic FQDN, or viceversa.

6.3.3.2 Resource: Mapping

6.3.3.2.1 Description

This resource represents the mapping between the FQDN of an NF in a foreign PLMN and a telescopic FQDN.

6.3.3.2.2 Resource Definition

Resource URI: {apiRoot}/nsepp-telescopic/<apiVersion>/mapping

This resource shall support the resource URI variables defined in table 6.3.3.2.2-1.

Table 6.3.3.2.2-1: Resource URI variables for this resource

Name	Data type	Definition
apiRoot	string	See clause 6.3.1

6.3.3.2.3 Resource Standard Methods

6.3.3.2.3.1 GET

This method shall support the URI query parameters specified in table 6.3.3.2.3.1-1.

Table 6.3.3.2.3.1-1: URI query parameters supported by the GET method on this resource

Name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description		
foreign-fqdn	Fqdn	0	01	This parameter shall contain the FQDN of the NF in the		
				foreign network, that needs to be flattened to a telescopic		
				FQDN in the local network (i.e. an FQDN that points to the		
				local SEPP).		
telescopic-label	string	0	01	This parameter shall contain the first label used in a		
				telescopic FQDN (i.e. an FQDN that points to the local SEPP)		
				that needs to be mapped to an NF in the foreign network.		
NOTE: The parame	NOTE: The parameters "foreign-fqdn" and "telescopic-label" shall not be present simultaneously.					

This method shall support the request data structures specified in table 6.3.3.2.3.1-2 and the response data structures and response codes specified in table 6.3.3.2.3.1-3.

Table 6.3.3.2.3.1-2: Data structures supported by the GET Request Body on this resource

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
n/a			

Table 6.3.3.2.3.1-3: Data structures supported by the GET Response Body on this resource

Data type	Р	Cardinality	Response codes	Description
TelescopicMappin g	M	1	200 OK	Upon success, a response body containing a TelescopicMapping object shall be returned
ProblemDetails	0	01	404 Not Found	The mapping between a foreign FQDN and a telescopic FQDN could not be found.

6.3.4 Data Model

6.3.4.1 General

This clause specifies the application data model supported by the API.

Table 6.3.4.1-1 specifies the data types defined for the Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN_Mapping service-based interface protocol.

Table 6.3.4.1-1: Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN_Mapping specific Data Types

Data type	Clause defined	Description
TelescopicMapping	6.3.4.2.2	Contains the Telescopic mapping data

Table 6.3.4.1-2 specifies data types re-used by the Nsepp_Telescopic_Mapping service-based interface protocol from other specifications.

Table 6.3.4.1-2: Nsepp_Telescopic_FQDN_Mapping re-used Data Types

Data type	Reference	Comments
Fqdn	3GPP TS 29.571 [12]	
ProblemDetails	3GPP TS 29.571 [12]	Common data type for error responses

6.3.4.2 Structured data types

6.3.4.2.1 Introduction

This clause defines the structures to be used in resource representations.

6.3.4.2.2 Type: TelescopicMapping

Table 6.3.4.2.2-1: Definition of type TelescopicMapping

Attribute name	Data type	Р	Cardinality	Description
telescopicLabel	string	С	01	This parameter shall contain the first label to be used in a telescopic FQDN (i.e. an FQDN that points to the local SEPP) that corresponds to a given NF in the foreign network.
				In a successful response, this parameter shall be included when the query parameter "foreign-fqdn" is present in the request.
seppDomain	Fqdn	С	01	This parameter shall contain the FQDN of the domain of the local SEPP that needs to be appended after the "telescopicLabel" to compose the complete flattened telescopic FQDN. In a successful response, this parameter shall be included when the query parameter "foreign-fqdn" is
foreignFqdn	Fqdn	С	01	present in the request. This parameter shall contain the FQDN of the NF in the foreign network. In a successful response, this parameter shall be included when the query parameter "telescopiclabel" is present in the request.

6.3.4.3 Simple data types and enumerations

6.3.4.3.1 Introduction

This clause defines simple data types and enumerations that can be referenced from data structures defined in the previous clauses.

6.3.4.3.2 Simple data types

The simple data types defined in table 6.3.4.3.2-1 shall be supported.

Table 6.3.4.3.2-1: Simple data types

Type Name	Type Definition	Description

6.3.5 Error Handling

6.3.5.1 General

HTTP error handling shall be supported as specified in clause 5.2.4 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

6.3.5.2 Protocol Errors

Protocol Error Handling shall be supported as specified in clause 5.2.7 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

6.3.5.3 Application Errors

The common application errors defined in the Table 5.2.7.2-1 in 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] may also be used for the Nsepp_Telescopic_Mapping service, and the following application errors listed in Table 6.3.5.3-1 are specific for the Nsepp_Telescopic_Mapping service.

Table 6.3.5.3-1: Application errors

Application Error	HTTP status code	Description

6.3.6 Feature Negotiation

This API does not currently specify any features.

6.3.7 Security

6.3.7.1 General

This API shall be accessed only from NFs in the same PLMN as the SEPP; it shall not be exposed externally to NFs from another PLMN.

7 Usage of HTTP CONNECT for N32-c connection establishment via Roaming Intermediaries

7.1 General

HTTP/2, as defined in IETF RFC 9113 [7], shall be used.

The Transmission Control Protocol as described in IETF RFC 793 [11] shall be used as transport protocol as required by HTTP/2 (see IETF RFC 9113 [7]).

The HTTP CONNECT method shall be used as defined in clause 9.3.6 of IETF RFC 9110 [9] and clause 8.5 of IETF RFC 9113 [7].

The ":authority" pseudo-header field in the HTTP/2 CONNECT request message shall be set to:

":authority" = uri-host [":" port] as specified in clause 8.3.1 of IETF RFC 9113 [7].

The Uri-host shall indicate the FQDN of the p-SEPP.

The HTTP CONNECT request and the 200 OK status response shall not contain any content.

7.2 HTTP standards headers

The HTTP standard headers defined in Table 7.2-1 shall be supported on the interface between the SEPP and RI.

Mandatory to support HTTP standard headers does not mean that all the HTTP requests and responses carry the identified request and response headers respectively. It only means it is mandatory to support the processing of the identified headers in request and response message.

Table 7.2-1: Mandatory to support HTTP response standard headers

Name	Reference	Description	
Via	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header should be inserted by a RI when relaying an HTTP error response (see clause 6.10.8 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]). It may be inserted when relaying other HTTP responses. When inserted by a RI, the received-protocol portion of the header field value should be set to "HTTP/2.0" or "2.0" and the received-by portion of the header field value should be formatted as follows: - "RI- <ri fqdn="">" for a RI</ri>	
Server	IETF RFC 9110 [9]	This header should be inserted by the originator of an HTTP error response (see clause 6.10.8 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4]). It may be inserted otherwise. When inserted by a RI, the pattern of the header should be formatted as follows: - "RI- <ri fqdn="">" for a RI</ri>	
NOTE: The inclusion of the Via and Server header in an HTTP CONNECT error response message enables the receiving SEPP to determine which RI has rejected the request in scenarios with two RIs between the SEPPs.			

7.3 HTTP custom headers

7.3.1 3gpp-Connect-Req-Info

The header enables to convey information in the HTTP CONNECT request to the RI, that may be used by the RI to determine whether to allow the establishment of the N32-c connection and/or for troiuble-shooting.

The encoding of the header follows the ABNF as defined in IETF RFC 9110 [9].

```
Sbí-Connect-Req-Info-Header = "3gpp-Connect-Req-Info:" OWS connect-purpose";" OWS orig-network-id
";" OWS sender-fqdn [";" OWS intended-n32-purposes] *( ";" OWS req-param ) OWS
connect-purpose = "connect-purpose=" OWS connect-purpose-value
connect-purpose-value = "n32c" / token
orig-network-id = "originating-network-id=" OWS 3DIGIT "-" 2*3DIGIT [ "-" 11HEXDIG ]
sender-fqdn = "sender-fqdn=" OWS 4*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." )
intended-n32-purposes = intended-n32-purpose *(";" OWS intended-n32-purpose)
intended-n32-purpose = "intended-n32-purpose=" OWS n32-purpose-value
n32-purpose-value = "ROAMING"
          / "INTER_PLMN_MOBILITY"
           / "SMS_INTERCONNECT"
           / "ROAMING TEST"
           / "INTER_PLMN_MOBILITY_TEST"
           / "SMS_INTERCONNECT_TEST"
           / "SNPN_INTERCONNECT"
           / "SNPN_INTERCONNECT_TEST"
           / "DISASTER_ROAMING"
           / "DISASTER_ROAMING_TEST"
           / "DATA_ANALYTICS_EXCHANGE"
           / "DATA_ANALYTICS_EXCHANGE_TEST"
           / token
req-param = req-param-name "=" OWS req-param-value
reg-param-name = token
req-param-value = token
```

EXAMPLE 1: For an HTTP CONNECT request message from the c-SEPP to the RI-A to request establishing the TCP connection towards the p-SEPP:

3gpp-Connect-Req-Info: connect-purpose=n32c; originating-network-id=123-45;sender-

fqdn = sepp 12.5 gc. mnc 155. mcc 400.3 gpp network; intended-n 32-purpose = ROAMING; intended-32-purpose = ROAMING; inten

purpose=SMS_INTERCONNECT

EXAMPLE 2: For an HTTP CONNECT request message from the RI-A to the RI-B to request establishing the

TCP connection towards p-SEPP:

3gpp-Connect-Req-Info: connect-purpose=n32c;originating-network-id=123-45;sender-

fqdn=ri234.rioperator.com;intended-n32-purpose=ROAMING;intended-n32-

purpose=SMS_INTERCONNECT

7.3.2 3gpp-Connect-Resp-Info

The header enables to convey information in the HTTP CONNECT response towards the c-SEPP.

The encoding of the header follows the ABNF as defined in IETF RFC 9110 [9].

```
Sbi-Connect-Resp-Info-Header = "3gpp-Connect-Resp-Info:" OWS resp-param *( ";" OWS resp-param ) OWS resp-param = allowed-n32-purposes / p-sepp-fqdn / other-resp-param allowed-n32-purposes = allowed-n32-purpose *(";" OWS allowed-n32-purpose) allowed-n32-purpose = "allowed-n32-purpose=" OWS n32-purpose-value p-sepp-fqdn = "p-sepp-fqdn=" OWS 4*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." ) other-resp-param = other-resp-param-name "=" OWS other-resp-param-value other-resp-param-value = token
```

EXAMPLE: 3gpp-Connect-Resp-Info: allowed-n32-purpose=ROAMING;allowed-n32-purpose=SMS_INTERCONNECT;p-sepp-fqdn=sepp2.5gc.mnc203.mcc422.3gppnetwork.org

7.4 Error Handling

7.4.1 General

HTTP/2 connection error and stream error shall be supported as specified in clause 5.4 of IETF RFC 9113 [7].

Upon detecting an error, the RI shall send an 4XX or 5XX error response. The error response should include a ProblemDetails object providing details on the error and including one of the application errors defined in Table 7.4.2-1

7.4.2 Application Errors

The application errors defined for the HTTP CONNECT service are listed in Table 7.4.2-1.

Table 7.4.2-1: Application errors

Application Error	HTTP status	Description
	code	
INVALID_MSG_FORMAT	400 Bad	It is used when the c-SEPP sends an HTTP request
	Request	with an invalid format.
CONTRACTUAL_REASON	403 Forbidden	It is used when the SEPP request does not match with the contract between the SEPP and RI.
INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES	500 Internal	It is used when the RI does not have enough
	Server Error	resources to establish the TCP connection toward the
		destination.
SYSTEM_FAILURE	500 Internal	The request is rejected due to generic error condition
	Server Error	at the RI.
CONNECTIVITY_ISSUE	502 Bad	It is used when the RI cannot establish the
	Gateway	connection towards the destination SEPP due to
		connectivity issue.

Annex A (normative): OpenAPI Specification

A.1 General

This Annex specifies the formal definition of the N32 Handshake API(s) on the N32-c interface. It consists of OpenAPI 3.0.0 specifications, in YAML format.

This Annex takes precedence when being discrepant to other parts of the specification with respect to the encoding of information elements and methods within the API(s).

NOTE: The semantics and procedures, as well as conditions, e.g. for the applicability and allowed combinations of attributes or values, not expressed in the OpenAPI definitions but defined in other parts of the specification also apply.

Informative copies of the OpenAPI specification files contained in this 3GPP Technical Specification are available on a Git-based repository that uses the GitLab software version control system (see 3GPP TS 29.501 [5] clause 5.3.1 and 3GPP TR 21.900 [7] clause 5B).

A.2 N32 Handshake API

```
openapi: 3.0.0
info:
  version: '1.3.1'
  title: 'N32 Handshake API'
  description:
   N32-c Handshake Service.
    © 2024, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
   All rights reserved.
servers:
   url: '{apiRoot}/n32c-handshake/v1'
    variables:
      apiRoot:
        default: https://example.com
        description: apiRoot as defined in clause 4.4 of 3GPP TS 29.501.
externalDocs:
 description: 3GPP TS 29.573 V18.8.0; 5G System; Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) Interconnection;
  url: https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/29_series/29.573/
paths:
  /exchange-capability:
   post:
      summary: Security Capability Negotiation
        - Security Capability Negotiation
      operationId: PostExchangeCapability
      requestBody:
        description: Custom operation for security capability negotiation
       required: true
        content:
          application/json:
            schema:
              $ref: '#/components/schemas/SecNegotiateReqData'
      responses:
        '200':
          description: OK (Successful negitiation of security capabilities)
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/SecNegotiateRspData'
        '307':
          description: redirection
          content:
            application/problem+json:
              schema:
```

```
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ExtRedirectResponse'
      '400':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/400'
      '401':
       $ref:
             'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/401'
      '403':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/403'
      '404':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/404'
      '409':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/409'
      '411':
       $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/411'
      '413':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/413'
      '415':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/415'
      '429':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/429'
      '500':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/500'
      '502':
        $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/502'
       $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.vaml#/components/responses/503'
      default:
       description: Unexpected error
/exchange-params:
 post:
   summary: Parameter Exchange
    tags:
     - Parameter Exchange
   operationId: PostExchangeParams
   requestBody:
     description: Custom operation for parameter exchange
     required: true
     content:
       application/json:
         schema:
           $ref: '#/components/schemas/SecParamExchReqData'
    responses:
      '200':
       description: OK (Successful exchange of parameters)
       content:
         application/json:
           schema:
              $ref: '#/components/schemas/SecParamExchRspData'
      '400':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/400'
      '401':
       $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/401'
      4031:
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/403'
      '404':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/404'
      '409':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/409'
      '411':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/411'
      '413':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/413'
      '415':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/415'
      '429':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/429'
      '500':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/500'
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/502'
      '503':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/503'
     default:
       description: Unexpected error
/n32f-terminate:
 post:
   summary: N32-f Context Terminate
   tags:
      - N32-f Context Terminate
```

```
operationId: PostN32fTerminate
   requestBody:
     description: Custom operation for n32-f context termination
     required: true
     content:
       application/json:
          schema:
           $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32fContextInfo'
    responses:
      '200':
       description: OK (Successful exchange of parameters)
       content:
         application/json:
           schema:
             $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32fContextInfo'
      '400':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/400'
      '401':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/401'
      '403':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/403'
      '404':
        $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/404'
      '411':
       $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.vaml#/components/responses/411'
      '413':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/413'
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/415'
      '429':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/429'
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/500'
      '502':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/502'
      '503':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/503'
      default:
       description: Unexpected error
/n32f-error:
 post:
   summary: N32-f Error Reporting Procedure
      - N32-f Error Report
   operationId: PostN32fError
   requestBody:
     description: Custom operation for n32-f error reporting procedure
     required: true
     content:
       application/json:
         schema:
           $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32fErrorInfo'
   responses:
      12041:
       description: successful error reporting
      '400':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/400'
      '401':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/401'
      '403':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/403'
      '404':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/404'
      '411':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/411'
      '413':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/413'
      '415':
       $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/415'
      '429':
        $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/429'
      '500':
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/500'
      15021:
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/502'
       $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/503'
      default:
```

```
description: Unexpected error
components:
  schemas:
    SecurityCapability:
      description: Enumeration of security capabilities
        - type: string
          enum:
            - TLS
            - PRINS
            - NONE
        - type: string
    ApiSignature:
      description: API URI of the service operation
        - $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Uri'
        - $ref: '#/components/schemas/CallbackName'
    HttpMethod:
      description: Enumeration of HTTP methods
      anyOf:
        - type: string
          enum:
            - GET
- PUT
            - POST
            - DELETE
            - PATCH
            - HEAD
            - OPTIONS
            - CONNECT
            - TRACE
        - type: string
    IeType:
      description: Enumeration of types of IEs (i.e kind of IE) to specify the protection policy
      anyOf:
        - type: string
          enum:
            - UEID
            - LOCATION
            - KEY_MATERIAL
            - AUTHENTICATION_MATERIAL
            - AUTHORIZATION TOKEN
            - RECURSIVE_NON_LEAF
            - OTHER
            - NONSENSITIVE
        - type: string
    IeLocation:
      description: Location of the IE in a HTTP message
      anyOf:
        - type: string
          enum:
            - URI_PARAM
            - HEADER
            - BODY
            - MULTIPART_BINARY
            - URI_PATH
        - type: string
    IeInfo:
      description: Protection and modification policy for the \ensuremath{\text{\textsc{IE}}}
      type: object
      required:
        - ieLoc
        - ieType
      properties:
        ieLoc:
          $ref: '#/components/schemas/IeLocation'
        ieType:
          $ref: '#/components/schemas/IeType'
        reqIe:
          type: string
        rspIe:
          type: string
        isModifiable:
          type: boolean
        isModifiableByIpx:
```

```
type: object
          additionalProperties:
           type: boolean
          minProperties: 1
        ancestorIe:
          type: string
    ApileMapping:
      description: API URI to IE mapping on which the protection policy needs to be applied
      type: object
      required:
        - apiSignature
        - apiMethod
        - IeList
      properties:
        apiSignature:
          $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiSignature'
        apiMethod:
          $ref: '#/components/schemas/HttpMethod'
        IeList:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/IeInfo'
          minItems: 1
# The attribute name does not follow the naming conventions specified in 3GPP TS 29.501. The
attribute name is kept though as defined in the current specification for backward compatibility
    ProtectionPolicy:
      description: The protection policy to be negotiated between the SEPPs
      type: object
      required:
        - apileMappingList
      properties:
        apileMappingList:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApileMapping'
          minItems: 1
        dataTypeEncPolicy:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/IeType'
          minItems: 1
    SecNegotiateReqData:
      description: Defines the security capabilities of a SEPP sent to a receiving SEPP
      type: object
      required:
       - sender
        - supportedSecCapabilityList
      properties:
        sender:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
        n32HandshakeId:
          type: string
          pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16};
        supportedSecCapabilityList:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/SecurityCapability'
          minItems: 1
        3GppSbiTargetApiRootSupported:
          type: boolean
          default: false
# The attribute name does not follow the naming conventions specified in 3GPP TS 29.501. The
attribute name is kept though as defined in the current specification for backward compatibility
reason.
        plmnIdList:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/PlmnId'
          minItems: 1
        snpnIdList:
          type: array
            $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/PlmnIdNid'
          minItems: 1
```

```
targetPlmnId:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/PlmnId'
        targetSnpnId:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/PlmnIdNid'
        intendedUsagePurpose:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/IntendedN32Purpose'
          minItems: 1
        supportedFeatures:
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/SupportedFeatures'
        senderN32fFadn:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
        senderN32fPort:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Uinteger'
    SecNegotiateRspData:
      description: Defines the selected security capabilities by a SEPP
      type: object
      required:
        - sender
        - selectedSecCapability
      properties:
       sender:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
        selectedSecCapability:
          $ref: '#/components/schemas/SecurityCapability'
        n32HandshakeId:
          type: string
          pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}$'
        3GppSbiTargetApiRootSupported:
          type: boolean
          default: false
# The attribute name does not follow the naming conventions specified in 3GPP TS 29.501. The
attribute name is kept though as defined in the current specification for backward compatibility
reason.
       plmnIdList:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/PlmnId'
          minItems: 1
        snpnIdList:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/PlmnIdNid'
          minItems: 1
        allowedUsagePurpose:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/IntendedN32Purpose'
          minItems: 1
        rejectedUsagePurpose:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/IntendedN32Purpose'
          minItems: 1
        supportedFeatures:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/SupportedFeatures'
        senderN32fFqdn:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
        senderN32fPortList:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Uinteger'
          minTtems: 1
    SecParamExchReqData:
      description: Request data structure for parameter exchange
      type: object
      required:
        - n32fContextId
      properties:
       n32fContextId:
          type: string
          pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}$'
        jweCipherSuiteList:
          type: array
          items:
```

```
type: string
     minItems: 1
    jwsCipherSuiteList:
      type: array
      items:
       type: string
     minItems: 1
    protectionPolicyInfo:
      $ref: '#/components/schemas/ProtectionPolicy'
    secProfiles:
     type: array
      items:
        type: string
      minItems: 1
     maxItems: 256
    ipxProviderSecInfoList:
      type: array
      items:
        $ref: '#/components/schemas/IpxProviderSecInfo'
     minItems: 1
    sender:
     $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
SecParamExchRspData:
  description: Response data structure for parameter exchange
  type: object
  required:
    - n32fContextId
 properties:
   n32fContextId:
     type: string
     pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}$'
    selectedJweCipherSuite:
     type: string
    selectedJwsCipherSuite:
     type: string
    selProtectionPolicyInfo:
     $ref: '#/components/schemas/ProtectionPolicy'
    selSecProfiles:
     type: array
     items:
       type: string
     minItems: 1
     maxItems: 256
    ipxProviderSecInfoList:
      type: array
      items:
        $ref: '#/components/schemas/IpxProviderSecInfo'
     minItems: 1
      $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
N32fContextInfo:
  description: N32-f context information
 type: object
 required:
    - n32fContextId
 properties:
   n32fContextId:
     type: string
     pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}$'
CallbackName:
 description: Callback Name
  type: object
 required:
    - callbackType
 properties:
   callbackType:
     type: string
N32fErrorInfo:
  description: N32-f error information
  type: object
 required:
    - n32fMessageId
    - n32fErrorType
 properties:
   n32fMessageId:
     type: string
```

```
n32fErrorType:
      $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32fErrorType'
    n32fContextId:
     type: string
     pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}$'
    failedModificationList:
     type: array
     items:
        $ref: '#/components/schemas/FailedModificationInfo'
     minItems: 1
    errorDetailsList:
      type: array
      items:
        $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32fErrorDetail'
     minItems: 1
   policyMismatchList:
      type: array
      items:
        $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/InvalidParam'
     minItems: 1
    riErrorInformation:
      $ref: '#/components/schemas/RiErrorInformation'
FailedModificationInfo:
  description: Information on N32-f modifications block that failed to process
  type: object
  required:
    - ipxId
    - n32fErrorType
 properties:
    ipxId:
      $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
    n32fErrorType:
      $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32fErrorType'
N32fErrorDetail:
  description: Details about the N32f error
  type: object
 required:
    - attribute
    - msgReconstructFailReason
 properties:
   attribute:
     type: string
    msgReconstructFailReason:
     $ref: '#/components/schemas/FailureReason'
IpxProviderSecInfo:
  description: Defines the security information list of an RI
  type: object
  required:
    - ipxProviderId
 properties:
    ipxProviderId:
      $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
    rawPublicKeyList:
     type: array
     items:
        type: string
     minItems: 1
    certificateList:
     type: array
     items:
        type: string
      minItems: 1
IntendedN32Purpose:
  description: Indicates the intended N32 establishment purpose
  type: object
 required:
    - usagePurpose
 properties:
    usagePurpose:
     $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32Purpose'
    additionalInfo:
     type: string
    cause:
     type: string
RiErrorInformation:
```

```
description: RI error information
  type: object
 properties:
   n32fConnectionRelInd:
      $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32ReleaseIndication'
    n32fContextRelInd:
      $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32ReleaseIndication'
    alternativeRi:
      $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
N32fErrorType:
  description: Type of error while processing N32-f message
  anyOf:
    - type: string
      enum:
       - INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED
        - INTEGRITY_CHECK_ON_MODIFICATIONS_FAILED
       - MODIFICATIONS_INSTRUCTIONS_FAILED
        - DECIPHERING_FAILED
        - MESSAGE_RECONSTRUCTION_FAILED
        - CONTEXT_NOT_FOUND
        - INTEGRITY_KEY_EXPIRED
        - ENCRYPTION_KEY_EXPIRED
        - POLICY_MISMATCH
        - NETWORK_MAINTENANCE
        - INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES
        - NO_CONNECTION_DUE_TO_CONTRACT
        - IDLE_N32F_CONNECTION
        - SWITCHING_TO_ANOTHER_RI
        - NO_CONNECTION_DUE_TO_CONNECTIVITY
    - type: string
FailureReason:
  description: Reason for failure to reconstruct a HTTP/2 message from N32-f message
  anyOf:
     type: string
      enum:
       - INVALID_JSON_POINTER
       - INVALID_INDEX_TO_ENCRYPTED_BLOCK
        - INVALID_HTTP_HEADER
    - type: string
N32Purpose:
  description: Usage purpose of establishing N32 connectivity
  anyOf:
    - type: string
      enum:
       - ROAMING
       - INTER_PLMN_MOBILITY
        - SMS_INTERCONNECT
        - ROAMING_TEST
        - INTER PLMN MOBILITY TEST
        - SMS_INTERCONNECT_TEST
        - SNPN_INTERCONNECT
        - SNPN_INTERCONNECT_TEST
        - DISASTER ROAMING
        - DISASTER_ROAMING_TEST
        - DATA_ANALYTICS_EXCHANGE
        - DATA_ANALYTICS_EXCHANGE_TEST
    - type: string
N32ReleaseIndication:
  description: N32-f connection/context release indication
  anyOf:
    - type: string
      enum:
        - RELEASE_REESTABLISHMENT_ALLOWED
        - RELEASE_REESTABLISHMENT_NOT_ALLOWED
        - REESTABLISH
    - type: string
ExtRedirectResponse:
  description: Extension of the redirection response
  allOf:
     - $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/RedirectResponse'
    - $ref: '#/components/schemas/RedirectResponseAddInfo'
RedirectResponseAddInfo:
```

```
description: Additional information in the redirection response
type: object
properties:
   seppFqdnForDiscovery:
   $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
```

A.3 JOSE Protected Message Forwarding API on N32-f

```
openapi: 3.0.0
info:
  version: '1.3.0'
  title: 'JOSE Protected Message Forwarding API'
  description:
   N32-f Message Forwarding Service.
   © 2024, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
   All rights reserved.
servers:
  - url: '{apiRoot}/n32f-forward/v1'
   variables:
      apiRoot:
        default: https://example.com
        description: apiRoot as defined in clause 4.4 of 3GPP TS 29.501.
externalDocs:
  description: 3GPP TS 29.573 V18.7.0; 5G System; Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) Interconnection;
  url: https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/29_series/29.573/
  /n32f-process:
   post:
      summary: N32-f Message Forwarding
      tags:
       - N32-f Forward
      operationId: PostN32fProcess
      parameters:
        - name: Content-Encoding
         in: header
          description: Content-Encoding, described in IETF RFC 9110
           type: string
        - name: Accept-Encoding
          in: header
          description: Accept-Encoding, described in IETF RFC 9110
           type: string
        - name: 3gpp-Sbi-Message-Priority
          in: header
          description: 3gpp-Sbi-Message-Priority, defined in 3GPP TS 29.500
          schema:
            type: string
      requestBody:
        description: Custom operation N32-f Message Forwarding
        required: true
        content:
          application/json:
            schema:
              $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32fReformattedReqMsg'
      responses:
        '200':
          description: OK (Successful forwarding of reformatted message over N32-f)
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/N32fReformattedRspMsg'
            Accept-Encoding:
              description: Accept-Encoding, described in IETF RFC 9110
              schema:
                type: string
            Content-Encoding:
              description: Content-Encoding, described in IETF RFC 9110
              schema:
                type: string
```

#

```
3gpp-Sbi-Message-Priority:
              description: 3gpp-Sbi-Message-Priority, defined in 3GPP TS 29.500
              schema:
               type: string
        '400':
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/400'
        '401':
         $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/401'
        '403':
         description: Forbidden
         content:
           application/problem+json:
              schema:
               $ref: '#/components/schemas/ProblemDetailsMsgForwarding'
        '404':
         $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.vaml#/components/responses/404'
        '411':
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/411'
        '413':
         $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/413'
        '415':
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/415'
        '429':
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/429'
        '500':
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/500'
        '502':
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/502'
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/503'
        default:
         description: Unexpected error
   options:
      summary: Discover communication options supported by next hop (RI or SEPP)
      operationId: N32fProcessOptions
      tags:
        - N32-f Forward
      responses:
        '204':
         description: No Content
         headers:
           Accept-Encoding:
              description: Accept-Encoding, described in IETF RFC 9110
              schema:
               type: string
        '400':
          $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/400'
        '401':
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/401'
        '403':
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/403'
        '404':
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/404'
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/405'
        '429':
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/429'
        '500':
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/500'
        501:
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/501'
         $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/502'
        15031:
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/503'
        default:
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/default'
components:
 schemas:
# STRUCTURED TYPES
   FlatJweJson:
      description: Contains the integrity protected reformatted block
```

```
type: object
      required:
       - ciphertext
      properties:
       protected:
         type: string
       unprotected:
         type: object
       header:
         type: object
        encrypted_key:
         type: string
\# The attribute name does not follow the naming conventions specified in 3GPP TS 29.501. The
attribute name is kept though as defined in the current specification for backward compatibility
reason.
         type: string
        iv:
         type: string
        ciphertext:
         type: string
        tag:
          type: string
    FlatJwsJson:
      description: Contains the modification from RIs on path
      type: object
      required:
        - payload
        - signature
      properties:
       payload:
         type: string
       protected:
         type: string
        header:
         type: object
        signature:
          type: string
    N32fReformattedReqMsg:
      description: Contains the reformatted HTTP/2 request message
      type: object
      required:
        - reformattedData
      properties:
       reformattedData:
          $ref: '#/components/schemas/FlatJweJson'
        modificationsBlock:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/FlatJwsJson'
          minItems: 1
   N32fReformattedRspMsg:
      description: Contains the reformatted HTTP/2 response message
      type: object
      required:
         - reformattedData
      properties:
       reformattedData:
          $ref: '#/components/schemas/FlatJweJson'
        modificationsBlock:
          type: array
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/FlatJwsJson'
          minItems: 1
    DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock:
      description: HTTP header to be encrypted or the value of a JSON attribute to be encrypted
      type: object
      required:
       - dataToEncrypt
      properties:
       dataToEncrypt:
          type: array
          items: {}
          minItems: 1
```

```
DataToIntegrityProtectBlock:
  description: Data to be integrity protected
  type: object
 properties:
   metaData:
     $ref: '#/components/schemas/MetaData'
    requestLine:
     $ref: '#/components/schemas/RequestLine'
    statusLine:
     type: string
    headers:
      type: array
      items:
        $ref: '#/components/schemas/HttpHeader'
     minItems: 1
   pavload:
      type: array
      items:
        $ref: '#/components/schemas/HttpPayload'
     minItems: 1
RequestLine:
  description: >
   Contains the request line of the HTTP API request being reformatted and forwarded over N32-f
  type: object
 required:
    - method
    - scheme
    - authority
    - path
    - protocolVersion
 properties:
    method:
     $ref: 'TS29573_N32_Handshake.yaml#/components/schemas/HttpMethod'
    scheme:
     \verb| $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml\#/components/schemas/UriScheme'| \\
    authority:
     type: string
    path:
     type: string
   protocolVersion:
     type: string
    queryFragment:
     type: string
    pathQueryProtectInd:
     type: array
      items:
        $ref: 'TS29573_N32_Handshake.yaml#/components/schemas/IeLocation'
     minItems: 1
      maxItems: 2
HttpHeader:
 description: Contains the encoding of HTTP headers in the API request / response
  type: object
 required:
     - header
    - value
 properties:
   header:
     type: string
    value:
     $ref: '#/components/schemas/EncodedHttpHeaderValue'
HttpPayload:
  description: Contains the encoding of JSON content in the API request / response
  type: object
 required:
    - iePath
    - ieValueLocation
    - value
 properties:
    iePath:
     type: string
    ieValueLocation:
     $ref: 'TS29573_N32_Handshake.yaml#/components/schemas/IeLocation'
    value:
     type: object
MetaData:
  description: Contains the meta data information needed for replay protection
  type: object
 required:
```

- n32fContextId

```
- messageId
        - authorizedIpxId
     properties:
        n32fContextId:
         type: string
         pattern: '^[A-Fa-f0-9]{16}$'
       messageId:
         type: string
        authorizedIpxId:
         type: string
        riFadn:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
    Modifications:
     description: Information on inserting of the modifications entry
      type: object
     required:
        - identity
     properties:
       identity:
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
        operations:
          type: array
         items:
            $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/PatchItem'
         minItems: 1
          type: string
    IndexToEncryptedValue:
      description: Index to the encrypted value
      type: object
     required:

    encBlockIndex

     properties:
        encBlockIndex:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Uinteger'
    EncodedHttpHeaderValue:
      description: HTTP header value or index to the HTTP header value
      oneOf:
        - type: string
        - $ref: '#/components/schemas/IndexToEncryptedValue'
    ProblemDetailsMsqForwarding:
      description: N32-f message forwarding Error Detail
      allOf:
        - $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/ProblemDetails'
        - $ref: '#/components/schemas/AdditionInfoMsgForwarding'
    AdditionInfoMsgForwarding:
      description: Problem Details extensions for N32-f message forwarding
     properties:
        suggestedStatusCode:
         type: integer
        {\tt suggestedProblemDetails:}
         $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/ProblemDetails'
        riErrorInformation:
          $ref: 'TS29573_N32_Handshake.yaml#/components/schemas/RiErrorInformation'
# SIMPLE TYPES
 ENUMS
#
```

A.4 SEPP Telescopic FQDN Mapping API

```
openapi: 3.0.0
info:
  version: '1.2.0'
  title: 'SEPP Telescopic FQDN Mapping API'
  description: |
    SEPP Telescopic FQDN Mapping Service.
    © 2024, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
```

```
All rights reserved.
servers:
  - url: '{apiRoot}/nsepp-telescopic/v1'
   variables:
      apiRoot:
        default: https://example.com
       description: apiRoot as defined in clause 4.4 of 3GPP TS 29.501.
 description: 3GPP TS 29.573 V18.7.0; 5G System; Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) Interconnection;
Stage 3
  url: https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/29_series/29.573/
paths:
  /mapping:
   get:
      summary: Maps an FQDN to/from a telescopic FQDN
      operationId: GetTelescopicMapping
      tags:
       - Telescopic Mapping (Document)
      parameters:
         - name: foreign-fqdn
          in: query
          description: FODN of the NF in the foreign PLMN
          schema:
           $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
        - name: telescopic-label
          in: query
          description: Telescopic Label
          schema:
           type: string
      responses:
        '200':
          description: Expected response to a valid request
           application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/TelescopicMapping'
        '400':
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/400'
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/401'
        '403':
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/403'
        '404':
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/404'
        '429':
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/429'
          $ref: 'TS29571 CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/500'
        5021:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/502'
        15031:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/503'
        default:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/responses/default'
components:
  schemas:
#
# STRUCTURED TYPES
#
   TelescopicMapping:
      description: Contains the Telescopic mapping data
      type: object
      properties:
        telescopicLabel:
         type: string
        seppDomain:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
        foreignFqdn:
          $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml#/components/schemas/Fqdn'
# SIMPLE TYPES
```

```
#
# ENUMS
#
```

Annex B (informative): Examples of N32-f Encoding

B.1 General

This Annex provides some example encodings of HTTP/2 request and response messages initiated by NF service consumer / producer when they are reformatted and sent over N32-f

B.2 Input Message Containing No Binary Part

Consider the following example:

"reformattedData":

- Some headers of the input HTTP/2 message need to be integrity protected and ciphered.
- Some content part of the input HTTP/2 message need to be integrity protected and ciphered.
- The input HTTP/2 message has no multipart/related binary content.
- The headers and content that are not required to be integrity protected and ciphered in the input HTTP/2 message need to be only integrity protected.

The N32fReformattedReqMessage for this example looks like

```
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header),
  "unprotected": <non integrity protected shared JOSE headers>,
  "header": <non integrity protected recipient specific JOSE headers>,
  "encrypted_key": BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key),
  "aad": BASE64URL(DataToIntegrityProtectBlock),
  "iv": BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector),
  "ciphertext": BASE64URL(JWE CipherText(DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock),
  "tag": BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag)
The DataToIntegrityProtectBlock for this example looks like
  "metaData":
      "n32fContextId": <the n32fcontext Id of receiving SEPP>,
      "messageId": <Id of the message>,
      "authorizedIpxId": <FQDN of the RI>
  "requestLine":
      "method": <http method of the NF service API>,
      "scheme": <http scheme of the NF service API>,
      "authority": <authority part of the NF service API URI>,
      "path": <path part of the NF service API URI>,
      "protocolVersion": <HTTP protocol version>,
      "queryFragment": <query fragment of the NF service API, if available>
    },
  "headers":
      {
        "header": <name of HTTP header 1>,
        "value": { "headerval": <string carrying value of the header>}
        "header": <name of HTTP header 2>,
        "value": {"encBlockIndex": 1}
  "payload":
    Γ
      {
```

```
"iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 1>,
    "ieValueLocation": "BODY",
    "value": <value of IE>
},
{
    "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 2>,
    "ieValueLocation": "BODY",
    "value": {"encBlockIndex": 2}
}
}
```

The DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock for this example looks like

B.3 Input Message Containing Multipart Binary Part

Consider the following example:

- Some headers of the input HTTP/2 message need to be integrity protected and ciphered.
- Some content part of the input HTTP/2 message need to be integrity protected and ciphered.
- The input HTTP/2 message has two multipart/related binary content out of which one binary content needs to be integrity protected and ciphered while the other is only required to be integrity protected.
- The headers and content that are not required to be integrity protected and ciphered in the input HTTP/2 message need to be only integrity protected.

The N32fReformattedReqMessage for this example looks like

```
"reformattedData": {
  "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header),
  "unprotected": <non integrity protected shared JOSE headers>,
  "header": <non integrity protected recipient specific JOSE headers>,
  "encrypted_key": BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key),
  "aad": BASE64URL(DataToIntegrityProtectBlock),
  "iv": BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector),
  "ciphertext": BASE64URL(JWE CipherText(DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock),
  "tag": BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag)
The DataToIntegrityProtectBlock for this example looks like
  "metaData":
      "n32fContextId": <the n32fcontext Id of receiving SEPP>,
      "messageId": <Id of the message>,
      "authorizedIpxId": <FQDN of the RI>
  "requestLine":
    {
      "method": <http method of the NF service API>,
      "scheme": <http scheme of the NF service API>,
      "authority": <authority part of the NF service API URI>,
      "path": <path part of the NF service API URI>,
      "protocolVersion": <HTTP protocol version>,
      "queryFragment": <query fragment of the NF service API, if available>
  "headers":
    [
        "header": <name of HTTP header 1>,
```

```
"value": { "headerval": <string carrying value of the header>}
        "header": <name of HTTP header 2>,
"value": {"encBlockIndex": 1}
     }
    ],
  "payload":
      {
        "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 1>,
        "ieValueLocation": "BODY",
        "value": <value of IE>
        "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 2 - which is an attribute defined with the RefToBinaryData
type>/contentId,
        "ieValueLocation": "BODY",
        "value": <value of the Content ID>
        "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 2 - which is an attribute defined with the RefToBinaryData
type>/contenttype,
        "ieValueLocation": "MULTIPART_BINARY",
        "value": <value of the Content Type>
        "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 2 - which is an attribute defined with the RefToBinaryData
type>/data,
        "ieValueLocation": "MULTIPART_BINARY",
        "value": <BASE 64 encoded byte array of the binary part>
        "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 3 - which is an attribute defined with the RefToBinaryData
type>/contentId,
        "ieValueLocation": "BODY",
        "value": <value of the Content ID>
        "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 3 - which is an attribute defined with the RefToBinaryData
type>/contenttype,
        "ieValueLocation": "MULTIPART_BINARY",
        "value": <value of the Content Type>
        "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 3 - which is an attribute defined with the RefToBinaryData
type>/data.
        "ieValueLocation": "MULTIPART_BINARY",
        "value": {"encBlockIndex": 2}
      }
    ]
}
```

NOTE: The "iePath" for Content Type or data is a virtual path, which actually refers to the "Content-Type" and "data" in multipart body.

EXAMPLE: If the input HTTP message contains multipart binary part, as:

```
POST /example.com/namf-comm/v1/ue-contexts/{ueContextId}/n1-n2-messages HTTP/2
Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary=----Boundary
Content-Length: xyz
----Boundary
Content-Type: application/json
    "n2InfoContainer": {
      "n2InformationClass": "SM",
      "smInfo": {
        "pduSessionId": 5,
        "n2InfoContent": {
          "ngapleType": "PDU_RES_SETUP_REQ",
          "ngapData": {
            "contentId": "n2msg"
     }
    "pduSessionId": 5
  ----Boundary
Content-Type: application/vnd.3gpp.ngap
Content-Id: n2msg
{ ... N2 Information binary data ...}
   ---Boundary
```

the binary content needs to be integrity protected will be formatted, as:

The DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock for this example looks like

B.4 Input Message Containing Sensitive Information in URI Path and/or URI Query Parameters

Consider the following example:

```
\label{location} $$ POST /nNf-service1/v1/(ueId)/service-operation-1?ue-loc=\{ueLocation\}&query2=\{value\ of\ query\ parameter\ 2\} $$
```

in the above HTTP request,

- One Variable in URI path of the input HTTP/2 message needs to be integrity protected and ciphered, i.e. the UE ID
- One URI query parameter of the input HTTP/2 message needs to be integrity protected and ciphered, i.e. UE location.
- The headers and content in the input HTTP/2 message need to be only integrity protected.

The N32fReformattedReqMessage for this example looks like

```
"reformattedData": {
  "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header),
  "unprotected": <non integrity protected shared JOSE headers>,
  "header": <non integrity protected recipient specific JOSE headers>,
  "encrypted_key": BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key),
  "aad": BASE64URL(DataToIntegrityProtectBlock),
  "iv": BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector),
  "ciphertext": BASE64URL(JWE CipherText(DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock),
  "tag": BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag)
The DataToIntegrityProtectBlock for this example looks like
  "metaData":
    {
      "n32fContextId": <the n32fcontext Id of receiving SEPP>,
      "messageId": <Id of the message>
      "authorizedIpxId": <FQDN of the RI>
    },
  "requestLine":
      "method": <http method of the NF service API>,
      "scheme": <http scheme of the NF service API>,
      "authority": <authority part of the NF service API URI>,
      "path": "/nNf-service1/v1/{"encBlockIndex":1}/service-operation-1",
      "protocolVersion": <HTTP protocol version>
      "queryFragment": "ue-loc={"encBlockIndex":2}&query2={value of query parameter 2}",
      "pathQueryProtectInd": [ "URI_PATH", "URI_PARAM" ]
    },
  "headers":
    [
      {
        "header": <name of HTTP header 1>,
        "value": {"headerval": <string carrying value of the header>}
        "header": <name of HTTP header 2>,
        "value": {"headerval": <string carrying value of the header>}
    1.
  "payload":
    [
        "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 1>,
        "ieValueLocation": "BODY",
        "value": <value of IE>
        "iePath": <JSON Pointer of IE 2>,
        "ieValueLocation": "BODY",
        "value": <value of IE>
    1
}
The DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock for this example looks like
  "dataToEncrypt":
    [
      <value of {ueId}>,
<value of {ueLocation}>
```

}

Annex C (informative): End to end call flows when SEPP is on path

C.1 General

This Annex provides an informative reference for how the end to end call flow works when the NF service consumer and the NF service producer are in different PLMNs and SEPP is involved on path.

The following clauses explain how the HTTP messages are forwarded between NF services in two PLMNs via the SEPP. In these clauses, the following aspects are not shown to avoid cluttering of the figures and procedure:

- Resolution of FQDN into an IP address using DNS. TCP / TLS connection for sending the HTTP/2 messages is initiated towards the IP address obtained from DNS resolution.

When https URI scheme is used, TLS protection between the Network Function and the SEPP may rely on using telescopic FQDN or 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header. See clause 6.1.4.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

C.2 TLS security between SEPPs

C.2.1 When http URI scheme is used

C.2.1.1 General

The following figure shows the end to end call flow between an NF service consumer and a NF service producer in different PLMNs when:

- the SEPP in each PLMN acts as a security proxy;
- the negotiated security policy between the SEPPs is TLS;
- "http" scheme URI is used between the NF service consumer and NF service producer; and
- "http" scheme URI is used for accessing NRF's NF discovery service.

NOTE: There may be one or more RI(s), offering only IP routing serving without content modification or observation of the information, in between the SEPPs.

C.2.1.2 Without TLS protection between NF and SEPP and with TLS security without the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header used over N32f




Figure C.2.1.2-1: End to end call flow when http scheme URI is used and TLS security without the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header used is used between SEPPs

- 1. The SEPP on the NF service consumer side (c-SEPP) and the SEPP on the NF service producer side (p-SEPP) negotiate the security capabilities using the procedure specified in clause 5.2.2. The SEPPs mutually negotiate to use TLS as the security policy.
- 2. A TLS connection is setup between the c-SEPP and the p-SEPP for N32-f forwarding.
- 3. Before the NF service consumer starts using the API of the NF service producer it needs to discover the NF service profile of the producer by querying the NRF. The NF service consumer uses "http" scheme URI to access the Nnrf_NFDiscovery service.
- 4. The NRF on the NF service consumer side (c-NRF) needs to further initiate a discovery request to the NRF on the NF service producer side (p-NRF). The c-NRF is configured to route all HTTP messages with inter PLMN FQDN as the "authority" part of the URI via the c-SEPP. The c-SEPP acts as a HTTP proxy.
- 5. The c-SEPP forwards the NF discovery request within the N32-f TLS tunnel established in step 2.
- 6. The p-SEPP forwards the NF discovery request to the p-NRF.

- 7. The p-NRF sends the NF discovery response. The NF service profile contains service URI with "http" scheme. The FQDN of the NF service is an inter PLMN FQDN.
- 8. The p-SEPP forwards the NF discovery response within TLS tunnel to the c-SEPP.
- 9. The c-SEPP forwards the NF discovery response to c-NRF.
- 10. The c-NRF sends the NF discovery response to NF service consumer.
- 11. The NF service profile received at the NF service consumer contains service URI with "http" scheme. The NF service consumer initiates a HTTP message (as supported by the NF service producer API) using "http" scheme URI. The NF service consumer is configured to route all HTTP messages with inter PLMN FQDN as the "authority" part of the URI via the c-SEPP. The c-SEPP acts as a HTTP proxy.
- 12. The c-SEPP forwards the HTTP service request within the N32-f TLS tunnel established in step 2.
- 13. The p-SEPP forwards the HTTP service request to the NF service producer.
- 14. The NF service producer sends the HTTP service response.
- 15. The p-SEPP forwards the HTTP service response within TLS tunnel to the c-SEPP.
- 16. The c-SEPP forwards the HTTP service response to the NF service consumer.

C.2.1.3 Without TLS protection between NF and SEPP and with TLS security with the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header used over N32f




Figure C.2.1.3-1: End to end call flow when http scheme URI is used and TLS security with the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header used is used between SEPPs

- 1. Same as step 1 of Figure C.2.1.2-1.
- 2. Same as step 3 of Figure C.2.1.2-1
- 3. Same as step 4 of Figure C.2.1.2-1
- 4. The c-SEPP setups a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the p-SEPP FQDN (in the apiRoot of the Request URI) and verifies that the certificate presented by the endpoint of the TLS connection belongs to the authoritative server of the p-SEPP. The c-SEPP is configured with the p-SEPP FQDN.
- 5. The c-SEPP sets the apiRoot in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-SEPP, inserts the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header set to the apiRoot of the p-NRF, and sends the request towards p-SEPP.

- 6. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the p-SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NRF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF discovery service of the p-NRF is "http", the p-SEPP forwards the NF discovery request to the p-NRF.
- 7 to 11. Same as steps 7 to 11 of Figure C.2.1.2-1.
- 12. The c-SEPP sets the apiRoot of the p-SEPP FQDN in the request URI, inserts the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header set to the apiRoot of the p-NF, and sends the request towards p-SEPP.
- 13. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the p-SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF service producer is "http", the p-SEPP forwards the request to the p-NF.

13 to 16. Same as steps 13 to 16 of Figure C.2.1.2-1.

C.2.2 When https URI scheme is used

C.2.2.1 General

The following figures show the end to end call flow between an NF service consumer and a NF service producer in different PLMNs when:

- the SEPP in each PLMN acts as a security proxy;
- the negotiated security policy between the SEPPs is TLS;
- "https" scheme URI is used between the NF service consumer and NF service producer;
- "https" scheme URI is used for accessing NRF's NF discovery service; and
- TLS protection between NF and SEPP relies on using telescopic FQDN or 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header.

C.2.2.2 With TLS protection between NF and SEPP relying on telescopic FQDN, and TLS security without the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header used over N32f




Figure C.2.2.2-1: End to end call flow when https scheme URI is used, telescopic FQDNs are used between NF and SEPP and TLS security without the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between SEPPs

- 1. The SEPP on the NF service consumer side (c-SEPP) and the SEPP on the NF service producer side (p-SEPP) negotiate the security capabilities using the procedure specified in clause 5.2.2. The SEPPs mutually negotiate to use TLS as the security policy.
- 2. A TLS connection is setup between the c-SEPP and the p-SEPP for N32-f forwarding.
- 3. Before the NF service consumer starts using the API of the NF service producer it needs to discover the NF service profile of the producer by querying the NRF. The NF service consumer uses "https" scheme URI to access the Nnrf_NFDiscovery service. This implies that the NF service consumer sets up a TLS connection to the c-NRF and then sends the HTTP request over the TLS connection to the c-NRF.
- 4. The NRF on the NF service consumer side (c-NRF) needs to further initiate a discovery request to the NRF on the NF service producer side (p-NRF). The c-NRF uses "https" scheme URI to access the NF discovery service of the p-NRF. Since "https" requires setup of TLS connection with the p-NRF and it requires that c-NRF has to verify that the certificate presented by the endpoint of the TLS connection belongs to the authoritative server of the p-NRF, a telescopic FQDN with wildcarded certificate scheme mechanism is specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]. The c-NRF is configured with the telescopic FQDN of the p-NRF with the telescopic FQDN having the FQDN of the c-SEPP as the trailing part. The c-NRF sets up a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the telescopic FQDN (i.e. the c-SEPP).
- 5. The c-NRF forwards the NF discovery request in this TLS connection.
- 6. The c-SEPP extracts the NF discovery request from the TLS connection, replaces the telescopic FQDN in the request URI with the FQDN of the p-NRF and sends the request towards p-SEPP in the TLS tunnel setup in step 2. The c-SEPP and the p-SEPP act as a man in the middle proxy in this case.
- 7. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF discovery service of the p-NRF is in the request URI "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the p-NRF.
- 8. The p-SEPP forwards the NF discovery request to the p-NRF.
- 9. The p-NRF sends the NF discovery response within the TLS connection. The NF service profile contains service URI with "https" scheme. The FQDN of the NF service is an inter PLMN FQDN.
- 10. The p-SEPP forwards the NF discovery response within TLS tunnel setup in step 2 to the c-SEPP. The p-SEPP may replace the inter PLMN FQDN of the NF service producer's API endpoint with a label representing that FQDN. The p-SEPP re-maps the label with the NF service producer's API endpoint in step 17.
- 11. The c-SEPP upon receiving the HTTP response message for NF discovery response, within the TLS tunnel in step 2, replaces the trailing part of the inter PLMN FQDN of the NF service producer's API endpoint in the NF service profile with the FQDN of the c-SEPP, to form a telescopic FQDN as specified in clause 28.5.2 of 3GPP TS 23.003 [19]. The c-SEPP may replace the label part of the telescopic FQDN with a label of it's own significance. The p-SEPP re-maps the label in step 16.
- 12. The c-SEPP then forwards the NF discovery response to c-NRF, with the NF service profile containing the telescopic FQDN.
- 13. The c-NRF sends the NF discovery response to NF service consumer.
- 14. The NF service profile received at the NF service consumer contains service URI with "https" scheme. The NF service consumer sets up a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the telescopic FQDN (i.e. c-SEPP) received in step 13.
- 15. The NF service consumer sends the HTTP service request within the TLS connection to the c-SEPP.
- 16. The c-SEPP extracts the HTTP request from the TLS connection, replaces the telescopic FQDN in the request URI the FQDN of the NF service producer and sends the request towards p-SEPP in the TLS tunnel setup in step 2. The c-SEPP and the p-SEPP act as a man in the middle proxy in this case.

- 17. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF service producer in the request URI is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the NF service producer. The p-SEPP also replaces callback URI and link relations within the extracted HTTP message with a telescopic FQDN containing the FQDN of the p-SEPP as the trailing part, as specified in clause 6.1.4.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].
- 18. The p-SEPP forwards the HTTP request to the NF service producer.
- 19. The NF service producer sends the HTTP response within the TLS connection.
- 20. The p-SEPP forwards the HTTP response within TLS tunnel setup in step 2 to the c-SEPP.
- 21. The c-SEPP upon receiving the HTTP response message within the TLS tunnel setup in step 2, forwards the response to the NF service consumer. The c-SEPP replaces callback URI and link relations within the extracted HTTP response message with a telescopic FQDN containing the FQDN of the c-SEPP as the trailing part, as specified in clause 6.1.4.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

C.2.2.3 With TLS protection between NF and SEPP relying on 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header, and TLS security without the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header used over N32f




Figure C.2.2.3-1 End to end call flow when https scheme URI is used, 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between NF and SEPP and TLS security without the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between SEPPs

- 1. Same as step 1 of Figure C.2.2.2-1.
- 2. Same as step 2 of Figure C.2.2.2-1.
- 3. Same as step 3 of Figure C.2.2.2-1
- 4. The NRF on the NF service consumer side (c-NRF) needs to further initiate a discovery request to the NRF on the NF service producer side (p-NRF). The c-NRF uses "https" scheme URI to access the NF discovery service of the p-NRF. The c-NRF setups a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the SEPP FQDN (in the apiRoot of the Request URI) and verifies that the certificate presented by the endpoint of the TLS connection belongs to the authoritative server of the c-SEPP. The c-NRF is configured with the c-SEPP FQDN, or the c-SEPP registered to the c-NRF (including c-SEPP FQDN in its profile).
- 5. The c-NRF forwards the NF discovery request in this TLS connection, including an 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header set to the apiRoot of the p-NRF.
- 6. The c-SEPP extracts the NF discovery request from the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NRF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header and sends the request towards p-SEPP in the TLS tunnel setup in step 2. The c-SEPP and the p-SEPP act as a man in the middle proxy in this case.
- 7. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF discovery service of the p-NRF is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the p-NRF.
- 8. Same as step 8 of Figure C.2.2.2-1
- 9. Same as step 9 of Figure C.2.2.2-1
- 10. Same as step 10 of Figure C.2.2.2-1
- 11, 12. The c-SEPP forwards the NF discovery response to c-NRF.
- 13. Same as step 13 of Figure C.2.2.2-1
- 14. The NF service profile received at the NF service consumer contains service URI with "https" scheme. Since the URI of the p-NF contains an authority of a remote PLMN, the NF service consumer sets up a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the SEPP FQDN (i.e. c-SEPP). The c-NF is configured with the c-SEPP FQDN, or the c-NF discovers the c-SEPP FQDN by querying the c-NRF.
- 15. The NF service consumer sends the HTTP service request within the TLS connection to the c-SEPP, including a 3pp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header set to the apiRoot of the p-NF.
- 16. The c-SEPP extracts the HTTP request from the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NRF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header and sends the request towards p-SEPP in the TLS tunnel setup in step 2. The c-SEPP and the p-SEPP act as a man in the middle proxy in this case.
- 17. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF service producer is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the NF service producer.
- 18. Same as step 18 of Figure C.2.2.2-1
- 19. Same as step 19 of Figure C.2.2.2-1
- 20. Same as step 20 of Figure C.2.2.2-1
- 21. The c-SEPP upon receiving the HTTP response message within the TLS tunnel setup in step 2, forwards the response to the NF service consumer.

C.2.2.4 With TLS protection between NF and SEPP relying on telescopic FQDN, and TLS security with the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header used over N32f




Figure C.2.2.4-1: End to end call flow when https scheme URI is used, telescopic FQDNs are used between NF and SEPP and TLS security with the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between SEPPs

- 1. Same as step 1 of Figure C.2.2.2-1.
- 2. Same as step 3 of Figure C.2.2.2-1.
- 3. Same as step 4 of Figure C.2.2.2-1.
- 4. Same as step 5 of Figure C.2.2.2-1
- 5. The c-SEPP setups a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the p-SEPP FQDN (in the apiRoot of the Request URI) and verifies that the certificate presented by the endpoint of the TLS connection belongs to the authoritative server of the p-SEPP. The c-SEPP is configured with the p-SEPP FQDN.
- 6. The c-SEPP sets the apiRoot in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-SEPP, inserts the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header set to the apiRoot of the p-NRF derived from the telescopic FQDN received in step 4, and sends the request towards p-SEPP.
- 7. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the p-SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NRF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF discovery service of the p-NRF is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the p-NRF.
- 8 to 15. Same as steps 8 to 15 of Figure C.2.2.3-1.
- 16. The c-SEPP extracts the HTTP request from the TLS connection, sets the apiRoot of the p-SEPP FQDN in the request URI, inserts the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header set to the apiRoot of the p-NF derived from the telescopic FQDN received in step 15, and sends the request towards p-SEPP.
- 17. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the p-SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF service producer is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the NF service producer.
- 18 to 21. Same as steps 18 to 21 of Figure C.2.2.2-1

C.2.2.5 With TLS protection between NF and SEPP relying on 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header, and TLS security with the 3gpp-Sbi-TargetapiRoot header used over N32f




Figure C.2.2.5-1: End to end call flow when https scheme URI is used, 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between NF and SEPP and TLS security with the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between SEPPs

- 1. Same as step 1 of Figure C.2.2.3-1.
- 2. Same as step 3 of Figure C.2.2.3-1
- 3. Same as step 4 of Figure C.2.2.3-1
- 4. Same as step 5 of Figure C.2.2.3-1.
- 5. The c-SEPP setups a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the p-SEPP FQDN (in the apiRoot of the Request URI) and verifies that the certificate presented by the endpoint of the TLS connection belongs to the authoritative server of the p-SEPP. The c-SEPP is configured with the p-SEPP FQDN.
- 6. The c-SEPP sets the apiRoot in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-SEPP and sends the request towards p-SEPP including the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header received in step 4.
- 7. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the p-SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NRF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF discovery service of the p-NRF is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the p-NRF.
- 8 to 15. Same as steps 8 to 15 of Figure C.2.2.3-1.
- 16. The c-SEPP extracts the HTTP request from the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the c-SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-SEPP, and sends the request towards p-SEPP including the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header received in step 15.
- 17. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the p-SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF service producer is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the NF service producer.
- 18 to 21. Same as steps 18 to 21 of Figure C.2.2.2-1

C.3 Application Layer Security between SEPPs

C.3.1 When http URI scheme is used

The following figure shows the end to end call flow between an NF service consumer and a NF service producer in different PLMNs when:

- the SEPP in each PLMN acts as a security proxy;
- the negotiated security policy between the SEPPs is "PRINS";
- "http" scheme URI is used between the NF service consumer and NF service producer; and
- "http" scheme URI is used for accessing NRF's NF discovery service.




Figure C.3.1-1 End to end call flow when http scheme URI is used and "PRINS" security is used between SEPPs

- 1. The SEPP on the NF service consumer side (c-SEPP) and the SEPP on the NF service producer side (p-SEPP) negotiate the security capabilities using the procedure specified in clause 5.2.2. The SEPPs mutually negotiate to use "PRINS" as the security policy.
- 2. A TLS connection is setup between the c-SEPP and the p-SEPP for N32-f forwarding. If RIs are deployed between the c-SEPP and p-SEPP, the TLS connection is set up hop by hop with the authoritative server of the next hop.
- 3. Before the NF service consumer starts using the API of the NF service producer it needs to discover the NF service profile of the producer by querying the NRF. The NF service consumer uses "http" scheme URI to access the Nnrf_NFDiscovery service.
- 4. The NRF on the NF service consumer side (c-NRF) needs to further initiate a discovery request to the NRF on the NF service producer side (p-NRF). The c-NRF is configured to route all HTTP messages with inter PLMN FQDN as the "authority" part of the URI via the c-SEPP. The c-SEPP acts as a HTTP proxy.

- 5. The c-SEPP forwards the NF discovery request within the N32-f TLS tunnel established in step 2 and using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively. The apiRoot of the Request URI of the HTTP request shall contain the apiRoot of p-SEPP. The HTTP request shall not contain any 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header.
- 6. The p-SEPP forwards the NF discovery request to the p-NRF.
- 7. The p-NRF sends the NF discovery response. The NF service profile contains service URI with "http" scheme. The FQDN of the NF service is an inter PLMN FQDN.
- 8. The p-SEPP forwards the NF discovery response within TLS tunnel to the c-SEPP using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively.
- 9. The c-SEPP forwards the NF discovery response to c-NRF.
- 10. The c-NRF sends the NF discovery response to NF service consumer.
- 11. The NF service profile received at the NF service consumer contains service URI with "http" scheme. The NF service consumer initiates a HTTP message (as supported by the NF service producer API) using "http" scheme URI. The NF service consumer is configured to route all HTTP messages with inter PLMN FQDN as the "authority" part of the URI via the c-SEPP. The c-SEPP acts as a HTTP proxy.
- 12. The c-SEPP forwards the HTTP service request within the N32-f TLS tunnel established in step 2 and using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively. The apiRoot of the Request URI of the HTTP request shall contain the apiRoot of p-SEPP. The HTTP request shall not contain any 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header.
- 13. The p-SEPP forwards the HTTP service request to the NF service producer.
- 14. The NF service producer sends the HTTP service response.
- 15. The p-SEPP forwards the HTTP service response within TLS tunnel to the c-SEPP using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively.
- 16. The c-SEPP forwards the HTTP service response to the NF service consumer.

C.3.2 When https URI scheme is used

C.3.2.1 General

The following figure shows the end to end call flow between an NF service consumer and a NF service producer in different PLMNs when:

- the SEPP in each PLMN acts as a security proxy;
- the negotiated security policy between the SEPPs is "PRINS";
- "https" scheme URI is used between the NF service consumer and NF service producer; and
- "https" scheme URI is used for accessing NRF's NF discovery service; and
- TLS protection between NF and SEPP relies on using telescopic FQDN or 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header.

When https URI scheme is used, TLS protection between the Network Function and the SEPP may rely on using telescopic FQDN or 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header. See clause 6.1.4.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

C.3.2.2 With TLS protection between NF and SEPP relying on telescopic FQDN




Figure C.3.2.2-1 End to end call flow when https scheme URI is used, telescopic FQDNs are used between NF and SEPP and "PRINS" security is used between SEPPs

- 1. The SEPP on the NF service consumer side (c-SEPP) and the SEPP on the NF service producer side (p-SEPP) negotiate the security capabilities using the procedure specified in clause 5.2.2. The SEPPs mutually negotiate to use "PRINS" as the security policy.
- 2. A TLS connection is setup between the c-SEPP and the p-SEPP for N32-f forwarding. If RIs are deployed between the c-SEPP and p-SEPP, the TLS connection is set up hop by hop with the authoritative server of the next hop.
- 3. Before the NF service consumer starts using the API of the NF service producer it needs to discover the NF service profile of the producer by querying the NRF. The NF service consumer uses "https" scheme URI to access the Nnrf_NFDiscovery service. This implies that the NF service consumer sets up a TLS connection to the c-NRF and then sends the HTTP request over the TLS connection to the c-NRF.
- 4. The NRF on the NF service consumer side (c-NRF) needs to further initiate a discovery request to the NRF on the NF service producer side (p-NRF). The c-NRF uses "https" scheme URI to access the NF discovery service of the p-NRF. Since "https" requires setup of TLS connection with the p-NRF and it requires that c-NRF has to verify that the certificate presented by the endpoint of the TLS connection belngs to the authoritative server of the p-NRF, a telescopic FQDN with wildcarded certificate scheme mechanism is specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]. The c-NRF is configured with the telescopic FQDN of the p-NRF with the telescopic FQDN having the FQDN of the c-SEPP as the trailing part. The c-NRF sets up a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the telescopic FQDN (i.e. the c-SEPP).
- 5. The c-NRF forwards the NF discovery request in this TLS connection.
- 6. The c-SEPP extracts the NF discovery request from the TLS connection, replaces the telescopic FQDN in the request URI with the FQDN of the p-NRF and sends the request towards p-SEPP in the TLS tunnel setup in step 2 and using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively. The apiRoot of the Request URI of the HTTP request shall contain the apiRoot of p-SEPP. The HTTP request shall not contain any 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header. The c-SEPP and the p-SEPP act as a man in the middle proxy in this case.
- 7. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF discovery service of the p-NRF in the request URI is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the p-NRF.
- 8. The p-SEPP forwards the NF discovery request to the p-NRF.
- 9. The p-NRF sends the NF discovery response within the TLS connection. The NF service profile contains service URI with "https" scheme. The FQDN of the NF service is an inter PLMN FQDN.
- 10. The p-SEPP forwards the NF discovery response within TLS tunnel setup in step 2 using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively, to the c-SEPP. The p-SEPP may replace the inter PLMN FQDN of the NF service producer's API endpoint with a label representing that FQDN. The p-SEPP re-maps the label with the NF service producer's API endpoint in step 17.
- 11. The c-SEPP upon receiving the HTTP response message for NF discovery response, within the TLS tunnel in step 2, replaces the trailing part of the inter PLMN FQDN of the NF service producer's API endpoint in the NF service profile with the FQDN of the c-SEPP, to form a telescopic FQDN as specified in clause 28.5.2 of 3GPP TS 23.003 [19]. The c-SEPP may replace the label part of the telescopic FQDN with a label of it's own significance. The p-SEPP re-maps the label in step 16.
- 12. The c-SEPP then forwards the NF discovery response to c-NRF, with the NF service profile containing the telescopic FQDN.
- 13. The c-NRF sends the NF discovery response to NF service consumer.
- 14. The NF service profile received at the NF service consumer contains service URI with "https" scheme. The NF service consumer sets up a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the telescopic FQDN (i.e. the c-SEPP).
- 15. The NF service consumer sends the HTTP service request within the TLS connection to the c-SEPP.

- 16. The c-SEPP extracts the HTTP request from the TLS connection, replaces the the telescopic FQDN in the request URI with the FQDN of the NF service producer and sends the request towards p-SEPP in the TLS tunnel setup in step 2 using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively. The apiRoot of the Request URI of the HTTP request shall contain the apiRoot of p-SEPP. The HTTP request shall not contain any 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header. The c-SEPP and the p-SEPP act as a man in the middle proxy in this case.
- 17. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF service producer in the request URI is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the NF service producer. The p-SEPP also replaces callback URI and link relations within the extracted HTTP message with a telescopic FQDN containing the FQDN of the p-SEPP as the trailing part, as specified in clause 6.1.4.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].
- 18. The p-SEPP forwards the HTTP request to the NF service producer.
- 19. The NF service producer sends the HTTP response within the TLS connection.
- 20. The p-SEPP forwards the HTTP response within TLS tunnel setup in step 2 to the c-SEPP using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively.
- 21. The c-SEPP upon receiving the HTTP response message within the TLS tunnel setup in step 2, forwards the response to the NF service consumer. The c-SEPP replaces callback URI and link relations within the extracted HTTP response message with a telescopic FQDN containing the FQDN of the c-SEPP as the trailing part, as specified in clause 6.1.4.3 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4].

C.3.2.3 With TLS protection between NF and SEPP relying on 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header




Figure C.3.2.3-1 End to end call flow when https scheme URI is used, 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between NF and SEPP and "PRINS" security is used between SEPPs

- 1. Same as step 1 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 2. Same as step 2 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 3. Same as step 3 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 4. The NRF on the NF service consumer side (c-NRF) needs to further initiate a discovery request to the NRF on the NF service producer side (p-NRF). The c-NRF uses "https" scheme URI to access the NF discovery service of the p-NRF. The c-NRF uses "https" scheme URI to access the NF discovery service of the p-NRF. The c-NRF setups a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the SEPP FQDN (in the apiRoot of the Request URI) and verifies that the certificate presented by the endpoint of the TLS connection belongs to the authoritative server of the c-SEPP. The c-NRF is configured with the c-SEPP FQDN, or the c-SEPP registered to the c-NRF (including c-SEPP FQDN in its profile).
- 5. The c-NRF forwards the NF discovery request in this TLS connection, including an 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header set to the apiRoot of the p-NRF.
- 6. The c-SEPP extracts the NF discovery request from the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NRF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header and sends the request towards p-SEPP in the TLS tunnel setup in step 2 and using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively. The apiRoot of the Request URI of the HTTP request shall contain the apiRoot of p-SEPP. The HTTP request shall not contain any 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header. The c-SEPP and the p-SEPP act as a man in the middle proxy in this case.
- 7. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF discovery service of the p-NRF is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the p-NRF.
- 8. Same as step 8 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 9. Same as step 9 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 10. Same as step 10 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 11, 12. The c-SEPP forwards the NF discovery response to c-NRF.
- 13. Same as step 13 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 14. The NF service profile received at the NF service consumer contains service URI with "https" scheme. Since the URI of the p-NF contains an authority of a remote PLMN, the NF service consumer sets up a TLS connection with the authoritative server for the SEPP FQDN (i.e. c-SEPP). The c-NF is configured with the c-SEPP FQDN, or the c-NF discovers the c-SEPP FQDN by querying the c-NRF.
- 15. The NF service consumer sends the HTTP service request within the TLS connection to the c-SEPP, including a 3pp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header set to the apiRoot of the p-NF.
- 16. The c-SEPP extracts the HTTP request from the TLS connection, replaces the apiRoot of the SEPP FQDN in the request URI with the apiRoot of the p-NF received in the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header and sends the request towards p-SEPP in the TLS tunnel setup in step 2 using the JOSE protected message forwarding procedure and API specified in clauses 5.3 and 6.2 respectively. The c-SEPP and the p-SEPP act as a man in the middle proxy in this case. The apiRoot of the Request URI of the HTTP request shall contain the apiRoot of p-SEPP. The HTTP request shall not contain any 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header.
- 17. The p-SEPP extracts the HTTP message received on the TLS connection, and then seeing that the URI scheme of the NF service producer is "https", the p-SEPP sets up a TLS connection with the NF service producer.
- 18. Same as step 18 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 19. Same as step 19 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 20. Same as step 20 of Figure C.3.2.2-1.
- 21. The c-SEPP upon receiving the HTTP response message within the TLS tunnel setup in step 2, forwards the response to the NF service consumer.

Annex D (informative): Withdrawn API versions

D.1 General

This Annex lists withdrawn API versions of the APIs defined in the present specification. 3GPP TS 29.501 [5] clause 4.3.1.6 describes the withdrawal of API versions.

D.2 N32 Handshake API

The API versions listed in table D.2-1 are withdrawn for the N32 Handshake API.

Table D.2-1: Withdrawn API versions of the N32 Handshake API service

API version number	Reason for withdrawal
1.0.0	A backward incompatible change has been introduced in v1.0.1 to align with related stage
	2 specifications. Indeed, the term "ALS" has been replaced by "PRINS" during the
	handshake procedure. As a consequence, the v1.0.0 must not be used in the field in order
	to avoid interoperability problem between roaming partners.

Annex E (Normative): ABNF grammar for HTTP custom headers

E.1 General

This Annex contains a self-contained set of ABNF rules, comprising the re-used rules from IETF RFCs, and the rules defined by the 3GPP custom headers defined in this specification (see clause 7.3).

This grammar may be used as input to existing tools to help implementations to parse 3GPP custom headers.

E.2 ABNF definitions (Filename:"TS29573_CustomHeaders.abnf")

```
RFC 5234
HTAB = %x09; horizontal tab
     = %x20
DIGIT = %x30-39; 0-9
ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z
HEXDIG = DIGIT / "A" / "B" / "C" / "D" / "E" / "F"
 RFC 9110
OWS = *(SP/HTAB)
tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "." / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." / "." / "." / "." / DIGIT / ALPHA
token = 1*tchar
  3GPP TS 29.573
   Version: 18.7.0 (June 2024)
   (c) 2024, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC).
; Header: 3gpp-Connect-Req-Info
Sbi-Connect-Req-Info-Header = "3gpp-Connect-Req-Info:" OWS connect-purpose ";" OWS
                              orig-network-id ";" OWS sender-fqdn [ ";" OWS intended-n32-purposes ]
                               *( "; " OWS req-param ) OWS
connect-purpose
                            = "connect-purpose=" OWS connect-purpose-value
connect-purpose-value
                            = "n32c" / token
                            = "originating-network-id=" OWS 3DIGIT "-" 2*3DIGIT [ "-" 11HEXDIG ]
orig-network-id
                            = "sender-fqdn=" OWS 4*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." )
sender-fødn
                            = intended-n32-purpose *( ";" OWS intended-n32-purpose )
intended-n32-purposes
```

```
= "intended-n32-purpose=" OWS n32-purpose-value
intended-n32-purpose
n32-purpose-value
                           = "ROAMING"
                           / "INTER_PLMN_MOBILITY"
                           / "SMS_INTERCONNECT"
                           / "ROAMING_TEST"
                           / "INTER_PLMN_MOBILITY_TEST"
                            / "SMS_INTERCONNECT_TEST"
                            / "SNPN_INTERCONNECT"
                           / "SNPN_INTERCONNECT_TEST"
                           / "DISASTER_ROAMING"
                           / "DISASTER_ROAMING_TEST"
           / "DATA_ANALYTICS_EXCHANGE"
           / "DATA_ANALYTICS_EXCHANGE_TEST"
                           / token
req-param
                           = req-param-name "=" OWS req-param-value
                           = token
req-param-name
req-param-value
                           = token
; Header: 3gpp-Connect-Resp-Info
Sbi-Connect-Resp-Info-Header = "3gpp-Connect-Resp-Info:" OWS resp-param *( ";" OWS resp-param ) OWS
                            = allowed-n32-purposes / p-sepp-fqdn / other-resp-param
resp-param
allowed-n32-purposes
                           = allowed-n32-purpose *( ";" OWS allowed-n32-purpose)
                            = "allowed-n32-purpose=" OWS n32-purpose-value
allowed-n32-purpose
                            = "p-sepp-fqdn=" OWS 4*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." )
p-sepp-fqdn
other-resp-param
                            = other-resp-param-name "=" OWS other-resp-param-value
other-resp-param-name
                            = token
other-resp-param-value
                            = token
; Header: 3gpp-Sbi-N32-Handshake-Id
Sbi-N32-Handshake-Id-Header = "3gpp-Sbi-N32-Handshake-Id:" OWS n32HandshakeId OWS
n32HandshakeId
                          = 16HEXDIG
```

Annex F (Informative): Examples of encoding of N32-c protection policies

F.1 General

This clause provides examples of how protection policies are encoded in N32-c signaling.

F.2 Protection policies for an API with a schema without recursive non-leaf IEs

This clause provides an example of how to encode the IeList attribute in the protection policy for an API schema not using recursive data types.

For an API with the following example schema where the payload of a request or response is defined with one attribute x defined as an object X:

```
Payload:
{
    x: X
}

X:
{
    x1: integer
    x2: string
    x3: Z
}

Z:
{
    z1: string
    z2: integer
}
```

The ApiIeMapping IE in the protection policy contains the following entries in the IeList array:

```
{
  "ieLoc":"BODY"
  "ieType":"UEID"
  "reqIe": "x/x1"
  "isModifiable": true
}

{
  "ieLoc":"BODY"
  "ieType":"OTHER"
  "reqIe": "x/x2"
  "isModifiable": false
}

{
  "ieLoc":"BODY"
  "ieType":"OTHER"
  "reqIe": "x/x3/z1"
  "isModifiable": true
}

{
  "ieLoc":"BODY"
  "ieType":"OTHER"
  "reqIe": "x/x3/z2"
  "ieLoc":"BODY"
  "ieType":"OTHER"
  "reqIe": "x/x3/z2"
  "ieLoc":"BODY"
  "ieType":"OTHER"
  "reqIe": "x/x3/z2"
  "isModifiable": false
}
```

F.3 Protection policies for an API with a schema with recursive non-leaf IEs

This clause provides an example of how to encode the IeList attribute in the protection policy for an API schema using recursive data types.

Example 1: For an API with the following example schema where the payload of a request or response is defined with one attribute x defined as an object X and where the attribute x3 of the object X is also defined as an object X, i.e. where x3 is a recursive non-leaf IE:

```
Payload:
{
    x: X
}

X:
{
    x1: integer
    x2: string
    x3: X
}
```

The ApileMapping IE in the protection policy contains the following entries in the IeList array:

```
{
  "ieLoc":"BODY"
  "ieType":"UEID"
  "reqIe": "x/x1"
  "isModifiable": true
}

{
  "ieLoc":"BODY"
  "ieType":"OTHER"
  "reqIe": "x/x2"
  "isModifiable": false
}

{
  "ieLoc":"BODY"
  "ieType":"RECURSIVE_NON_LEAF"
  "reqIe": "x/x3"
  "isModifiable": true
  "ancestorIe": "x"
}
```

The attribute x/x3 is defined as modifiable since the x1 attribute of the data type X is defined as modifiable.

Example 2: For an API with the following example schema where the payload of a request or response is defined with one attribute x defined as an object X and where the attribute y3 of the object Y is also defined as an object X (Recursively occurring at a lower level), i.e. where y3 is a recursive non-leaf IE:

```
Payload:
{
    x: X
}

X:
{
    x1: integer
    x2: string
    x3: Y
}
```

```
Y:
{
    y1: integer
    y2: string
    y3: X
```

The ApiIeMapping IE in the protection policy contains the following entries in the IeList array:

```
"ieLoc": "BODY"
  "ieType":"UEID"
"reqIe": "x/x1"
  "isModifiable": true
  "ieLoc": "BODY"
  "ieType":"OTHER"
"reqIe": "x/x2"
  "isModifiable": false
{
  "ieLoc": "BODY"
  "ieType": "LOCATION"
"reqIe": "x/x3/y1"
  "isModifiable": false
  "ieLoc": "BODY"
  "ieType": "KEY_MATERIAL
"reqIe": "x/x3/y2"
  "isModifiable": false
  "ieLoc": "BODY"
  "ieType": "RECURSIVE_NON_LEAF"
"reqIe": "x/x3/y3"
  "isModifiable": true
  "ancestorIe": "x"
```

The attribute x/x3/y3 is defined as modifiable since the x1 attribute of the data type X is defined as modifiable.

Annex G (informative): Change history

Date	Meeting	TDoc	CR	Rev	Cat	Change history Subject/Comment	New
Duto	linooning		0.1		Jui		version
2018-07	CT4#85bi s	C4-185523				TS Skeleton, Scope, General Description and N32 Procedures. Implementation of C4-185531, C4-185353, C4-185352, C4-185469	0.1.0
2018-08	CT4#86	C4-186630				Implementations of PCRs agreed in CT4#86 - C4-186157, C4-186421, C4-186422, C4-186423, C4-186425 and C4-186599	0.2.0
2018-09	CT#81	CP-182082				Presented for information and approval	1.0.0
2018-09	CT#81	CP-182233				Approved in CT#81	15.0.0
2018-12	CT#82	CP-183026	0001	1	F	Resolve the editor's note on HTTP/2 connection management	15.1.0
2018-12	CT#82	CP-183026	0002	1		Clarification to N32-f Forwarding Procedure	15.1.0
2018-12	CT#82	CP-183026	0003	2		N32-f Error Reporting	15.1.0
2018-12	CT#82	CP-183026	0004	2		Resolve editor's notes on identification of notifications	15.1.0
2018-12	CT#82	CP-183026	0005	2		Resolve Editor's Notes on RequestId and NextHopId	15.1.0
2018-12 2018-12	CT#82 CT#82	CP-183026 CP-183026	0006	1		General Cleanup OpenAPI for N32 Handshake API	15.1.0 15.1.0
2018-12	CT#82	CP-183196	0007	2		OpenAPI for JOSE Protected Message Forwarding API on N32-f	15.1.0
2018-12	CT#82	CP-183026	0000	1		Cardinality	15.1.0
2018-12	CT#82	CP-183026	0010	-	F	Error Handling Clauses	15.1.0
2019-06	CT#84	CP-191043	0011	4		PLMN ID verification at receiving SEPP	15.2.0
2019-06	CT#84	CP-191043	0012	1		Informative Annex on End to End Call Flow via SEPP	15.2.0
2019-06	CT#84	CP-191043		2		Storage of OpenAPI specification files	15.2.0
2019-06	CT#84	CP-191043	0014		F	New name for Application Layer Security protocol	15.2.0
2019-06	CT#84	CP-191043	0015	1	F	Copyright Note in YAML file	15.2.0
2019-06	CT#84	CP-191043	0016		F	3GPP TS 29.573 API version update	15.2.0
2019-09	CT#85	CP-192114	0017		F	ALS renaming to PRINS	15.3.0
2019-09	CT#85	CP-192114	0019	1		Add an Annex to Withdrawn N32 Handshake API v1.0.0	15.3.0
2019-09	CT#85	CP-192123		1		Telescopic FQDN Mapping Service	16.0.0
2019-09	CT#85	CP-192080	0020	2		Exchange IPX security information lists	16.0.0
2019-09	CT#85	CP-192123	0021		F	SecurityNegotiateReqData in the Security Capability Negotiation	16.0.0
2019-09	CT#85	CP-192120	0023		F	3GPP TS 29.573 API Version Update	16.0.0
2019-10	CT#06	CP-193063	0024		F	Corrupted references fixed Certificate and Public key Encoding	16.0.1
2019-12 2019-12	CT#86 CT#86	CP-193063 CP-193044	0024		F	3GPP TS 29.573 API version update	16.1.0 16.1.0
2020-03	CT#87	CP-193044 CP-200039	0020	2		Add Corresponding API descriptions in clause 5.1	16.1.0
2020-03	CT#87	CP-200016	0027	3		Inter-PLMN communication using 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot	16.2.0
2020-03	CT#87	CP-200047	0030	2		Corrections to N32 procedures for PRINS (PRotocol for N32	16.2.0
2020 00	00.	0. 2000	0000	_		INterconnect Security)	10.2.0
2020-03	CT#87	CP-200039	0031	2	D	Editorial corrections	16.2.0
2020-03	CT#87	CP-200039	0032	1		Correction - formatting consistency	16.2.0
2020-03	CT#87	CP-200140	0033	3		29573 CR optionality of ProblemDetails	16.2.0
2020-03	CT#87	CP-200052	0035		F	3GPP TS 29.573 Rel16 API External doc update	16.2.0
2020-07	CT#88	CP-201061	0036		F	Storage of YAML files in ETSI Forge	16.3.0
2020-07	CT#88	CP-201061	0037	1		Data type column in Resource URI variables Table	16.3.0
2020-07	CT#88	CP-201061		1			16.3.0
2020-07 2020-09	CT#88 CT#89	CP-201327 CP-202110	0039	1		29.573 Rel-16 API version and External doc update N32f Error Type	16.3.0 16.4.0
2020-09	CT#89	CP-202110		1		TLS security with the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header on N32f	16.4.0
2020-09	CT#89	CP-202119	0041		F	Corrections to PRINS call flows	16.4.0
2020-09	CT#89	CP-202023	0044	3		Error handling of mismatch of polices at SEPP	16.4.0
2020-09	CT#89	CP-202043		2		Correction of flow description	16.4.0
2020-09	CT#89	CP-202096	0047		F	29.573 Rel-16 API version and External doc update	16.4.0
2020-12	CT#90	CP-203048	0049	3		PLMN ID handling over N32	16.5.0
2020-12	CT#90	CP-203048	0050	2		N32-f payload compression	16.5.0
2020-12	CT#90	CP-203037	0051		F	Update of the metaData	16.5.0
2020-12	CT#90	CP-203037	0052	2		Exchange of the modification policy	16.5.0
2020-12	CT#90	CP-203035	0053		F	Storage of YAML files in 3GPP Forge	16.5.0
2020-12	CT#90	CP-203037	0054	2		Update the description of leType	16.5.0
2020-12	CT#90	CP-203036	0055		F	Rel-16 API version and External doc update	16.5.0
2021-03	CT#91-e	CP-210062	0058		F	dataToEncrypt encoding in DataToIntegrityProtectAndCipherBlock	16.6.0
2021-03	CT#91-e	CP-210058	0059	1		Error handling for encBlockIndex	16.6.0
2021-03 2021-03	CT#91-e CT#91-e	CP-210054 CP-210034	0062 0060	1	F	29.573 Rel-16 API version and External doc update OpenAPI Reference	16.6.0 17.0.0
2021-06	CT#91-e	CP-211081	0064	2		Annex C.2.2.2 & C.3.2.2 correction of Telescopic FQDN handling in call flow over N32	17.1.0
2021-06	CT#92-e	CP-211028	0065		F	Data Types Descriptions	17.1.0
2021-06	CT#92-e	CP-211028	0066	1		Discover the SEPP via NRF	17.1.0
2021-06	CT#92-e	CP-211051	0068	2		Clarification to N32 protocol stack	17.1.0
2021-06	CT#92-e	CP-211050	0069	_	F	29.573 Rel-17 API version and External doc update	17.1.0
2021-09	CT#93-e	CP-212076	0071	3		Correction on Parameter Exchange procedure	17.2.0
2021-09	CT#93-e	CP-212076	0073	1		Via and server header	17.2.0

2021-09 CTM98-0 CP-220025 0089							T	
2022-03 CT#95-6 CP-220025 0966 F Adding Missing theble	2021-09	CT#93-e	CP-212082	0078	1	<u> </u>	Essential Correction in TLS for N32-f	17.2.0
2022-03 CT895- CP-220032 00976 2 5 Adding Missing table 17.4.0 17.4.0 2022-03 CT895- CP-220080 0076 2 A SEPP cynthetic spenarios 17.4.0 2022-03 CT895- CP-220080 0076 2 A PLMN Specific N32-C connection 17.4.0 2022-03 CT895- CP-220080 0076 2 A PLMN Specific N32-C connection 17.4.0 2022-03 CT895- CP-220080 0076 2 A PLMN Specific N32-C connection 17.4.0 2022-03 CT896 CP-221027 0092- F Description of n32*Contextidid 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221028 0093 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221028 0094 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221028 0094 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221028 0094 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221028 0095 F Informative note for attributes not complying with 29.501 naming 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221028 0096 T F Reuse of type Fight from 29.571 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221028 0098 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221029 0010 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221029 0101 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221029 0101 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221029 0101 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221029 0101 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221029 0101 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221029 0101 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221029 0101 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221029 0101 F Contract the name of Authenticate/Slock 17.5.0 2								
2022-03 CTP86+ CP-220080 0098 1 A SEPP for interconnect scenarios 17.4.0 2022-03 CTP86+ CP-220080 0097 2 A P.LMN Specific N32-C connection 17.4.0 2022-03 CTP86+ CP-220080 0075 2 A P.LMN Specific N32-C connection 17.4.0 2022-06 CTP86 CP-220080 0090 F 2 8.573 Rel-17 API version and External doc update 17.4.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-220080 0093 1 F 2 8.573 Rel-17 API version and External doc update 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221027 0095 1 F N.525 Front Report 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221028 0096 1 F N.525 Front Report 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221028 0096 1 F CONTEXT NOT FOUND error report in N32c 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221038 0096 1 F CONTEXT NOT FOUND error report in N32c 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0098 1 F CONTEXT NOT FOUND error report in N32c 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0098 1 F CONTEXT NOT FOUND error report in N32c 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0098 1 F CONTEXT NOT FOUND error report in N32c 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0098 1 F CONTEXT NOT FOUND error report in N32c 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0098 1 F CONTEXT NOT FOUND error report in N32c 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0098 1 F CONTEXT NOT FOUND error report in N32c 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0103 2 A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0103 2 A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0107 A AME Almentacian tag 17.5.0 2022-06 CT896 CP-221036 0107 A AME Almentacian tag 17.5.0 2022-07 CT897 CP-222036 0107 A AME Almentacian tag 17.5.0 2022-09 CT897 CP-222036 0107 A AME Almentacian tag 17.5.0 2022-09 CT897 CP-222036 0107 A AME Almentacian tag 17.5.0 2022-09 CT897 CP-222036 0107 A AME Almentacian tag 17.5.0 2022-09 CT897 CP-222036 0107 A AME Almentacian tag 17.5.0 2					2			17.4.0
2022-03 CT#96+ CP-220080 0098 1 A SEPP for interconnect scenarios 17.4.0 2022-03 CT#96+ CP-220080 0097 2 A PLMN Specific N32-C connection 17.4.0 2022-03 CT#96+ CP-220080 0090 F 29.573 Rel-17 API version and External doc update 17.4.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0093 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0094 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0094 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0094 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0095 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0096 1 F Releve of type Fadh from 29.571 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0096 1 F Releve of type Fadh from 29.571 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0098 1 F Contrest the name of Authenticated Block 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221029 00101 F Informative note for attributes not complying with 29.501 naming 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221089 0103 2 A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221089 0103 2 A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221089 0103 2 A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221089 0107 A JWE Authentication tag 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-222089 0108 B S MS over RSY CRESS						F	Adding Missing table	17.4.0
2022-03 CT#96+ CP-220080 0098 1 A SEPP for interconnect scenarios 17.4.0 2022-03 CT#96+ CP-220080 0097 2 A PLMN Specific N32-C connection 17.4.0 2022-03 CT#96+ CP-220080 0090 F 29.573 Rel-17 API version and External doc update 17.4.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0093 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0094 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0094 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0094 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0095 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0096 1 F Releve of type Fadh from 29.571 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0096 1 F Releve of type Fadh from 29.571 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221028 0098 1 F Contrest the name of Authenticated Block 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221029 00101 F Informative note for attributes not complying with 29.501 naming 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221089 0103 2 A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221089 0103 2 A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221089 0103 2 A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-221089 0107 A JWE Authentication tag 17.5.0 2022-06 CT#96 CP-222089 0108 B S MS over RSY CRESS	2022-03	CT#95-e	CP-220032	0079	2	В	SEPP capability negotation	17.4.0
2022-06 CT#96 CP-22008 OB94 F 29.573 Rel-17 API version and External doc update 17.6.0	2022-03	CT#95-e	CP-220080	8800	1	Α	SEPP for interconnect scenarios	17.4.0
2022-08 CF996 CP-22006 O909 F 20.573 Rel.17 API version and External doc update	2022-03	CT#95-e	CP-220080	0075	2	Α	PLMN Specific N32-C connection	17.4.0
2022-06 CT#96 CP-21027 O092 F Description of n2t/Contexted 17.5.0						F		
2022-06 CT1996 CP-221028 0093 1 F Error response of JOSE Protected Forwarding 17.5.0								17.5.0
2022-06 CT996 CP-221028 094					1			
2022-06 CT#96 CP-221027 095 F Informative note for attributes not complying with 29.501 naming 17.5.0								
Conventions					- '			
2022-06 CT196 P-221028 0966 1 F CONTEXT NOT FOUND error report in N32c 17.5.0	2022-00	C1#96	CF-221021	0095		Г		17.5.0
2022-06 CT96 CP-221028 0097 1 F Reuse of type Fqdn from 29.571 17.5.0 2022-08 CT96 CP-221039 0099 F Correct the name of AuthenticatedBlock 17.5.0 2022-08 CT96 CP-221029 0109 F Correct the name of AuthenticatedBlock 17.5.0 2022-06 CT96 CP-221069 0103 Z A Message with SNPN 17.5.0 2022-06 CT96 CP-221069 0103 Z A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT96 CP-221069 0103 Z A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0 2022-06 CT96 CP-221069 0109 F Rel-17 API version and External doc update 17.5.0 2022-09 CT99-16 CP-220051 0116 T F Correction on applying modification policies 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-6 CP-220051 0116 T F Correction on applying modification policies 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-6 CP-220052 0115 T F Correction on applying modification policies 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-6 CP-220052 0112 3 F Adding the SBI Message Priority to N32 Message header 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-6 CP-220052 0112 3 F Adding the SBI Message Priority to N32 Message header 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-6 CP-220052 0112 3 F Adding the SBI Message Priority to N32 Message header 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-6 CP-220052 0112 3 F Adding the SBI Message Priority to N32 Message header 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-7 CP-222025 0112 3 F Adding the SBI Message Priority to N32 Message header 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-7 CP-222025 0112 3 F Adding the SBI Message Priority to N32 Message header 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-7 CP-222025 0112 3 F Adding the SBI Message Priority to N32 Message header 17.6.0 2022-09 CT99-7 CP-223028 0112 1 F Missing mandatory status codes in OpenAPI 18.0 2022-10 CT99-8 CP-230083 0125 1 A Source SNPN ID verification and External doe update 18.0 2023-03 CT999 CP-230093 0126 2 B Redirection support for N32-c connection 18.2 2023-03 CT999 CP-230093 0156 5 F 2	2022.06	CT#06	CD 224020	0006	- 1	_		17 5 0
2022-06 CT196 CP-221036 0098 B N32 usage with SNPN 17.5.0								
2022-06 CT#96 CP-221029 0099 F Correct the name of AuthenticatedBlock CP-221089 CT#96 CP-221089 0103 Z A Message Containing Multipart Binary 17.5.0					1			
2022-06 CT#96 CP-221029 0101 F Informative note for attributes not complying with 29.501 naming 17.5.0								
Conventions							Correct the name of AuthenticatedBlock	
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<u>CF-240033</u> 0173 B Intermediary	2024-03	C1#103	CD 040055	0470		Г		18.6.0
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2024-03	CT#103	00 040040	0.470	_	_	N32-c connection establishment to support roaming intermediaries	18.6.0
	07	<u>CP-240</u> 240	0170	2	В	for 5GS roaming	10.00
2024-03	CT#103	00 0100-			_	N32-c connection establishment rejection by Roaming	18.6.0
000100	07	<u>CP-240055</u>	0171	1	В	Intermediaries	10.00
2024-03	CT#103	00 040055	0.470		_	N32-f message format for RI originated messages and related data	18.6.0
000100	07	<u>CP-240055</u>	0172	1	В	types	10.00
2024-03	CT#103	00 040055	0.470		_	Error Handling for Roaming Intermediary Generated N32-f Related	18.6.0
0004.00	OT#400	<u>CP-240055</u>	0179	1	В	Error Request	40.00
2024-03	CT#103	00 040055	0405		_	Applicative request message originated by roaming intermediary	18.6.0
0004.00	OT#400	CP-240055	0165	2	В	over N32-f	40.00
2024-03	CT#103	CP-240056	0181		<u>F</u>	29.573 Rel-18 API version and External doc update	18.6.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241028	0187		F	ABNF corrections	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	00 044004			_	EN on handling the applicative errors for termination of session and	18.7.0
		CP-241051	0182		F	deregistration of the UE by RI	
2024-06	CT#104	00 044054	0.4.00		_	EN on the clash of the message ID created by the RI and any	18.7.0
222122	07	CP-241051	0183	1	F	messages initiated by the c-SEPP	10 = 0
2024-06	CT#104	00 044054	0404		_	N32-f connection and/or N32-f context termination initiated by	18.7.0
	07	CP-241051	0184	4	<u>F</u>	Roaming Intermediary	
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241051	0186	2	<u></u>	Support of Modified PRINS in earlier releases	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241051	0188		<u>F</u>	Correcting the figure heading	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241051	0189		<u></u>	Corrections on modificationsBlock	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241051	0190	1	F	Modification on the definition of Roaming Hub	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241051	0191	1	F	Replacing IPX with Roaming Intermediary	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241051	0192	1	F	Clarification on the usage of N32-f message ID	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241050	0194		F	Feature negotiation correction	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241050	0195	1	F	Replacing Roaming Intermediary with RI	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104					Description of N32Purpose, ProblemDetailsMsgForwarding and	18.7.0
		CP-241050	0196	1	F	AdditionInfoMsgForwarding	
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241050	0197	4	F	N32-c and N32-f Correlation	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241041	0199	3	В	Exchanging data or analytics between PLMNs	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241050	0202		F	Correct table references	18.7.0
2024-06	CT#104	CP-241052	0204		F	29.573 Rel-18 API version and External doc update	18.7.0
2024-09	CT#105					Indication on support of senderN32fFqdn and	18.8.0
		CP-242039	0206	2	F	senderN32fPortList/senderN32fport	
2024-09	CT#105	CP-242039	0208	2	F	HTTP redirection for multiple SEPPs per PLMN	18.8.0
2024-09	CT#105	CP-242053	0210	1	F	Protection policy for recursive non-leaf IE	18.8.0
2024-09	CT#105	CP-242054	0214		F	29.573 Rel-18 API version and External doc update	18.8.0

History

Document history							
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V18.8.0	September 2024	Publication					